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Abstract
The concept of revenue neutral environmental tax reform has been around since the early
1970's when the concept of taxing an economic 'bad', e.g., pollution, and using the revenue
raised to reduce distortionary taxation was postulated by Sandmo (1973). The basic
premise is that such tax reform has a two-fold benefit - a double dividend. The first
dividend comes from the impact of the environmental tax on the externality in question
and the second divided arises from the beneficial efficiency effect on the tax system
resultant from the fall in the level of distortionary taxation. Although a large literature on
this issue has built up on this issue in recent years, there has been a significant omission in
that the distributional implications of such tax reform have been neglected. The purpose of
this thesis is to investigate the consequences, of raising the tax rate on an economic bad and
using the revenue gained to reduce the tax rate on an economic good, on the distribution of
income. The methodology employed is a progression from a simple theoretical model to a
complex computable general equilibrium framework.
PREFACE 1
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND THE EXISTING DOUBLE DIVIDEND LITERATURE 3
1.1. INTRODUCTION 3
1.2. DEFINITION OF THE DOUBLE DIVIDEND 5
1.2.1 The double dividend defined 5
1.2.2 Distributional Issues 8
1.3. THE ACADEMIC DEBATE - THEORY VERSUS EMPIRICISM 9
1.4. POLICY MOVE AND POLLUTANT 13
1.4.1 A frameworkfor categorisation 13
1.4.2 The literature within theframework 17
1.4.2.1 No control to Non-Optimal Taxes 18
1.4.2.2 No control to Optimal Emission Tax 19
1.4.2.3 Technical Standards to Non-Optimal Taxes 20
1.5. CHOICE OF REVENUErRECYCLING INSTRUMENT 22
1.6. MEASUREMENT OF DESIRABILITY 23
1.7. CONCLUSIONS 25
CHAPTER 2 - A SIMPLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 28
2.1 THE MODEL 28
2.2 WELFARE EFFECTS 30
2.3 EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS 32
2.4 THE BOVENBERG AND DE MOOIJ RESULT 35
2.5 DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES 37
2.6 CONCLUSION 41
CHAPTER 3 - AN EMPIRICAL PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH. 45
3.1 INTRODUCTION 45
3.2 THEORETICAL LAYOUT OF THE MODEL 46
3.2.1. Derivation of the marginal social cost ofpublicfunds measure 46
3.2.2 Theoretical application ofthe model 51
3.2.3 Distributional issues 53
3.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 55
3.3.1 The Almost Ideal Demand System ofPashardes (1993) 55
3.3.2 Calibration of the model 56
3.3.3 Examination ofthe calibrated demandparameters 5 7
3.3.4 Calculation ofthe MCF and MSCFmeasures 58
3.4 RESULTS 59
3.4.1 Results for the Average household 59
3.4.2 Resultsfor all Households 60
3.4.3. Revenue Neutrality 65
3.4.4 Distributional issues 68
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 71
CHAPTER 4 - THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF THE COMPETITIVE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
MODEL 88
4.1 OVERVIEW 88
4.2 THE HOUSEHOLD SECTOR 93
4.3 THE PRODUCTION SECTOR 102
4.4 THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR 106
4.5 THE INVESTMENT SECTOR 108
4.6 INTERNATIONAL TRADE 109
4.7 TAXATION 110
4.7.1 Taxation ofthe household sector Ill
4.7.2 Taxation of the production sector 113
4.8 SOLUTION PROCEDURE 115
4.9 FEATURES OF THE MODEL 116
4.9.1 Distributional Effects 116
4.9.2 Energy Taxes 120
4.9.3 The consequences oflabour market clearing 121
4.10 CONCLUSION 123
CHAPTER 5 - MODEL DATA, CALIBRATION AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 125
5.1 MODEL DATA 125
5.1.1 Production, Investment, Government Spending and Trade 125
5.1.1.1 TheDUM and IUM 129
5.1.1.2 The Intermediate Use Matrix per unit output matrix 129
5.1.1.3 Factors of production 130
5.1.1.4 Investment 131
5.1.1.5 Government Expenditure and Taxes 132
5.1.1.6 Trade 132
5.1.2 Consumption Side 133
5.1.2.1 Expenditure data 133
5.1.2.2 Household income 134
5.1.3 Matching ofthe production and household data 136
5.1.4 The whole economy data 138
5.2 CALIBRATION 138
5.2.1 Production 138
5.2.2 Investment, Government Expenditure and Trade 140
5.2.3 Consumption and the household. 141
5.3 AN EXAMPLE SOLUTION TO THE MODEL 143
5.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 145
5.4.1 Trade elasticities 145
5.4.2 The uncompensatedwage elasticity oflabour supply 147
5.4.3 The savings elasticity 148
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 150
CHAPTER 6 - RESULTS OF THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 166
6.1 CONSUMER ENERGY TAXES 167
6.1.1 Efficiency effects 168
6.1.2 Distributional issues 176
6.2 PRODUCER ENERGY TAXES 178
6.2.1 Efficiency effects 179
6.2.2 Distributional issues 185
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 188
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS 202
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211
Preface
The concept of revenue neutral environmental tax reform has been around
since the early 1970's when the concept of taxing an economic 'bad', e.g.,
pollution, and using the revenue raised to reduce distortionary taxation was
postulated by Sandmo (1973). The basic premise is that such tax reform has
a two-fold benefit - a double dividend. The first dividend comes from the
impact of the environmental tax on the externality in question and the
second divided arises from the beneficial efficiency effect on the tax system
resultant from the fall in the level of distortionary taxation.
The double-dividend concept remained a minor issue until the 1990's when
Pearce (1991) suggested that it was central to the imposition of carbon
taxation in the context of global warming. In the years that followed a large
literature arose, both theoretical and empirical, that examined the double-
dividend in a variety, of frankly confusing, ways. This literature is divided
academically between theoretical models that deal with a general,
unspecified pollutant and empirical models which deal, in virtually all
cases, with carbon or energy taxation. The general consensus of this
literature is best thought as being that the double dividend probably does
not exist, but that revenue-neutral tax reform may be preferable to the
retention of revenue or lump-sum transfer. The foucs here will follow that of
the literature - the theoretical analysis will deal with a general pollutant
whilst the empirical models will concern themselves with energy taxation.
This is for technical reasons - it is difficult to analyse specific pollutants
theoretically - as well as to tie in this work with that which is already
available.
What is immediately noticeable about the double dividend literature, which
is comprehensively examined in Chapter 1, is that with one notable
exception (Proost and van Regemorter 1995), it does not examine the
distributional implications of such a revenue neutral tax reform. It is the
contention here that such distributional effects are central to the issue,
especially if one is appraoching it from a political economy perspective. The
key goal of this work is to attempt to cast light on how the imposition of
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such a shift in the burden of taxation will impact on different sections of
society.
The basic contention is that lower income groups spend proportionally more
of their income on energy and, as such, a shift in the tax buden will, by it's
very nature be regressive. Lower income groups will face a proportionally
higher loss, or potentially lower gain. If this is indeed the case, it may well
mean that the use of such environmental tax reform will be politically, and
perhaps socially, unacceptable. It is thus an area that requires investigation.
Three methodologies are used, each increasing in complexity. Chapter 2
examines the issue theoretically by extending the model of Bovenberg and
de Mooij (1994b) to cover multiple households. Chapter 3, based on Schob
(1995) is a simple empirical model, dealing with the household sector only.
The remaining three chapters use a computable general equilibrium
framework. Chapter 4 lays out the theoretical basis of the general
equilibrium model, Chapter 5 deals with the issue of calibration and
sensitivity analysis and Chapter 6 presents some results. Finally Chapter 7
contains conclusions, both from a methodological point of view, and, in
terms of the results acquired.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction and the existing
double dividend literature
The purpose of this first chapter1 is to attempt to clarify the concept of the
double dividend that may exist from revenue-neutral tax reform, to
investigate the large existing literature in the area and to examine the
methodologies that may be used in analysis. The focus is on the double
dividend literature as a whole, rather than on the specifics of distributional
issues as, as will be seen, only a tiny portion of the literature actively
considers distributional effects.
1.1. Introduction
Since the 1960s, a central idea of environmental economics has been that it is
statically and dynamically more efficient to use taxes or tradable permits,
rather than regulation, to control pollution. In the 1970's and 1980's the
further proposal was made §andmo 1975, Terkla 1984, Lee and Misiolek
1986) that the benefits of such economic instruments of control extend
beyond the polluting industry. If the revenue raised by the instruments is
used to lower conventional, distortionary taxes such as income tax or VAT,
then it is argued that there will be, what has come in the 1990s to be known
as, a 'double dividend'. Not only will there be a benefit from lower
emissions of the pollutant (the first or environmental dividend), but there
will also be a benefit (the second dividend) from reaching a less distorting
tax system, following Tullock's (1967) idea of "excess benefit". The overall
argument is that emission taxes or tradable permits are more desirable,
taking this effect into consideration, than would be calculated if their
revenue effects are ignored.
The double dividend idea has been subject to vigorous technical debate, and
definitions and analyses (and more than a few measurements) of one or both
dividends have multiplied. Goulder (1995b) performed the valuable service
of clearing up the semantic confusions that had arisen. In particular, he
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clarifies the notion of applying 'weak' and 'strong' labels to avoid the
ambiguity of some double dividend concepts. However, a gulf still remains
among the approaches to the issue. Empirical analysis almost always
considers the use of carbon taxes to reduce CO2 emissions and hence global
warming. They thus build, consciously or not, on the origin of the double
dividend term (if not the basic idea), and its rooting in a specific policy
context:
"There are major advantages of a carbon tax over the general alternative of
regulating [CO2] emissions through conventional command and control policies. ...
A carbon tax....would inevitably be revenue raising... Governments may then adopt
a fiscally neutral stance on the carbon tax, using revenues to finance reductions in
incentive-distorting taxes such as income tax, or corporation tax. This "double
dividend' feature of a [CO2] pollution tax is of critical importance in the political
debate about the means of securing a 'carbon convention'."
(Pearce 1991)
An extension of this approach, which has found its way into the manifestos
of several European political parties, is that of "ecological tax reform" (after
von Weizsacker 1991). This applies Pearce's argument from C02 to
pollution in general, and proposes a major shift in the tax system towards
taxing "bads" rather than "goods". It perhaps explains why the third
approach, that of mainstream economic theorists (especially Bovenberg with
de Mooij or van der Ploeg), deals almost always with a general, unspecified
pollutant. The focus here is on energy (carbon) taxation but it is important to
consider all possibilities.
A point that has been largely neglected, in that some authors may mention it
(Bovenberg 1997) but with a few notable exceptions none have analysed it, is
that environmental tax reform will have an impact on the distribution of
income. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine both the ways this issue
can be examined and the issue itself.
From a policy makers perspective the most useful classification for the
double dividend literature is by policy move2 (Section 1.4) but from an
academic perspective it may be better to classify it first by academic criteria,
between what can broadly be classed the theoretical and empirical
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literatures (Section 1.3). The classification can be practical again, in terms of
the revenue-recycling instrument concerned (Section 1.5). Finally the
classification can be technical by means of the measure of desirability used
by the authors concerned (Section 1.6). Initially however, Section 1.2 of this
chapter looks at the definition of the double dividend and considers the
main focus of this thesis - a neglected but vital area, that of distributional
issues.
1.2. Definition of the double dividend
The first part of this section lays out the basic definition of the double
dividend. The second part considers distributional issues which may be the
most vital part of the double dividend hypothesis in terms of acceptability to
policy makers but have been largely neglected, in terms of analysis, in the
literature.
1.2.1 The double dividend defined
This section borrows heavily from Goulder (1995b) who provides a
comprehensive analysis of the definition of the double dividend. A
definition of the double dividend in the context of all possible policy moves
(See Section 1.4) can be found in Pezzey and Park (1997).
The double dividend consists of an environmental dividend (the first
dividend) and a dividend from an increase in the efficiency of the tax system
(the second dividend) and is best explained through the use of a diagram. In
Figure 1 the vertical axis represents some notion of desirability (See Section
1.6). Movements along the horizontal axis represent the two stages of
revenue-neutral tax reform - the imposition of an environmental tax and the
recycling of revenue. Points A and B are intermediate stages in the process,
points D and E are for explicate power and points F to I are possible
outcomes. In Figure 1 a vertical line (BC, FG and HI) represents a change in
the environment and a diagonal line represents a change in the tax system.
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The process of analysis begins with the move from A to B which is simply
the imposition of an environmental tax with the revenue being retained. AB
represents this imposition before environmental effects are taken into
account. It is however, assumed that this tax change will cause an
improvement in the environment, represented by the line BC. Thus the
imposition of an environment tax, where the revenue is retained is desirable
because of the environmental benefit, but undesirable because of the higher
tax burden. It should be remembered however, that the revenue raised does
not disappear. The usual analysis is to assume that it is returned in lump¬
sum fashion3. A lump-sum return of revenue is non-distorting and would be
represented by a horizontal line on the diagram4. Thus the imposition of an
environmental tax is represent, in desirability terms, by a move from A to C.
So far nothing can be said about the double dividend hypothesis5. However,
once the revenue raised by the initial environmental tax is used to reduce
other, distortionary taxes, the nature of the second dividend becomes clear.
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The effect of the reduction in other taxation is represented by either of the
dotted lines, BD and BE and the second dividend by AD and AE. In the case
of BD, the loss of desirability caused by the environmental tax (AB) is offset,
but not completely, by the reduction of other taxation. This is the weak form
of the second dividend and is often referred to as an increase in the efficiency
of the rest of the tax system. Goulder (1995b) also defines an intermediate
second dividend, which specifies that there is at least one redistributive tax
for which the strong form of the second dividend holds. It may be argued
that this is unnecessary as the double dividend is not defined until the
particular revenue recycling instrument is defined. See Section 1.5.
The move to point E, represented by the line AE represents the strong form
of the second dividend. In this case the loss of desirability caused by the
environmental tax is more than offset by the reduction of other taxation. In
other words there has been an increase in the efficiency of the whole tax
system. This has important policy implications. The existence of the strong
form of the second dividend can be seen as the holy grail of environment tax
reform as it represents a free (environmental) lunch. With the strong form the
magnitude of environmental effects need not be considered, as the switch in
the tax system (the move A to E) is desirable in itself. Given the difficulty in
quantifying the value of environmental improvements this is a persuasive
argument.
The story does not end here however. So far, the second dividend and the
environmental effect of the environmental tax have been considered. Schob
(1995) makes the point that the recycling of revenue will also have an
environmental effect. Whether this effect is desirable or not will depend on
two factors. It is obvious that the tax rate that is reduced will be the primary
influence. The effect will depend on the relationship between the item that is
subject to less taxation and the environment. It is also obvious, but may be
overlooked, that the measure of desirability being used is also vital. Thus,
this second environmental effect is indeterminate. The overall environmental
effect is represented to the right of the main diagram in figure 1 by a line
from J to between K and L6. Combining the two dividends we move from A
to a point between H and I (the strong form) or between F and G (the weak
form).
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The rejection of the strong form of the second dividend by much of the
literature often seems to be viewed as a reason for the rejection of revenue-
neutral environmental tax reform. This view should be tempered by careful
consideration. The existence of the weak form of the second dividend is
almost universally accepted and is preferable to the case of non-revenue
neutrality7. This is in addition to the standard benefits of taxation of
externalities over other forms of control, in that taxation allows the
achievement of a least cost (in terms of abatement costs) solution. This issue
is considered in great detail in Pezzey and Park (1997).
1.2.2 Distributional Issues
The area of distributional issues is one that is mentioned by the literature far
more often than it is analysed, yet may be the crucial factor in determining
the acceptability of revenue-neutral tax reform to policymakers and
politicians.
'Distributional issues are at the heart of the double dividend issue: Without
distributional concerns, taxes would not need to be distortionary as governments could
freely use lump-sum taxes to meet their revenue needs.'
Bovenberg (1997)
It is important to make the distinction between distribution in terms of
property rights and distribution in terms of equity. With any tax reform there
will be a redistribution of welfare. Some will gain, others will lose. However,
in the context of the double dividend we are concerned specifically with
equity or more strongly, equality, considerations. It is important to realise
that by equity we mean some notion of 'fairness' and by equality a more
even distribution of income. Equity is desirable and equality may be but is
much more subjective. To avoid this issue it is useful to simply ask, will
revenue neutral environmental tax reform be regressive?
It would seem to be easy to analyse the problem theoretically. If the tax that
is increased on the environmental good is more regressive than the tax that is
lowered then the change will, overall be regressive. In this case, lump-sum
transfer would be preferable from the point of view of equality. If the
situation were reversed the tax reform would be progressive and equality
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would be increased. This is relatively simple analysis to undertake in terms
of environmental tax reform involving indirect taxation. The situation is
made much more complicated with the introduction of labour taxes. This
brings the question of unemployment into the equation and also the
question of which income groups are most at risk, given a specific reform
package, from unemployment. It would be possible, in terms of
unemployment, for a strong second dividend to leave the poor much worse
off, if employment was diverted away from sectors of the economy that those
on low incomes are predominately employed.
As mentioned above there has been relatively little work done on the
problem. Proost and van Regemorter (1995) find that the double dividend
hypothesis can fail completely when distributional effects are taken into
account. They use an applied general equilibrium model, for Belgium, that
can simulate two macroeconomic regimes - fixed and flexible wages and
include estimates of environmental benefits for major air pollutants. With
flexible wages, the choice of tax-reform strategy does not effect aggregate
economic results but has an impact on income distribution: tax proceeds
may be used to increase welfare payments or to decrease direct tax rates.
When real wages are fixed, Proost and van Regemorter find that the gross
costs of a carbon tax are high and that reducing social security payments for
employers (Employer's National Insurance contributions in the UK) is the
optimum way of returning tax revenue.
1.3. The academic debate - Theory versus Empiricism
A distinction between those authors who tackle the double dividend
question in a theoretical manner and those who consider it empirically is the
most obvious way to classify the literature from an academic point of view.
This distinction must be remembered whenever the double dividend is
discussed. The reason for the importance of this academic distinction is that,
simplistically, the theoretical literature tends to reject the strong form of the
double dividend, whilst the conclusions of the empirical literature are more
mixed. The reasons for this distinction are not immediately apparent but
some possible explanations will be suggested.
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The key theoretical result is that of Boveberg and de Mooij (1993,1994b). A
detailed analysis can be found in Goulder (1995b), and Boveberg and de
Mooij (1994b) forms the basis of Chapter 2, so only a brief outline is given
here. The basic idea is that the imposition of the environmental tax is
successful in reducing emissions. The problem arises from the fact that this
success causes an the erosion of the environmental tax base and a loss of
revenue. This loss of revenue results in an inability to reduce other taxes
enough to compensate for the adverse effects of the higher pollution tax,
from a consumption viewpoint. In addition, substitution between inputs,
caused by the environmental tax, means that labour market distortions may
actually increase. Thus, real wages and hence employment fall. Welfare
effects depend on the separability assumptions between consumption,
leisure and environmental quality. Given this analysis however, it is still
found that adjustment of distortionary tax rates is preferable to lump-sum
transfers. The weak form of the second dividend holds.
On the other hand the empirical literature cannot be so neatly labelled. The
results are much more mixed. Authors such as Brinner et. al. (1992) and
Goulder (1992 and 1995a) find that the strong form of the hypothesis fails but
many other authors, among them Capros et. al. (1996) and Bossier and De
Rous (1992) find in favour of the strong form.
The papers mentioned above and those examined in a policy context in
Section 1.4.2.3 all share the distinction of being general equilibrium models
of varying complexity. As such they may be picking up more of what is
happening than the theoretical models which by their nature are forced to be
more simplistic. However, it may be argued that an important factor could
be that the empirical models implicitly consider existing environmental
regulation by their use of baseline scenarios for calibration purposes. As will
be seen in section 1.4 this issue is important and is generally ignored by
theoretical work.
In mitigation, the empirical literature deals with carbon / energy taxation,
which is obviously not subject to the regulatory standards, both technical
and emission based, set for pollutants such as sulphates etc. However, there
are still strong effects that must be considered. The key point is that any
current baseline will be in compliance, or at the very least is supposed to be
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in compliance, with existing regulation. We would suggest that any form of
energy-use technical standard will have some bias on the results a model
that does not include it, generates. In addition any form of environmental
standard, be it for SO2 or other pollutants, will have some impact on energy
usage. Brendemoen et. al. (1996), although they do not explicitly consider the
issue, probably analyse this effect most efficiently due to the extensive range
of pollutants they include in their model.
This divergence between the theoretical and empirical literature was
diminished somewhat by Bovenberg and Goulder (1996). The paper focuses
on the how the optimal environmental tax rate differs from the Pigouvian
ideal when the existing second-best tax structure is taken in consideration.
This analysis is undertaken both theoretically and empirically8. Although the
double dividend is not explicitly examined the theoretical and empirical
results are very similar.
Although the focus of this work is not econometric, there is a body of
econometric literature on energy taxation, specifically, and other tax reform,
more generally. This literature is considered briefly here and further details
can be found in Majocchi (1996). A further comprehensive survey can be
found in Clarke et. Al. (1996). Ingham et. al. (1994) provide details of many of
the estimates of the levels of carbon taxation required to meet specific
targets, both globally and for the UK (and the US) specifically.
Very few econometric studies explicitly consider the double dividend and
most focus on the cost of standard forms of carbon taxation. A notable
exception is Barker and Gardiner (1996) who use an econometric approach to
examine the tax incidence effects of (primarily) employers social security
contributions9 as a revenue recycling instrument. They find, subject to a
proviso, namely that the nature of the relationship between unions,
employers and governments in terms of wage negotiation is likely to be
important, that reductions in employer's payments are likely to lead to lower
real wage costs and higher employment. Additionally, as energy intensive
and energy producing industries tend to have low labour intensities,
revenue neutral environmental tax reform, with employers social security
contributions as the recycling instrument is likely to reduce pollution and
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increase employment. In other words, they find evidence to support the
strong form of the double dividend.
The econometric model used by Barker and Gardiner (1996) (E3ME - a
general Energy-Environment-Economy Model for Europe) is a multi-sectoral
dynamic regional model that was developed from a regional E3 (Energy-
Environment-Economy) model for the UK detailed in Barker and Peterson
(1987). Barker, Baylis and Madsen (1993) use this earlier model to analyse
the effects of a carbon tax on the UK economy.
Barker (1998), extends Barker and Gardiner (1996), again using the E3ME
model, and deals with the uncoordinated, co-ordinated and unilateral
introduction of energy taxes (excise duties) to reach a 10% reduction of C02
emissions, which is recycled by a cut in social security contributions. The
results show a considerable 'double dividend' effect and a considerable
employment effect. The employment effect for the EU lies between 1.2% (co¬
ordinated) and 1.3% (uncoordinated) showing effects of more than 2% for
some countries.
As far as distributional issues are concerned, there has been a small amount
of econometric work undertaken. A survey of early work can be found in
Bradshaw (1978). This early work was concerned with the variation in fuel
expenditure across household types. The household characteristics included
income but also composition, dwelling size and type, regional location and
central heating. However, this analysis did not go beyond the consideration
of the pattern of the relative budget shares for energy across different
household types.
Common (1985) considers the distributional impact of higher UK energy
prices explicitly and takes into account the impact of higher energy prices on
other commodity prices by calculating indices of cost of living changes
(consequent on higher energy prices) across all commodity price changes
caused by higher energy prices. He finds that ignoring this issue (namely
the effect of increased energy prices on other commodity prices) typically
understates the total effect by around half10. His results are consistant with
the claim that higher energy prices are regressive in their impact in the UK
though the size of this impact is relatively small - in the region of a 5%
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greater effect on the worst affected household group compared with all
households generally. However, the data for the simulations is the 1974
input-output tables and so the results should be viewed with some caution,
a quarter of a century later.
1.4. Policy move and Pollutant
The first part of this section lays out the policy framework in which the
double dividend hypothesis should be considered. The second section then
considers, in depth, the literature within this policy framework. However, as
will be seen, as soon as one starts to consider policy, then the actual
pollutant concerned is of vital importance.
1.4.1 A framework for categorisation
There has been a tendency for the academic debate on the double dividend
hypothesis to stray from the original policy context. Pezzey and Park (1999)
deals with this issue in some detail. It is the intention of this section to lay
out the policy framework that the double dividend debate fits into. To this
end it is useful to look at the possible ways in which governments can
control environmental externalities, that are relevant to the double dividend.
The key point is that the most suitable policy will vary with the pollutant in
question. In our view, this is an issue that has been neglected in the
arguments that have arisen over the double dividend. The focus will be on
those moves or shifts in policy that are relevant to the double dividend.
Figure 1.2 shows the possible policies that a government can take to control
a pollutant, that are relevant to the double dividend hypothesis. It is
however, policy moves that are the focus of interest. More specifically still, it
is policy moves that allow a double dividend. A move from the current
policy (which we assume does not include market based instruments) to
emission taxes is thus required. These taxes may be optimal or non-optimal.
The current policy, assuming no market based instruments are currently in
use, is likely to be either no control, technology standards or emission
standards. This current policy is of crucial importance and is often
overlooked in the double dividend literature. Other market instruments
such as tradable emission permits are not considered here. Although they
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are of relevance to the double dividend debate, they are not considered in
the literature. Pezzey and Park (1999) considers the double dividend in a
wider policy framework, including other market instruments.
Figure 1.2 - Possible policy moves giving rise to the double dividend
Crudely speaking, there are three criteria for any move away from current
policy to be first considered and then adopted and the application of these
criteria depends on the pollutant in question. Firstly, it must be known that
emissions cause environmental damage. The local damage caused by SO2
has been known for decades, although awareness of its long distance
damage via acid deposition is more recent. Confirmation that rising CO2
concentrations will alter climate significantly has been very recent, and is
still controversial.
Secondly, emissions must be controllable. Again the nature of the pollutant
is important. In respect to control of emissions, pollutants can be classified
into two broad types - those that are a unwanted by-product of a production
process and those that are, in some sense, the goal of a production process.
The first category, by-products, covers most 'traditional' pollutants such as
SO2, particulates etc. In this case, there must exist an affordable technology







clean up after themselves. Technologies to control SO2 emissions are
commercially available, though there has been a long debate about whether
the best technology is simply to use tall stacks to disperse and dilute the
emissions, or flue gas desulphurisation to reduce total emissions at source11.
With this type of pollutant, the goal of environmental policy is the
introduction of the appropriate control technology.
The second case, the product of a production process being a
pollutant, is more complex. The most obvious example is CO2, from fossil
fuels, although in the recent past CFC's also fell into this category. The
distinction is that for pollutants in this category there is no control
technology and the goal of environmental policy must be to reduce or
eliminate the usage of a product. In the case of CFC's, this was achieved, in
the developed world at least, by the introduction of non- environmentally
damaging alternatives. Unfortunately, in the case of CO2, no alternatives are
immediately available, at least on a sufficiently large scale. So the goal of
policy must be to limit, or at least reduce, usage.
Finally, it must be affordable for the government or agency to monitor the
results of its policy and there must be the political will to impose the costs of
control on polluting firms (and their customers). Leaving aside the issue of
political acceptability for the moment, there are big differences in monitoring
costs between SO2 and CO2, as shown by the following data:
Table 1.1 - Source of total emissions by pollutant type.
Pollutant







Source: UK. Dept of Trade & Industry (1996), Digest of UK Energy Statistics, pp 190-1.
The 44% of CO2 emissions which come from small and often mobile
emitters makes it prohibitively expensive to monitor a big enough
proportion of individual emissions. In addition, the it is generally difficult if
not impossible to increase the energy efficiency of most existing equipment.
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All in all it is no surprise that there has been no political will to set standards
for existing CO2 technologies. Technology standards, which are in terms of
energy efficiency, for CO2 therefore apply only to new equipment. We will
observe later that the literature pays little explicit attention to such
standards.
Even if they are possible, technology standards have obvious
disadvantages. They give no incentive to find alternative means of control,
and they given no direct control over the level of emissions. It is therefore
preferable to have to emission standards12, provided that the information
costs of so doing are reasonable, which is generally true for SO2 given
modern monitoring equipment.
The equivalent, indirect move for CO2 would be to move from setting
standards for new energy equipment, to fixing the amount of carbon-energy
actually sold (since CO2 emissions are directly in proportion to this). This is
obviously seriously impractical and incredibly costly. This is the origin of
the idea of moving from (indirect) technology standards for CO2, to control
by carbon taxes. This will create a pervasive incentive to reduce CO2
emissions in the most cost- effective way, without specifying which users are
to reduce emissions, by how much or with which technologies. But because
monitoring CO2 emissions directly is so costly, and because almost all
carbon fuel used is burnt13, the tax incentive is applied to carbon inputs
instead. Without carbon taxation (which could be implicit, for example the
reduction of any existing subsidies for carbon-energy use), many analysts
cannot see how widely-agreed targets for CO2 control can be achieved.
But why is there no equivalent literature on sulphur or SO 2 taxes,
extolling the virtues of using the revenue from them to get a double
dividend by lowering conventional, distortionary taxes? Indeed, there is
virtually no literature solely on SO2 taxes as such. The nearest one comes is
in an empirical discussion of 'Ecological Tax Reform' (von Weizsacker 1992)
- i.e. a deliberate, macroeconomically significant move from taxing "goods"
such as income, labour and commodities towards taxing "bads" such as
pollution, congestion and resource depletion. This is because firstly, SO2
emission standards are feasible and moderately effective. Secondly, because
thanks to much lower monitoring costs, a politically much more attractive
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alternative is available. Any concern about the inefficiency of emission
standards (caused by their typical uniformity, which again is a result of the
information costs of non-uniform standards) will therefore push policy in the
direction of that alternative, not towards revenue-neutral SO2 taxes.
Revenue-neutral emission taxes can be set non-optimally. This is
virtually inevitable for carbon taxes, given the near- impossibility of valuing
environmental damage. To our knowledge only Nordhaus (1991) has
attempted the numerous and highly debatable empirical and ethical14
assumptions needed to calculate an optimal carbon tax. Or, taxes can be set
"optimally", which is what the theoretical literature does. As we shall see,
this literature universally ignores any pre-existing technology (or emission)
standards, and assumes instead that there is no emissions policy to start
with. In all these cases, the policy move is not well- defined until the means
of revenue-neutrality is specified: that is, which conventional tax is to be
reduced using the emission tax revenue. See Section 1.5.
The most important detail is the fact that the no policy situation, in
effect, does not exist in reality. In practice, some form of environmental
regulation exists for all pollutants, whether it is specifications of nuclear
storage facilities or regulations on the design of waste sources. More
importantly, there are strong interlinkages between regulatory standards for
any pollutant and energy usage. A simplistic example would be the
mandatory fitting of catalytic converters on cars, having an effect on their
(energy) efficiency. The theoretical analysis of the double dividend question
(see Section 3) does not tend to acknowledge the existence of existing
regulatory standards, whilst the empirical literature does. In reality it is very
likely that all pollutants are subject to both forms of regulatory standard
(Technological and emission based) either explicitly or, especially in the case
of carbon, implicitly.
1.4.2 The literature within the framework
This section categorises the double dividend literature into the framework
outlined in Section 1.4.1. Due to informational difficulties we do not make
the distinction between a current policy of technology standards or emission
standards but consider them jointly as regulatory control.
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1.4.2.1 No control to Non-Optimal Taxes
This category, represented by policy move 1 on Fig. 2, contains for the main
part, theoretical papers and one, that of Schob (1995) that attempts empirical
analysis. This paper becomes the basis for Chapter 3. Bonetti and Fitzroy
(1996) set up a theoretical model and then produce simulation results,
although the model is not calibrated, in the strictest sense to real world data.
The basic result is the standard Bovenberg critique that the erosion of
the environmental tax base results in an inability to reduce other taxes
enough to compensate for the adverse effects of the higher pollution tax. The
strong dividend fails but the weak dividend holds. From a different
perspective, Parry (1995), in a very simplistic model, shows that by
increasing marginal production costs, environmental taxes reduce GDP and
this is not compensated for by a reduction in distortionary tax. A negative
exception is Proost and van Regemorter who find that if the macroeconomic
regime is one of flexible wages and fixed employment the second dividend
fails. This is because with fixed-labour supply and their redistributive
instrument, social security contributions, there is no reduction in distortions.
Labandeira-Villot and McCoy (1996) explicitly consider the issue of the first
dividend (environmental improvement) depending on public finance
considerations, in other words the redistribution of revenue. This is the
issue raised in moving from J to either K or L in the right of Figure 1. Schob
(1996) also analyses this question, first from a theoretical perspective and
then empirically. He uses commodity taxation as the revenue returning
instrument and shows that the environmental dividend will depend on the
complementarity or substitutability relationship between the polluting good
and the revenue returning instrument chosen. He uses a partial equilibrium
model of the UK economy, based on Pasardes (1991) Almost Ideal Demand
System and finds that the strong form of the second dividend fails. As
mentioned above it is this paper, extended to multiple households, that is
the basis for Chapter 3.
Bonetti and Fitzroy (1996) show, in contrast to other authors, that a small,
revenue-neutral energy tax will raise employment at constant wages if
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government expenditure is not large. Although the authors interpret their
tax energy tax rise as an additional tax rise on fossil fuel energy, the
relatively simplistic nature of their model categorises the paper into this
section. The simulation results presented show that a substitution of energy
taxation for labour taxation, which doubles the price of energy, increases
output by 1%, employment by 6-9% and Welfare by 5-13% if the net wage is
held constant. To some extent, the result is driven by this assumption in that
a constant net wage, given a lower income tax rate, means that gross wages
fall and thus labour demand rises. Fitzroy (1996) also finds that there is the
possibility of a strong dividend existing. Schneider (1997) shows that where
involuntary unemployment exists, a second (employment) dividend may be
possible if workers do not respond to lower unemployment by reducing
their effort.
Bonetti and Fitzroy (1999) model involuntary unemployment by imposing a
constant real wage and using simulation analysis, based on a relatively
simple model, find that there are substantial net welfare and employment
gains for a plausible set of parameters. This result is driven by the fact that a
(relatively) small increase in energy taxation increases the return to (fixed)
capital as in the Cobb-Douglas specification used, capital is a fixed
proportion of output.
1.4.2.2 No control to Optimal Emission Tax
This category of policy action is by far the most common theoretically and is
represented on Figure 2 by policy move 2. It is a shift to optimal taxes that
has the most appeal intuitively in that optimal tax rates mean that pollution
is optimally controlled or in other words the environment receives the 'right'
amount of help. Flowever, there are obvious problems in quantifying
optimal rates as the monetary value of the environmental impact of the
pollutant is required. We would argue that the very concept of 'optimal'
environmental taxation is, for this reason, of little use to policy-makers. This
is particularly the case with CO2 taxation in the context of global warming.
Policy action 2 represents most of the work of Bovenberg and co¬
authors. An in depth analysis of theoretical methodology is not attempted
here. Rather, a few stylised facts are presented. Bovenberg and de Mooij
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(1994b, 1993) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994a, 1994b) all find that
the strong form of the double dividend fails, although the weak form holds.
Bovenberg and de Mooij's simplistic models of 1993 and 1994b are
elaborated on by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, who include variable labour
supply in an open economy (1994b) and a closed economy (1994a).
However, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994a) find, that when the
environmental externality has an impact on production, the strong form may
hold if this externality is large. Also, the inclusion of involuntary
unemployment in Bovenberg and van der Pleog (1996) suggests more hope
for the strong form. They use an analytical general equilibrium model of a
closed economy, which also considers the possibility of a third dividend
arising through the analysis of the optimal level of public spending and find
that this triple dividend is possible. Employment will rise if the shifting of
the tax burden of firms away from wages, outweighs the effect of a fall in the
marginal cost of public funds encouraging the government to raise the
overall tax burden. A welfare 'triple dividend' will occur if environmental
concern is small, fixed factors account for a large share of production,
substitution between fixed factors and resources is easy and substitution
between resources and labour is difficult. This result is qualified by the
suggestion that it is more likely in the short-run and unlikely in the context
of an open economy with internationally mobile capital.
It will be noted that the inclusion of involuntary unemployment in this
paper and that of Bonetti and Fitzroy (1999), above, tends to give more
favourable results in terms of the existence of a double-dividend. This is an
issue that is returned to in section 4.9.3.
1.4.2.3 Technical Standards to Non-Optimal Taxes
Policy action 3, a move from regulatory standards to non-optimal taxes is the
most common policy action empirically. Indeed, the literature, in this
context, deals entirely with empirical measures of carbon/energy taxes. The
reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, there is the implicit inclusion of
regulatory standards, technical in the case of energy15, when one has
reference to a baseline case, a natural process in computable (empirical)
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general equilibrium modelling, the way in which carbon/energy taxes are
most commonly (and usefully) analysed. Secondly, in a general equilibrium
setting, the use of non-optimal tax rates is the most natural way to proceed,
especially when dealing with carbon / energy. Setting optimum tax rates to
control greenhouse gases requires knowledge of the relationship between
emissions and concentration of gases in the atmosphere, the relationship
between concentration and climate change and not least, the feedback from
climate change onto the economy. Including these effects within an economic
model is challenging to say the least. It has been attempted - see the DICE
(Dynamically Integrated Climate Economy) Model of Nordhaus (1993)16 - but
the simplifying assumptions of the science and the variability of results to
these assumptions are large. As such, the validity of the results gained, for
policy making, are easily challenged. Thus, the majority of the empirical
carbon / energy literature focuses on non-optimal taxes and to a large extent,
until climate-economy interactions are understood more fully, this is the
most useful approach.
Brendemoen and Vennemo (1996) calculate the effect of the
imposition of taxes on eight different pollutants (SO2, NO2, CO, CO2, VOC,
CH4, N2O, Particulates), that appear primarily through their role as
composites of fossil fuels. The authors calculate both a measure of the direct
impact of tax changes, the second dividend, and a measure of both the direct
effect and environmental impact, the overall dividend. Without including
externalities, overall welfare increases when CO 2 tax rates are raised and
Income tax or VAT levels are reduced, remains the approximately the same
when gasoline and oil are taxed and income tax levels reduced and falls for
oil and gasoline taxes with VAT reduction. If externalities are included then
all the above tax changes are welfare increasing. Reference should again be
made to their implicit inclusion of regulatory standards for a wide range of
pollutants.
Capros et. al. (1996) use the GEM-E3 CGE model for the 12 EU member states
linked through endogenous trade. They find that Employment increases
across the EU with the exception of Greece which loses 12000 jobs. The UK
and Germany gain most. They find that GDP at market prices increases by
between 3.27% (Belgium) and 1.22% (Greece). Elowever, they make the
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critical assumption that the real wage elasticity of labour supply is relatively
high.
Carraro et. al. model a segmented labour market within a dynamic CGE
model of the EU. They consider a carbon tax with the revenue used to reduce
payroll taxes, paid by employers17. They find that employment rates rise in
the short run, but stabilise to the baseline case in the long-run, except in the
UK where there is a positive effect in the long run. Brinner et. al. (1992),
although they use a less sophisticated methodology and do not explicitly
analyse the double dividend, find the strong form exists in the long term, if
the revenues raised by a gasoline tax are again used to reduce payroll
(employer paid) taxes, in the US. Welsch (1996) finds that the strong
dividend will hold, in terms of employment, if there are no increased wage
claims.
These papers are in conflict with the studies by Goulder (1995b, 1992) that
use a similar sophisticated methodology. Goulder (1995) finds that the
impact of a carbon tax on intermediate goods and it's narrow base outweighs
the benefit of the attendant labour tax reduction. In his 1992 paper, Goulder
finds that although the welfare loss is lower if revenues are redistributed
through income tax, corporation tax and payroll taxes, as opposed to a
lump-sum fashion, there is still a welfare loss.
In the case of Bossier and De Rous (1992), revenue from carbon taxation is
returned in the form of subsidies to investment in energy efficient
technology18. Unsurprisingly perhaps, their empirical results suggest that
this policy, although it reduces GDP in the short term, increases GDP in the
long-run. This is due to the fact that energy efficient technology takes time to
come 'on-line'. Although the modelling of future technical change is fraught
with difficulty the result would seem sensible.
1.5. Choice of revenue-recycling instrument
It is simple to list the available alternatives. Personal income taxes,
corporate income taxes, employment taxes, specific commodity taxes,
general commodity taxes (whether on sales or value added), and social
security contributions are the main ones. The important point is that the
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choice of revenue returning instrument will, obviously, make a difference to
the desirability of revenue neutral tax reform.
The most common choice of instrument is labour or income taxes. It is
interesting to note that with the exception of Brendemoen and Vennemo
(1996) all papers that consider income taxes find that the strong form of the
second dividend fails. The majority of the papers are theoretical so the
points made in Section 3 may apply but Brinner et.al. (1992) and Goulder
(1992) both find that whilst labour tax reductions do not give a strong second
dividend, other tax reductions do. A problem may be that labour taxes are
generally not modelled to a sufficient degree of accuracy. For example, most
models view income tax as simply a proportion of income. This is a technical
necessity in general equilibrium modelling19. The reason is that a more
realistic income tax structure, including tax allowances and bands is
discontinuous and will result in a general equilibrium model behaving
unpredictably or not achieving solution.
Both the above papers in addition to Capros et.al. (1996) and Carraro et. al.
(1996) find that a reduction in payroll taxes20 is most likely to provide the
strong form. This is perhaps because this is one tax reduction that may
benefit both producers and consumers directly. We would argue that the
way forward is more comprehensive modelling of realistic tax structures and
an examination of all possible redistributive instruments.
1.6. Measurement of desirability
Of fundamental importance to the double dividend hypothesis is how it is
measured, or more specifically over what it is measured. Section 2.1 defined
the double dividend purely in terms of its desirability. The usual measures
of desirability are employment, output and most commonly, welfare.
Although an increase in any or all of these would, generally, be considered
desirable, for a given policy change an increase in one may not necessarily
mean an increase in each or either of the others. It is possible, for example,
for output to increase following some change in the tax system but for
employment to fall21. Although we accept that many authors impose this
distinction within their work (Bonetti and Fitzroy (1996), Bovenberg and de
Mooij (1993), Bovenberg and van der Pleog (1996), Capros et. al. (1996),
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Goulder (1992)), we feel that it is important to stress that it should be
remembered.
The most common and obvious way to measure desirability is through some
notion of welfare, usually measured as the change in some social utility
function which depends on both goods consumption and pollution. The
exact functional form of this welfare function will have a bearing on results.
Using some notion of welfare as a yardstick does have the advantage of
being the only measure of desirability that can directly capture
environmental effects. However, most of the literature, including this paper,
makes the important assumption that the effects of consumption and
emissions on desirability are additively separable. In other words the
environment is a component of welfare but does not affect any of the other
components22. But without additive separability, it is hard to agree on how
to decompose the desirability effect of introducing a revenue-neutral
emissions tax into an environmental dividend and a second dividend from
reduced tax distortion.
Another common method of measurement is that of changes in employment
(Capros et.al. 1996, Carraro et. al. 1996, Fitzroy 1996 and almost all the
papers by Bovenberg and co-authors). In this sense the second dividend is
measured in terms of the effect of the revenue-neutral tax change on the
labour market and as such the modelling of the labour market becomes
crucial. Obviously one must not assume full employment if one wants to
measure employment effects. This was illustrated in section 1.4.1.2. by the
inclusion of involuntary unemployment in Bovenberg and de Mooij (1996)
reversing the results of their earlier models. This should be contrasted with
the work of authors, such as Schob (1996), who ignore labour market effects
completely. There are obvious linkages between welfare and employment,
but which measure is used can make a big difference to the way a theoretical
model is constructed. This makes comparisons between such models much
more difficult.
This difficulty in comparison gets worse when one considers empirical
models of revenue-neutral emission taxes, which are relevant to double
dividend questions, even if the models often do not explicitly recognise this.
As mentioned above virtually all such models are of carbon-energy taxation.
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The complex nature of general equilibrium models means that a comparison
of even two models requires detailed scrutiny. Looking at the empirical
literature as a whole, the measures of desirability used vary, and include
output and growth in addition to welfare and employment. In this context,
the problem of comparison of models is compounded by the problem of
comparison of results.
1.7. Conclusions
The literature on the double divided has been considered from several
different aspects - policy, academic methodology, method of revenue
recycling and desirability. The main point is that the divergence between the
theoretical and empirical literature may be due to pollutant non-specific
nature of the theoretical literature and its neglect of existing environmental
regulation.
Theoretical developments in recent years have been very useful in refining
the definition of the strong and weak forms of the double dividend
hypothesis. They have shown not only that the strong form of the double
dividend hypothesis - that the reduced distortion from using emission tax
revenues is larger than their basic cost - is very likely to fail. Furthermore,
they have shown that returning emission tax revenue as lower conventional
taxes rather than as lump sums may fail to improve welfare, and even fail to
lower emissions. But in so doing they have also shown that only empirical
measurement can determine these failures will occur in practice. This
consensus is qualified somewhat by those papers that model involuntary
unemployment as they tend to be more favourably disposed to the existence
of the strong form.
Once one looks at the empirical literature on, or accidentally relevant
to, the double dividend idea, one rapidly realises how it is entirely restricted
to the idea of taxing carbon and/or energy use. This is not surprising,
because C02 is the only major pollutant where the costs of directly
monitoring and controlling the large majority of emissions are prohibitive,
and therefore directly revenue-neutral alternatives such as grandfathered
tradable emission permits have not been considered. The outcome is that
wider forms of the double dividend idea, such as the idea of reforming the
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whole tax system to tax "bads" rather than "goods", are almost entirely
untested.
However, empirical results so far seem to suggest that the weak form
of the double dividend hypothesis is true, so carbon taxation is indeed more
attractive than would be calculated if its revenue effects were ignored. Many
studies also find the strong form. What needs to be done is therefore for
empirical modelling to ensure that it addresses the subtler, indirect effects of
revenue-neutral emission taxes that the theorists have highlighted. It also
needs to address the practical and political realities of the pollutants under
debate. Modelling taxes on S02, particulates or BOD effluent will produce
very different numbers than for carbon. Attention needs to be paid to the
starting point of current policy, to the administrative costs of monitoring,
and it would help if the conventional tax which is to be reduced using
emission tax revenue were to be examined in more detail. And above all,
estimates, or at least lower bounds, of the values of reduced emissions will
have to be found, unless there is already a binding commitment to reduce
emissions.
In addition, distributional issues (can poor people afford coal for heating,
etc.), or who gains or loses from revenue neutral tax reform are be a crucial
issue and is one that has been largely neglected to date. Indeed, the
proponents of wider-ranging "ecological tax reform" must not lose sight of
political realities. It may be better economically to return emission tax
revenue as a lower distortionary tax than as lump sums, leaving aside
distributional concerns, for lump-sum transfer may be preferable from this
point of view, but the political reality of the situation must not be forgotten.
It is vital that the academic debate does not distract attention away from the
practical policy applications. After all, it would seem that the double
dividend debate has, to some extent, chosen to ignore the standard
efficiency, in terms of abatement cost, arguments for environmental taxation.
The existence of only the weak form of the second dividend is preferable to
(increased) regulatory standards and may be the only way to deal with the
problem of carbon caused global warming. However, it is clear that
distributional issues are of prime importance from the point of view of
political acceptability and it is this issue that this thesis concentrates on.
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Notes:
'An early version of this chapter became the basis for the author's contribution to two papers
in collaboration with Jack Pezzey of the University of York (Park and Pezzey (1999) and
Pezzey and Park (1999)). The nature of this collaborative process led to the introduction of a
new structure to the chapter.
2Note the distinction between a policy and a policy move, the latter being a switch between
policies. This is important as any existing regulation or environmental policy will have an
impact on a newly introduced policy.
3Revenue may however be retained and used to fund further public expenditure or reduce
government debt. Bovenberg and van der Pleog (1996) include the optimum level of public
spending in their analysis of revenue-neutral tax reform.
4A lump-sum redistribution, although neutral in tax efficiency terms may be desirable if equity
issues are important. See Section 1.2.2.
5It may be thought that BC represents the environmental dividend but, as will be seen, this is
not the case.
6There is some evidence that this second environmental effect is so small as to be insignificant.
See Bovenberg and Goulder (1995).
Tump-sum redistribution is almost certainly impractical in reality.
8The theoretical model is an extension of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b) and the empirical
general equilibrium is that used inGoulder (1995a).
9 See Section 1.5 for further discussion of the choice of revenue recycling instrument.
10 It should be noted that this result is conditional on the authors use of 1974 production
technology.
nOne should also mention the introduction of smokeless zones in cities, which achieved a
major reduction in S02 emissions by simply banning small-scale coal burning. Whether one
calls this an input standard or a technology standard hardly matters, since the fuel type and
the furnace type are jointly determined.
"Most logically, standards would be set in terms of the total emissions from a site, often known
as the "bubble" policy in the USA, rather than in terms of emissions from one stack, or
emissions concentrations.
13Any problems of unfairness caused by taxing carbon which ends up locked up in products,
e.g. in plastics, are ignored here.
14The prime ethical assumption is that the objective of policy is to maximise the present value
of welfare using a constant exponential discount rate applied over the lifetimes of several
generations.
15A1though the point made previously with regard to the interaction between standards for any
pollutant and energy use should not be forgotten.
16This model is not included as it uses lump-sum transfers.
''Equivalent to employers National Insurance contributions in the UK.
18The inclusion of revenue being returned through energy efficiency subsides maybe
considered as being outside the bounds of what could be termed the 'standard' double
dividend hypothesis.
19The key is that the tax schedule must be linear. It is possible to include a notion of tax
allowances and then a single income tax rate as this still gives a linear function but it is not
possible to have a realistic income tax structure with tax bands. Such a system is non-linear
and may result inmultiple equilibria.
'"Employers National Insurance contributions in the UK.
21If there was a switch in the burden of taxation from capital to labour and the marginal
productivity of capital was higher than the marginal productivity of labour.
"It is quite clear that this is a simplification.
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Chapter 2 - A simple general equilibrium model
This chapter follows Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b) closely but expands
their model, which is based on identical households, to allow for
differentiated households. At the same time, the expanded model presented
here allows a direct exposition of their basic result.
The chapter is laid out as follows. Section 2.1 details the basic form and
assumptions of the model. Section 2.2 calculates an expression for the
welfare effects in the model and section 2.3 extends this analysis, by solving
the model for employment effects. Section 2.4 makes the assumption of a
single representative household and outlines, in depth, the conclusions of
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b). Section 2.5 uses the ability of this form of
the model to deal with differentiated households to analyse distributional
issues and, finally, section 2.6 concludes.
2.1 The model
The model is a relatively simplistic general equilibrium model but is close
to the most complicated model that can be solved without parameterisation.
Indeed, if a more complicated theoretical model were technically feasible, it
is likely that interpretation of the results would not be.
The model consists of a household sector with n households, who need not
be identical, a government sector, responsible for public spending and
taxation and two production sectors producing clean, C, and dirty, D,
consumption goods respectively.
A simple linear technology describes production:
n n n
(2.1) h^Li =hL =XCi +XDi+G = c + D + G
i=l i = l i=l
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where Xi represents household levels of a variable and X represents
economy levels of a variable. Labour, L, is the only input into production
and total labour supply is the sum of the labour supply of individual
households, Lj (i=l,...,n). Labour productivity, h, is constant and output is
divided between public consumption (government spending), G, as well as
the consumption of the clean and dirty private consumption goods, denoted
by C and D respectively, as above. The total consumption of private
consumption goods is made up of the sum of individual household
consumption. Units are normalised so that the constant rates of
transformation between the three produced quantities are unity. In addition
all private commodities are expressed in per capita terms.
The basic form of an individual household's utility function is:
(2.2) Ui=u1(Q,Di,Vi,G,E)
The two public goods, public consumption, G, and environmental quality, E,
enter individual household utility. The household takes the supply of these
two good as given. In optimising its utility the household adopts the
demands for private goods (clean and dirty consumption and leisure, V) as
instruments.
The inclusion of the quality of the natural environment in the household
utility function allows the interaction between environmental and labour
market distortions to be examined in a second best framework. The
environmental distortion comes about because households do not take into
account the adverse effect of their dirty consumption on environmental
quality. More specifically the functional form of the utility function is such
that both public goods, public spending and environmental quality are
(weakly) separable from private goods, leisure, clean and dirty
consumption. Thus environmental quality and public spending have no
impact on private consumption or leisure and vice versa.
The effect of aggregate consumption of the dirty good on environmental
quality is given by:
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The model, by including a leisure-work trade-off, endogenises labour
supply and thus the labour-market distortion originates in a tax, tp, on
labour income. The level of household leisure, V, is given by the household
potential labour supply1, Ljs, minus actual labour supplied, Lp In addition
the government imposes a pollution tax, tp>, on dirty consumption.
Thus, the household budget constraint is given by:
Household consumption of private goods is equal to net labour income.
Combining the budget constraint of all households (2.4) and market
equilibrium gives, by Walras' law, the government budget constraint2:
Public spending is thus equal to the total tax revenue gained from the taxes
on labour and the dirty good.
2.2Welfare effects
The first order conditions characterising optimum household behaviour
arise from the Lagrangean:
(2.6) t- =u(C1,Di,Vi,G,E) + ^(h(l-tL)(Lt-Vi)-Ci-(l +tD)Di)max Vj£i,Di v '
(2.4) C,+(l+ffl)£>,=/»(l-*£XL?-^)
(2.5) G=tDXD,+tLXL






(2.7c) —L = /((l + tD), where A.j is the marginal utility of income.dD
The welfare effects, on an individual household, of a revenue neutral change
in the tax mix (i.e. dG=0) are given3 by:
A, „ du, A, du,
(2.8) dU — dL, H dC, H dD, HK ' ' d^'dC'dD.'dE
de
dD
dD , where D=^ D;
The first three terms on the RHS represent the effect on the household from
changes in its own behaviour (labour supply, dirty and clean consumption)
and the final term represents the environmental effect on the household from
total changes (across all households) in the consumption of the dirty good.
Substituting the first order conditions for utility maximisation from (2.7) into
(2.8) gives:
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Dividing by Xi and summing across all households gives:
(2.10) = -AC1 -tL)dL + dC + {l + tD )dD +X
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Taking the total differential of (2.1), and again setting dG=0 gives
(2.11) hdL = dC + dD + dG







The first term on the RHS of (2.12) is the effect on the labour market
distortion, due to the effect of the tax on labour income. The second term
represents the effect on the environmental distortion. The welfare effect of a
marginal increase in consumption of the dirty good, i.e. the term in dD in
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square brackets, is broken down into the social benefit of additional tax
revenue due to a wider tax base (the first term in the bracket) and a term
representing the marginal social damage from increased pollution (the
second term in the bracket).
When there is no need to finance public spending through distortionary
taxation on labour (tL=0), the 'first-best' case the optimal value of the tax on
the dirty good, tp>, would simply be the Pigouvian tax which fully






With a Pigouvian tax4, in the absence of distortionary labour market taxation,
the beneficial environmental effects of lower consumption of the dirty good
exactly offset the welfare loss due to a decline in the tax base (from the
reduction in consumption of the dirty good). Changes in employment do not
affect welfare as in a distortion free labour market the social opportunity
costs of additional employment (in terms of leisure) exactly offset the social
benefits (in terms of increased consumption).
The distributional implications of (2.12) and (2.13) are detailed below in
section 2.5.
In the presence of a distortionary tax on labour (tL>0), (2.12) demonstrates
that the welfare effect of revenue neutral changes in the tax mix would
depend on changes in employment. The following section explores this
issue.
2.3 Employment effects
In order to examine employment effects in the context of a revenue neutral
tax change, the model is manipulated to show the variables in terms of
relative changes5. This process means, in effect, the expositional form of the
model is one of comparative statics, which makes interpretation more
straightforward.
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Taking the total differential6 of the government budget constraint, from (2.5),
and again setting the change in public spending to zero, gives:
(2.14) dt^D, +tDXdDi + dtLhXLi +tLhXdLi = 0
i i i i
Dividing through by (l-tp)hLjLi and rearranging, gives:
tD^dD, hYjdLi dt»XDi dtL^Li
(2'15) (1 - tLWZL, + (1 ■-tL)XA ~ "(1'-h)h^L, ~ (1 -tL)XL,
i i i i
Defining the relative change in the tax rate on labour, tL and the relative
change in household employment, Lir by tL = dtL/(l -tL) and
Lj = dL^/^L, respectively and substituting into (2.15) gives:
toXdDi t _ d^SD,
(Z16) o-tjhiL,?Li="d-,L)hiL," '<■
Further defining the share of dirty goods in overall household consumption,
Od, as Od = (1 +tD)/\C+ (\ + td)D\, the share of dirty goods in terms of
overall output, aD/ as aD=^D./ h ^L. = (1 - tL)<PD / (1 + tD), the
/ i
proportional tax change in the tax rate on the dirty good, tD, as
tD = dtD/(l + tD) and the relative change in household consumption of dirty




= _ (h /lL ^ DlD
The LFIS of (2.17), is the 'tax-base' effect, b'. The first term is the effect on the
base of the labour tax and the second term is the effect on the base of the
pollution tax. Given a fixed before tax wage7, h, real after tax wages, w, are
defined as w=h(l-tp)/p where p is the consumption price index. The first
term in the RHS of (2.17) is the change in the labour tax rate and the second
term is the share of dirty good consumption in overall household
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consumption times by the change in the tax rate on the dirty good and can
thus be interpreted as the change in the consumption price index. Examining
the definition of w, the RHS of (2.17) is the change in the real after tax wage.
Hence (2.17) reveals that the real after tax wage, w, falls if the tax base
erodes.
In order to calculate household labour supply and demand for dirty goods
the separability assumptions alluded to above regarding household utility
are formalised . Public goods, G and E, are (weakly) separable from private
goods, C, D and V. Clean and dirty goods are aggregated into a composite
consumption good, Q. Formally:
(2.18) Ui=ui(G,E,Hi(Vi,Qi(Ci,Di)))
Optimising the sub-utility function E| in (2.18) subject to the household
budget constraint gives8:
(2.19) Lj = 6jw
The change in the labour supply of household i is given by the household's
uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply, 0'j, times the change in the
real after tax wage. Labour supply depends only on the real-after tax wage




A similar process to that for labour supply above gives the following
expression for the household demand for dirty consumption:
(2.21) El =Li +w+(l-<J>D)oitD
where (?i represents the household substitution elasticity between clean and
dirty consumption in the sub-utility function, Qp
Substituting (2.20) and (2.21) into (2.17) gives the solution for employment:
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(2.22) ^-MdCI-OdKX0:^ where //. = l-(tL+aDtDXI + #')
The term with Li on the LHS, pp is strictly greater than zero9. Before
examining distributional issues, the following section examines the basic
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) result.
2.4 The Bovenberg and de Mooij result
By assuming a single representative household, (i=l), (2.22) allows
Bovenberg and de Mooij's result to be directly examined. (2.22) becomes:
(2.23) JUL = -SDaD(l-0D)dtD where ju= l-(tL +aDtDXl + 0
It should be noted that previously Li was defined as the relative change in
household employment compared with total employment. In the case of a
single household however, total employment is equal to household
employment and so (2.23) shows the relative change in household (and thus,
in this case, total) employment. Thus, provided the pollution tax is at a
positive initial level (tD>0), then a marginal increase in the pollution tax will
reduce employment provided the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour
supply, 01, is positive. Most empirical studies indeed suggest that 01 is
positive (see e.g. Hausman, 1985). The transmission mechanism for this
change is as follows.
The decline in employment is due to a fall in the real after tax wage, w, (from
2.19), eroding the incentives to supply labour. This fall in the real after tax
wage takes place because the reduced rate of labour taxation, tp, is unable to
fully compensate labour for the adverse effects of the increased pollution tax
on their real wage. The reason for this effect is the erosion of the base of the
environmental tax - the higher environmental tax causes households to
substitute clean for dirty consumption.
From (2.17) and including the single household assumption, the tax base
effect is given by:
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(2.24) pJkklh^L\ = -7L-mD7„ = w
The revenue neutral change imposed by the model means that, at the
margin, tLLi + tDDi = 0. Remembering that tp falls and t[) rises, comparing
this expression with (2.24) shows that the tax base will fall as ao, the output
share of dirty goods, is less than one. This fall in the tax base results in the
fall in the real wage, again from (2.24).
The key point is that in order to maintain overall tax revenues the
government is unable to reduce the tax on labour sufficiently to offset the
effect on the real-wage and hence employment of the higher pollution tax.
The pollution tax, which amounts to a narrow base tax, is less efficient in
raising revenue than the broad-based labour tax, as the pollution tax changes
the composition of the consumption basket10. This change in the
consumption basket, a switch from dirty to clean goods, enhances
environmental quality but reduces the real after tax income from work. In a
sense there is an increase in the overall supply of collective goods, in terms
of the enhanced environmental quality and because the costs of collective
goods, including a cleaner environment, are borne by labour, this reduces
the incentive to supply labour.
Returning to (2.12) and again imposing the single household assumption,
welfare effects of the tax changes can be examined:
-v-
Without a pre-existing distortionary labour tax, (tL=0), a marginal reduction
in the pollution tax below its Pigouvian level would not affect welfare11. On
the other hand, if the initial tax on labour was positive, welfare would
increase due to this marginal reduction in tpy The second term on the RHS of
(2.25) would still be zero but from (2.23) the reduction in tD would increase
employment giving a positive first term. Thus in this 'second-best' case, the










The government could return the revenue from pollution taxes in terms of
lump-sum transfers, or indeed by increasing public spending, rather than by
cutting taxes on labour. In this case however, the associated higher levels of
distortionary taxation and transfers imply that employment would decline
more than in the case where labour taxes were reduced. This lower level of
employment would reduce the labour tax base and thus worsen the pre¬
existing distortion. Thus, in the presence of distortionary taxation, revenue-
neutral pollution taxes do allow, in the terminology of the previous chapter,
a 'weak' double dividend in the sense that a cost reduction can be achieved
compared with either returning revenues in a lump-sum fashion or retaining
them.
When distributional effects are taken into consideration, the situation
becomes more complicated and this is dealt with in the following section.
2.5 Distributional issues
To examine the distributional implications of the tax reform considered it is









(2.27) MA = ~tDaD (1 - jto°M where M = 1~(A + aDtD )(! + #)
An examination of (2.27) shows that the change in the relative employment of
household i, L. , where to recap Li=dL^2^Li, is dependant on the
parameters Gi1 and aj where Gi1 and Oj are the household uncompensated
wage elasticity of labour supply and substitution elasticity between clean
and dirty consumption respectively. It is useful to rephrase (2.27):
1 — (t, +aDtD)(l+ &[) ~
<"8>
(2.28) shows the relationship, all else being held constant, between the
household substitution elasticity between dirty and clean goods and the
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household uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply, for a given
change (rise) in tD in relative household labour supply13. A plot14 of (2.28) is
shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 - Relationship between Gj1 and 0i for a given change in
household labour supply.
Figure 2.1 shows the inverse relationship between Sj1 and oj for a given fall
in household labour supply. 01* represents the point at which the Laffer
curve ceases to be upward sloping (gi=0). The two curves in Figure 2.1, L;a
and Ljh, vary the change in employment. L;b represents a greater fall in
employment than L,a, but both are for the same relative change in tp>
If two households have an identical level of marginal substitution between
dirty and clean goods, then, as one would expect, the household with the
greater wage elasticity of labour supply will face the largest fall in
employment (point A and point B on Figure 2.1). Alternatively, if two
households have an identical of wage elasticity of labour supply then the
household with the greater elasticity of substitution between dirty and clean
goods will face the largest fall in employment (point C and D on Figure 2.1).
0 01*
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So how are wage elasticity of labour supply and elasticity of substitution
between dirty and clean goods likely to vary with household income?
Considering wage elasticity of labour, it is likely that higher income
households will have higher levels as, in some sense, they are able to 'afford'
to reduce their labour supply in response to a lower real wage. Low income
households on the other hand, who may be close to subsistence levels, are
likely to respond to a cut in real wages to a lesser degree15. Thus, it would
appear that lower income households will have a lower wage elasticity of
supply than higher income households and, as such, other things being
equal will face a lower fall in employment.
Examining the elasticity of substitution between dirty and clean
consumption goods, the exact nature of the dirty good is obviously
important. If the dirty good is a necessity, e.g., energy, then the
substitutability between it and the clean consumption good is likely to be
relatively low for all households. However, it may be argued that, in the case
of, say, energy, the lower the income of the household, the closer they are
likely to be to subsistence levels of consumption of the dirty good, and thus,
the lower the elasticity of substitution. Higher income households on the
other hand may have scope to reduce wasteful consumption and thus have a
higher elasticity of substitution.
So it would appear that, for both parameters, the likely situation is that their
values will be lower for lower income households. As such, it is likely that
lower income households will endure a lower relative change in
employment. The effect of the tax reform may well be progressive in nature,
in terms of employment.
Turning to welfare, the situation is more complicated. Examining (2.12),











This expression is a good proxy for the relative change in welfare due to the
inclusion of the marginal utility of income term on the LHS. The Pigouvian
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tax detailed in (2.13), if there is no pre-existing labour tax (tL=0) will have a
distributional impact in the model, if the households are differentiated. The
impact on any particular household will depend on that household's
marginal valuation of the environment, cfy/oE. Households with a high
environmental valuation will experience a welfare gain whilst those with
low environmental valuations will experience a welfare loss. Without
quantification of this valuation the effect is ambiguous.
If we differentiate households by income, as is natural, it may be argued
that higher income households have the resources to be able to be concerned
about the environment and thus may place a higher value on environmental
quality. Alternatively, higher income households may be more able to
isolate themselves from poor environmental quality by relocating away from
the pollutant source, meaning as they are able to avoid environmental
damage they may value the environment less highly than lower income
households who are geographically immobile.. Which of these arguments, if
either, holds true is open to debate, but will obviously depend on the nature
of the environmental externality being considered. The first argument may
be suited to pollution that has a global impact, e.g. CO2, whilst the second
would be more relevant to a pollutant with a geographically localised
impact such as SO2- The first of the two arguments may, in reality, have
more merit.
The basic argument outlined in Section 2.4, for the optimal environmental
tax, in the presence of distortionary labour taxation, to be below Pigouvian
levels is unaffected by any distributional breakdown. However, it was
shown above that the relative change in employment, given a increased
pollution tax, is lower for lower income households. Given the uncertainty
about relative environmental valuation it is difficult to draw any firm
implications in terms of overall relative welfare changes. It may be argued
that, given the postulated higher elasticity of substitution between dirty and
clean goods of higher income households, lower income households may
gain from the increased environmental quality caused by the reduction in
dirty consumption which is undertaken primarily by higher income
households. But it must be reiterated that the overall relative welfare change
is dependant on the environmental valuation of households.
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In considering the alternative revenue recycling instrument, alluded to
above, of increased lump-sum transfers, the situation becomes more
complicated. As mentioned above, the associated higher levels of
distortionary taxation would mean that employment would decline more
than in the case in which labour taxes are cut. The overall effect is less
attractive than the use of the revenue to reduce labour taxes. However, given
the lower employment effects that lower income households face, lower
income households may see a relative gain due to the higher benefit they
would receive from increased transfers.
This is an issue that will be addressed in the following chapters which
present a more complicated empirical approach. It should be noted at this
point that the difficulty in quantifying environmental changes16 empirically
presents a difficult in what follows. The approach used in the following
chapter, is to use potential environmental valuation as a bench mark for
comparison. This is facilitated by the relatively straightforward form of the
model's results. In the case of the CGE model, specific to carbon taxation,
that forms the remainder of this thesis, the form of the results generated is
much more complex and the approach is to consider environmental effects
only in the sense of achieving given levels of CO2 emissions.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has extended the model of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b) to
allow for differentiated households. The form of the expansion allowed their
results, alluded to in chapter 1, to be presented in detail. The basic story is
that a revenue neutral increase in a pollution tax in the presence of
distortionary labour taxation will cause a fall in employment but will be
preferable to the revenue being retained or being recycled by lump-sum
transfer. The double dividend of revenue-neutral environmental taxation
exists in, to use the terminology of Goulder (1995), its weak form.
This fall in employment is due to a fall in the real after tax wage, w, reducing
incentives to supply labour. The fall in the real after tax wage takes place
because the reduced rate of labour taxation is unable to fully compensate
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labour for the adverse effects of the increased pollution tax on their real
wage. This takes place because of an erosion of the base of the
environmental tax.
If the households in the model are differentiated by income, then sensible
assumptions about the differences in the wage elasticity of labour supply
and the substitutability of clean and dirty consumption goods between
households result in lower income households facing a smaller relative
change in employment. Thus, the employment effect of such revenue-
neutral tax reform is progressive.
The situation in terms of welfare is unclear as relative changes in welfare
depend on the households' environmental valuation. It is not clear in what
way the environmental valuation of households will change as one moves
up through the income distribution. What is clear is that it will be dependant
on the nature of the pollutant concerned. As such, a theoretical model such
as that presented in this chapter is of little direct use to policy makers.
The situation is one where empirical analysis, focused on a specific pollutant
is required. The focus for the remainder of this thesis will be on carbon
taxation for the reasons outlined in chapter 1. Briefly, the key point is that no
abatement technologies exist for CO2 - it is the use of carbon based fuel that
is the pollutant. This is in contrast to SO2 which is a side-product of other




'The inclusion of different levels of household potential labour supply allows differentiation
between households.
2From this point on^ will be used to denote the sum across all households.
i
3Namely the total differential of household utility from (2.2) with the change in G set to zero.
4With N identical households (2.13) exactly matches Bovenberg and de Mooij result that the
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5Bovenberg and de Mooij refer to this process as log-linearisation. See also Bovenberg (1989).
6As tax changes are now being dealt with, the tax rates, t]_ and tp>, are no longer treated as
constants.
The before tax wage is simply equal to labour productivity.
The specific maximisation problem is:
max Ht (V,; Q,) s.t. pQ = h(l - tL )(L* - Vi)




The change in the supply of labour, Lj, in response to a change in the real wage, w, is:
AT fLiAAL. = —11 Aw
c^v
Thus, combining the two equations above:
L; AN Aw
AL, = 6|— Aw=>—L = Q '=>Lj =6jw
w Lj w
9If p;<0 then the household Laffer curve is downward sloping and the model is unstable.
10The labour tax does not distort the consumption basket due to the assumptions made about
the form of the household utility function.
"Under an existing Pigouvian tax with no labour taxation, both the first term on the RHS and
the term in brackets on the RHS of (2.25) would be equal to zero. A marginal reduction in ip>
would have no impact.
12The functional form of both (2.12) and (2.22) is such that such a disagregation is trivial.
13Again subject to the condition that the Laffer curve is upward sloping.
14A plot of (2.28) is the same basic shape regardless of the parameterisation, provided that the
condition that |_L > 0 is met.
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15The existence of a comprehensive benefit system may negate this argument if it provides an
incentive for low income households to reduce employment when faced with a lower real
wage.
16Both in terms of household's environmental valuation and indeed the extent of any
environmental effect.
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Chapter 3 - An Empirical Partial Equilibrium
Approach
3.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the simplest possible empirical approach to an
examination of the distributional consequences of the double-dividend
hypothesis, that of partial equilibrium analysis. The model that follows
concentrates solely on the consumption or household sector of the economy
and abstracts from effects on production.
While this approach is not in any major sense realistic, it does allow the
exploration of some of the issues raised by the consideration of
distributional effects within the broader context of the double dividend
hypothesis. Once the absence of production sector affects is accepted, the
model that is set up has the power to analysis the behaviour of the
consumption sector in a detailed way. In the following model, the scenario
considered should be viewed as dealing with consumer taxation only, i.e..
changes in the indirect taxation, faced by consumers, on final goods. An
alternative view could be a situation where the production sector is assumed
to simply pass on any increase in costs.
The most important loss generated by the concentration on the household
side of the economy is that employment effects are ignored. This is a
significant omission as even within the context of consumption taxation only,
there are likely to be significant employment effects. If nothing else, the
result will be that changes in the demand for various goods will affect the
output and hence the employment of the sector of the economy that
produces them.
Another important issue to note is that concentration on the environmental
externalities in an economy arising solely from consumption goods is likely
to grossly understate the total effect. It is quite obvious that the production
sector is responsible for the generation of a majority of externalities. This
will obviously depend on the nature of the externality being considered.
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Table 1.1 (repeated from the previous chapter) gives some indication of this
split for carbon dioxide (CO2) and Sulphur Dioxide (SO2).
Table 1.1 - Percentage of emissions generated by sector of the economy
Percentage of total emissions coming from:
Pollutant Housing, commerce, transport Power stations, refineries and
and agriculture other industry.
C02 44 56
S02 11 89
Source: UK Dept. of Trade and Industry(1996), Digest of UK Energy Statistics,
pp 190-1
It should be noted that the split shown in the table does not exactly
correspond to the division imposed in the model as the model does not
consider the use of transport and agriculture in the production sector, but it
is sufficient to illustrate the point required. CO2 is a much more suitable
pollutant to consider in the way proposed than SO2.
Thus the focus of the empirical part of this chapter will be on energy use.
Section 3.2 details the theoretical layout of the model and defines the terms
used. Section 3.3 examines the empirical analysis undertaken and Section 3.4
presents these empirical results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical layout of the model
The model outlined in this section follows closely the model of Schob (1995)
but is expanded to allow for differentiated households, thus allowing the
examination of distributional effects. The analysis is simplistic in that it only
considers final good (consumption) taxation in a small open economy.
Section 3.2.1 derives the marginal social cost of public funds measure that is
the basis of the model, Section 3.2.2 applies this measure theoretically and
Section 3.2.3 considers the distributional issues raised.
3.2.1. Derivation of the marginal social cost ofpublic funds measure
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The model deals with h households, who need not be identical. There are n
goods, denoted by x\,...xd,..., Goods x^ to ^ (not xy) are clean goods
whose consumption causes no externality. Good x^ is a 'dirty' good whose
consumption creates a negative externality, E. The externality is equal
simply to the aggregate consumption of the dirty good:
where ^ is the consumption of the dirty good by household h. Each
household has a twice, continuously differentiable utility function u(x;[,...,
xq,...., xn, E), with positive marginal utilities except for the marginal utility
of the environmental externality, up, which is negative. Good x^ is chosen
as numeraire and is assumed to be untaxed. A small, open economy
assumption is made - producer prices are equal to world market prices and
as such remain constant when tax-rates and consumer prices change. For
simplicity these producer prices are set at unity. Thus, the indirect utility
function of household h is given by:
where tj is the tax rate on the clean good i (i=l,..N) and ty denotes the tax
rate on the dirty good d. Tp is the lump-sum transfer from the government to
household h, if applicable. This allows the construction of a utilitarian social
welfare function of the form:
The welfare change of a tax-rate change, when revenue is retained by the
government, can be found by:
with k = l,...,N,d and u1 is the marginal utility of the numuaire and ug is the
marginal utility of environmental damage. On examining (3.4), the first term
in the bracket is the direct utility loss of each of the respective households,




(3.3) W = £vh = £vh(t2,...,td,...,tN,Th,E)
h h
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denotes the change in utility arising from a change in the environment. The
first part of this term can be written as dE/ dtk =2_, dcj/dtk. A change in the
h
consumer price of any good will change the level of emissions due to either
the own price effect, when the good taxed is the dirty good (k=d), or the
cross-price effect when the price of other goods changes (k=l,...,N, and kDd).
Total tax revenue, R, is given by
(3.5) R=j[%nxhn+tdxh\-^Thh V"=l J h
The breakdown of R is quite simple - the first term denotes the tax revenue
due to the taxation of the clean goods, the second term the taxation of the
dirty goods and the final term the lump-sum transfer to the households. It is
now assumed that there is separability between emissions and the
consumption of all private goods i.e. a change in emissions does not affect
consumption or algebraically, dxk/dE = 0,\/ k We can now find the change in
tax revenues resulting from a change of tax rate k:
(3.6) +y3'* j
dtk dtk ' dtk)
with i=l,...,d,...,N. A revenue-neutral environmental tax reform which
increases the environmental tax on the dirty good, d, and reduces the tax on
clean good, c, such that the revenue raised remains constant is described
algebraically by:
(3.7) dRd =~dRc > 0
Thus, positive revenues, due to an increase in t^, are equal to the amount to
be refunded by decreasing f^. To evaluate the welfare costs of a tax reform,
the costs can be broken down into the direct cost, assuming that
environmental quality remains constant, and the indirect benefit from the
improvement in the environment. The direct cost or the marginal cost of
public funds (MCF)1 is determined by aggregating the utility loss of a single
household over all households. The direct loss to a single household,
ignoring environmental effects (denoted by E), from a marginal increase in
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tp is given by: du*/dtk|1 = -xk, where du*=du/ui- Aggregating over all
households and relating to the marginal tax revenues we have:
A
MCF, =■(3.8) — k- ^
The MCFp measures the social cost of one marginal unit of tax revenue
raised by an increase in the tax rate on good k. It is important to note that a
positive MCF associated with a tax rise is welfare diminishing and a positive
MCF associated with a tax fall is welfare increasing. In other words the MCF
measures the cost associated with a tax rise and the benefit associated with a
tax fall. It is also important to stress that the MCF has no unit and thus is
only useful for comparison between potential tax rate changes. The MCF
measure, as stated above, does not measure any environmental effects
associated with a change in tax rate, k.
The key point is that if the cross-price effect between any good, in this case
good k, and the dirty good, d, is non-zero then the tax change will induce a
change in demand for good d and the quality of the environment will
change. This will have a resultant effect on welfare. To measure this effect
the indirect loss or benefit from the environmental impact must be related to
the revenues raised in a similar way to that above. This indirect welfare
effect for a particular household is equal to the marginal utility of a change
in emissions (up) times the change of emissions due to a change in tp
(dE/ dtk). Thus, summing up for all households, we have the marginal
environmental impact (MEI) of the tax change:
(3.9) MEIk -
Making use of Equation (3.1), and the separability assumption between
emissions and consumption we can define:
(3.10)
dtk h dtk







and substituting into Equation (3.9), we have an alternative expression for
MEL
xf£x«:
(3.ii) MEik = * y
dt.
The first term in the numerator represents the Marginal Environmental
Damage (MED) of a change in emissions. Thus, a negative MED, a reduction
in emissions represents an environmental improvement. The second term
represents the Marginal Environmental Valuation (MEV) of a rise in
emissions. The MEV of a particular household is difficult to quantify but
will be negative if households gain utility from environmental quality. It
should be remembered that Ue and hence MEV is negative in sign. This is
simply a result of the fact that a households' utility will decrease if it values
the environment and the environment degrades. It is important to note that,
given the above, a positive MEI associated with a tax rise denotes a benefit
(negative MED from a fall in emissions and thus an improvement in the
environment times a negative MEV) and a positive MEI associated with a tax
cut denotes a loss - this is purely from the way the measure is defined. The
marginal social cost of public funds (MSCF) is derived by subtracting the
environmental benefit from the direct cost of the tax change.
(3.12) MSCFk=MCFk - MEIk
It is now crucial to note that a positive MSCF associated with a tax rise
represents a decline in welfare, whilst a positive MSCF associated with a tax
fall represents a rise in welfare. Decomposing the welfare effects of a tax
change in this way allows the welfare effects of tax reform to be analysed in
terms of both the efficiency of the tax system and the environmental damage.
This is consistent with Schob (1995). However the disaggregation by
households allows examination of distributional effects. It should also be
noted that, in this raw form, the measure takes no account of what happens
to the revenue raised.
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3.2.2 Theoretical application of the model
This section again follows Schob (1995) very closely in its initial stages, but
then goes on to examine the distributional factors that the extension to his
model allows. The welfare effect of a revenue neutral tax change as
described by equation (3.7) is a combination of the welfare effects of the two
tax changes - the reduction in tax on the clean good and the increase in tax on
the dirty good. The MSCF measure measures the cost, in terms of welfare, to
society of a tax change. It is vital to note however that because of the raising






0& MSCF - MSCFA
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This can be thought of intuitively as follows - the effect of lowering the tax
rate on good c is to increase welfare by the MSCFc, whilst the effect of raising
the tax rate on good d is to reduce welfare by MSCFj. Equation (3.1.14)
decomposes the MSCF into the environmental dividend and the efficiency





= "0 <=> (MEId - MEIc) + (MCFc - MCFd )'
<
ro
where W represents the welfare associated with a revenue neutral tax
change. In addition to examining the effect of imposing the environmental
tax and reducing other tax rates, it is desirable to examine the consequences
of using the revenue to reduce all tax rates - in effect a uniform VAT
reduction. The MCF and MEI for this are shown in equations (2.1.15a) and
(2.1.15b).
(3.15a)MCFvat =JjrJ^-^
l / li MCF:
(3.15b) MEIvat =YM/X £*,+X'/> ai / i V J k
ok,
dt.k /
At this point it would be useful to summarise which sign of which measure
for which good indicates a welfare improvement. This is shown in the Table
3.1.
Table 2.1 - Welfare implications of the sign of the MEI ad MCF
measures.





Equation (3.14) illustrates the environmental dividend (MEy - MEy, the
strong form of the second dividend (MCFc - MCF^) and the weak form of the
second dividend (MCFc).
The environmental dividend is given by MEy, which will be positive if the
environment improves due to the increased tax on good d, minus MEy
which will be positive if the environment is worsened by the reduced tax on
good c. It is obvious that MEy will be positive2, but the sign of ME^
depends on the complementarity / substitutability relationship between the
two goods. If good d is a complement to good c, then a reduction in the price
of good c will increase demand for good d, ceterus paribus and MEIC will be
positive and either (i) the environmental dividend will be reduced (MEy >
MEy or it will be negative (MElc>MEy). If the goods are substitutes the
environmental dividend will be reinforced by the fall in the price of good c
reducing the demand for good d further and if there is no relationship
between the two goods then the environmental dividend will be given solely
by MEy, as MEIc will be equal to zero.
The second dividend will take its strong form if MCFC/ the efficiency gain
from the effect of the tax decrease on the rest of the tax system is positive and
greater in magnitude than MCFj, the efficiency loss from the tax increase on
the dirty good. This will depend on the nature of the two goods and must be
determined empirically. If MCFc is positive, but lower in magnitude than
MCF,-}, then we have the weak form of the second dividend - the efficiency of
the rest of the tax system is improved, but the efficiency of the tax system as
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a whole is reduced. In this case there will exist a critical value of the net
MED (MEDfj - MEDC) for which environmental dividend exactly outweighs
the direct cost of the tax reform (MCFf.-MCF^). This critical value, for a
particular tax change, will be determined by the environmental valuation of
the household or MEV. This value for environmental valuation will be
termed Critical Marginal Environmental Valuation (CMEV).
3.2.3 Distributional issues
The distributional effect of a tax change can easily be ascertained from the
model. The form of the social welfare function used means that all
households have equal weight. Disaggregating Equation (3.14) to household
level gives us:
(3.16) ^ = {MEtd - MEf )- (MCF*c - MCFhd)
atd




and similarly for the VAT reduction measures in equations (3.15a) and
(3.15b). This allows analysis of the issues of Pareto improvements and equity
effects.
Assuming that the change to the tax system is welfare improving overall, it




If we assume there are H households, h = 1,...,H and they are ranked in
income order in that household H has the highest income and household 1










Constant W; = Wj
i<j
The expressions in equation (2.1.19) represent the proportionate increase in
welfare of the households i.e. the increase in welfare divided by its level.
Thus, if a lower income household's welfare is increased proportionally
more than a higher income households, then there will be an improvement
in equity.
Equation (3.16) decomposes the MCF and MEI measures for individual
households. A stated previously, the MEI measure is equal to the marginal
environmental change associated with the relevant tax change times the
household's valuation of the environment. Thus a household that values the
environment highly will have a high MEI for a given tax-rate. On considering
the relative importance of the environment between a high and a low income
household the case can be argued in either direction.
Firstly, a high income household may value the environment more highly as
it can afford to do so. This can be thought of as an 'altruistic' motive for
environmental concern in that households may value the existence of a
'clean' environment even if it does not affect them directly. Alternatively, a
low income household may be unable to isolate itself from environmental
damage. In this case, what can be termed an 'impact' or 'effect' motive for
environmental valuation, lower income households are likely to have
greater concern. In reality, a mixture of both 'altruistic' and 'effect' motives
will combine to give an overall view of the environment for a particular
household. This will depend on both the precise nature of the externality
being considered, in particular the location of its effects, and the income
level of the individual. A traditional externality such as smoke from a factory
will impact less on a higher income household, as they will be more easily
able to locate away from the source. Thus impact motives are likely to be
important for such a source for lower income households. However, an
externality such as SO2 emissions causing acid rain in Scandinavia and
impacting, say, on biodiversity, may be of concern to higher income
households for altruistic reasons.
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The individual household MCF measure simply depends on the direct loss
of utility from the tax change. If the dirty good is an inferior good, then lower
income households will be hit harder, as will be the case if the clean good is
a normal good and vice versa.
3.3 Empirical analysis
The model outlined in Section 3.2 was analysed empirically using
Pashardes' (1993) Almost Ideal Demand System for the UK economy.
Pashardes estimates an Almost Ideal Demand System for the UK economy
using Family Expenditure Survey Data, 1970-86, for seven non-durable good
types - Food, Alcohol, Fuel, Clothing, Transport, Other and Services. The
problems of applying standard demand analysis to durable goods are
detailed in Deaton and Muellbaur (1980).
3.3.1 The Almost Ideal Demand System ofPashardes (1993)
Under the Almost Ideal Demand System the budget share of good i, w[ is
given by:
where a;, yjj and (3 are parameters, Y is expenditure, pj is the price of good j
and where P is a price Index defined by:
The parameters a; and ao vary between households and the y;j and |Vs
define the interrelationships between goods and the income effects
respectively. It should be noted that Equation (3.21) represents the exact
form of the price index which Pashardes (1993) shows is preferable to the
often used Stone approximation, which being linear simplifies estimation,
but causes bias due to an omitted variable problem. The Stone
Approximation Index is given by:
(3.20)





log P = log Pl
(3.22)
Pashardes estimates the demand system in four ways: Macro data using the
Stone Index (MaS), Macro data using the True Index (MaT), Micro data using
the Stone Index (MiS) and Micro data using the True Index (MiT).
All four demand systems were used in order to achieve some analysis of the
sensitivity of the results to variations in the parameters. Pashardes1 results
can be found in Appendix 3a.
3.3.2 Calibration of the model.
The Almost Ideal Demand System allows the parameters a; and ao to vary
between households. The model was calibrated using 1996 data on
household budget shares and expenditure (normalised in terms of
household 1) as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 - Data on household budget shares and expenditure (normalised in
Household Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services Normalised
Expenditure
Average 0.256 0.087 0.076 0.075 0.178 0.127 0.202 3.3426
1 0.329 0.110 0.142 0.057 0.106 0.098 0.159 1
2 0.318 0.089 0.124 0.068 0.102 0.104 0.194 1.254
3 0.295 0.093 0.097 0.064 0.151 0.108 0.191 1.836
4 0.259 0.084 0.074 0.072 0.147 0.184 0.181 2.345
5 0.246 0.090 0.069 0.073 0.194 0.123 0.206 2.951
6 0.241 0.095 0.060 0.080 0.196 0.129 0.198 3.328
7 0.229 0.082 0.053 0.080 0.226 0.133 0.197 3.568
8 0.230 0.086 0.052 0.084 0.214 0.123 0.210 4.320
9 0.219 0.076 0.046 0.086 0.229 0.133 0.212 5.376
10 0.190 0.069 0.040 0.085 0.215 0.133 0.267 7.448
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Producer prices were normalised to unity and consumer prices were
calculated by adding the proportion of indirect tax on each good type shown
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 - Proportion of indirect tax on the good types.
Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services
0% 71.82% 17.5% 17.5% 17.5% 17.5% 17.5%
Source - Schob 1995.
Four sets of data were available from the Macro and Micro data estimated by
both the Stone Index and the True Index. For each set of data both the Exact
and True index were used for calibration of household demand parameters.
This gave rise to 8 sets of demand parameters as follows:
• Macro data using the Stone Index for estimation and the Stone Index for prediction - MaSS
• Macro data using the Stone Index for estimation and the True Index for prediction - MaST
• Macro data using the True Index for estimation and the Stone Index for prediction- MaTS
• Macro data using the True Index for estimation and the True Index for prediction- MaTT
• Micro data using the Stone Index for estimation and the Stone Index for prediction - MiSS
• Micro data using the Stone Index for estimation and the True Index for prediction - MiST
• Micro data using the True Index for estimation and the Stone Index for prediction - MiTS
• Micro data using the True Index for estimation and the True Index for prediction - MiTT
Although it may be theoretically dubious to use data estimated with one
type of price index method for prediction with another type, the process
allowed a more significant analysis of the sensitivity of the results to the
demand parameters. The calibrated demand parameters are given in
Appendix 3b.
3.3.3 Examination of the calibrated demand parameters
On examination of the calibrated demand parameters, a few stylised facts
become apparent. The intercept terms for the MaST and MaTT models are
significantly different from the parameters from the other models. It should
be remembered, of course, that the models that use the true index for
estimation (MaST, MaTT, MiST, MiTT) have an extra parameter, the price
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index co-efficient, than the models that use the Stone Index for
approximation. However, all of the Micro data models share very similar
intercept terms. Examination of the Price Index co-efficients for the Macro
models shows that they vary considerably in sign and magnitude across
households and are correlated strongly to each other. The Micro models
have small, relatively constant values across all households. This would
appear to be consistent with Pashardes' result that bias from the Stone Index
is exacerbated in Macro data and throws suspicion3 on the Macro models,
especially the two that use the two different indices (MaST and MaTS).
The parameters for Food, Clothing, Other and Services are very similar
across all models as opposed to those for Fuel in particular. This is perhaps
a worry as it is Fuel, as the dirty good that we are primarily concerned with.
As far as analysis across households is concerned, higher income households
have generally higher intercepts for Food and Other, whilst for the other
goods they remain relatively constant or there is no discernible pattern. The
co-efficient for household 4 for Other is somewhat difficult to explain.
The following section details the calculation of the MCF and MSCF
measures.
3.3.4 Calculation of theMCF andMSCF measures
The MCF and MEI for each good were calculated using equations (3.8) and
(3.11). It should be noted that no value was initially implemented for the
marginal environmental value, MEV, in equation (2.1.11). Rather the co¬
efficient or marginal environmental damage, MED was calculated. The use
of this co-efficient is seen in the following sections. In addition to calculating
the MCF, MEI and then the MSCF for an increase in indirect taxation (a VAT
increase in effect) for each good, the MCF and MEI for an overall VAT
change were also estimated using equations (3.15a) and (3.15b).
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3.4 Results
Each of the models produces 11 by 8 = 160 ([[Households x MCF] + MED] x
Goods {7+VAT} ) initial values as its basic results which are then
manipulated. These results are given in their entirety in Appendix 3c. The
large amount of raw result data, particularly for the MCF, means that it is
difficult to intuitively grasp what is happening. Thus, Section 3.4.1 deals
solely with the MCF for the average household in order to generate a 'feel'
for what is taking place. Section 3.4.2 then considers all households.
3.4.1 Results for theAverage household
The results for the average household are shown in Table 3.4. and illustrated
in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 clearly shows that the MCF is highest for Alcohol
and also that there is the most variation between models for Alcohol. This is
consistent with the initial high rate of tax on Alcohol as i) one would expect
the MCF to be high in this case and ii) with a high initial tax rate small
differences between models will be exacerbated. Examining the other goods,
although the conclusions are not so obvious as the conclusions drawn for
Alcohol, it can be seen that the MaST and MaTS models vary considerably
from the others, particularly Services. This is consistent with Pashardes'
result that bias from the Stone Index approximation is exacerbated with
Macro data. Thus, using a mixture of indexes with the Macro data produces
distorted results. These two models (MaST and MaTS) are excluded from
any further analysis.
Table 3.4 - Results for the average household.
Model Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
MaSS 0.104785 0.193875 0.11163 0.088246 0.092947 0.103702 0.102398 0.112865
MaST 0.101939 0.016596 0.112541 0.1056 0.081716 0.113004 0.16883 0.114009
MaTS 0.104187 0.01646 0.112339 0.105644 0.084742 0.109867 0.166242 0.113142
MaTT 0.100249 0.1894 0.098796 0.093279 0.093714 0.10549 0.110898 0.114854
MiSS 0.113362 0.249559 0.097306 0.081118 0.090574 0.102984 0.101587 0.11246
MIST 0.096406 0.313 0.086918 0.101011 0.099131 0.101539 0.104706 0.121344
MiTS 0.089083 0.434153 0.07997 0.110374 0.104062 0.101507 0.108535 0.127668
MiTT 0.083784 0.616397 0.073269 0.120881 0.111751 0.100662 0.11147 0.133789
59











After excluding the two 'mixed' Macro models (MaST and MaTS), it becomes
apparent that the remaining results are broadly consistent with each other.
The Macro models tend to understate values for Clothing and Transport and
overstate values for Food and most significantly Fuel, compared with the
Micro models. The next sectionwill deal with all households.
3.4.2 Results for all Households
All results for the MCF can be found in Appendix 3c but are illustrated
diagramatically in Figure 3.2 (a to f).
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Figure 3.2b - MCF by household in the MaST model
Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
MCF by household
0
Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
Figure 3.2e - MCF by household in the MiSS model
MCF by household
Figure 3.2d - MCF by household in the MiST model
MCF by household
Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
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Figure 3.2e - MCF by household in the MiTS model.
MCF by household
Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
Figure 3.2f - MCF by household in theMiTT model
MCF by household
Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
The results for all goods are broadly similar in that, as one would expect, the
higher the income of the household, the higher the MCF the household faces
from a rise in the tax rate on a particular good. One exception to this is Other
which is bi-modal at household 4 and 10. Across models, the results for
Food and Fuel seem to be overstated by Macro data and the results for
Alcohol and to a lesser extent Transport are overstated by Micro data.
The marginal environmental damage (MED) co-efficients which are the same
for all households are show in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.5 - Marginal Environmental Damage co-efficients
Model Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
MaSS -0.03682 0.613905 -0.51676 -0.18077 -0.22098 0.17985 -0.02851 -0.0827
MaTT -0.07893 0.629277 -0.57021 -0.07871 -0.16296 0.255552 0.117447 -0.01342
MiSS -0.1116 1.451169 -0.35453 -0.03594 -0.25007 0.165688 -0.11787 -0.06814
MiST -0.03215 1.981076 -0.2616 0.015364 -0.21367 0.229609 -0.05548 -0.00619
MiTS -0.30749 3.450824 -0.51691 0.237012 -0.10376 0.152675 -0.03587 0.013884
MiTT -0.23525 5.227079 -0.42104 0.330172 -0.04079 0.217513 0.03537 0.085004
The MED results show much greater variance than those for the MCF. A tax
increase on Food, Fuel, Transport and Services is shown to be
environmentally improving across all models and a tax increase on Clothing
and VAT is environmentally improving across a majority of models. These
results are illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 - Marginal Environmental Damage coefficients
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A somewhat surprising result is that a rise in Alcohol tax is severely
environmentally damaging, a fact that is massively exaggerated by the micro
models. This could conceivably be explained by the nature of the good in
relation to Fuel (the dirty good). Although both goods are inferior in that
lower income households spend proportionally more on them, alcohol
could be considered a luxury and fuel a necessity. Thus, an increase in the
price of Alcohol would induce a large amount of switching to Fuel. This is
borne out by Pashardes (1993) who calculates the cross price elasticity of
demand4 (at average budget shares and reference prices) for alcohol and fuel
to be 0.732. This is relatively large (compared with all other cross price
elasticities except Alcohol and services) and is of a similar size to the own
price elasticites of the commodities other than Alcohol. As a point of
reference, these own price elasticities range from (minus) 0.550 for Food to
(minus) 0.813 for Transport. The own price elasticity for Alcohol is (minus)
1.957.
Pashardes' elasticity results are reasonably consistent with those of Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980) on Macro data and Browning and Meghir (1991) on
micro data when the Stone or approximate index is used (by Pashardes). It
should be noted that the purpose of Pashardes (1993) is to examine the bias
generated by the use of this approximation compared with the more
complex true index (See 3.21 and 3.22). Pashardes finds that there is indeed
significant bias (with both data types) and a close examination shows that
this bias is downward for the cross price elasticity of Fuel and Alcohol. Thus,
although the large environmental damage resulting from a rise in the
Alcohol tax is surprising it is consistent with both the AID system estimates
that are used and, bearing inmind the comments above, other studies.
The MED results are interesting in that they show that the environment
would benefit from a range of tax rises, not just one on fuel, although an
increase in the tax on Fuel offers the greatest beneficial change. However,
more importantly, when revenue-neutrality is considered, reducing tax rates
on Food, Transport and Services and to some extent Clothing and VAT
results in the overall environmental benefit being reduced. This is dealt with
more thoroughly in the next section.
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3.4.3. RevenueNeutrality
The revenue-neutral changes considered consist of raising the tax rate on
Fuel and reducing the tax rate on each of the other goods in turn. This gives
the results for MCF and MED reported in Appendix 3d. These results are
illustrated for MCF for all households in Figure 3.4 (a to h).
Figure 3.4a - MCF for revenue neutral tax changes in MaSSmodel
MCF by household - revenue neutrality
Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
Figure 3.4b - MCF for revenue neutral tax changes inMaTT model
MCF by household • revenue neutrality
Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
Figure 3.4c - MCF for revenue neutral tax changes inMiSS model
MCF by household ■ revenue neutrality
□ f 02 9i Ch 05 Ds H7 Si Hta Ebo
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Figure 3.4d - MCF for revenue neutral tax changes in MiST model
MCF by household - revenue neutrality
Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
Figure 3.4e - MCF for revenue neutral tax changes in MiTS model
MCF by household - revenue neutrality
Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
Figure 3.4f - MCF for revenue neutral tax changes in MiTT model
MCF by household • revenue neutrality
Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
The basic pattern is that for all goods, with the exception of Alcohol, a
revenue-neutral tax change causes a direct welfare loss to the lower end of
the income spectrum. This loss is least for Food. This means that the second
dividend exists in it's strong form for Alcohol and it's weak form for all other
goods. In general the Macro models tend to understate the gains for the high
income households and overstate the losses of the low income households.
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This is due to the fact that the MCF for Fuel is significantly higher in the
Macro models.
The values for the MED are shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 - Marginal Environmental damage under revenue-neutrality.
MED Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
MaSS -0.47994 -1.13067 -0.33599 -0.29579 -0.69661 -0.48825 -0.43407
MaTT -0.49128 -1.19949 -0.49151 -0.40725 -0.82577 -0.68766 -0.55679
MiSS -0.24292 -1.80569 -0.31859 -0.10446 -0.52021 -0.23666 -0.28638
MiST -0.22945 -2.24268 -0.27696 -0.04793 -0.49121 -0.20612 -0.25541
MiTS -0.20942 -3.96773 -0.75392 -0.41315 -0.66958 -0.48103 -0.53079
MiTT -0.18579 -5.64812 -0.75121 -0.38025 -0.63856 -0.45641 -0.50605
The table clearly shows that what ever the revenue returning instrument, the
environment clearly benefits. However the scale of this benefit varies
considerably. This is illustrated in Figure 3.5.





















Reducing taxes on Alcohol yields the greatest environmental benefit. Indeed,
given the direct benefit from using Alcohol tax, the strongest policy
prescription is to use the revenue raised from the tax on Fuel to reduce taxes
on Alcohol. This raises several policy issues. Firstly, alcohol and tobacco are
considered by many (but not all) to be 'bad' goods and responsible for
externalities in their own right and there would likely be objections on
health and perhaps, public order grounds. Secondly though, in a European
context, taxes on Alcohol and Tobacco are significantly higher in Britain than
much of Continental Europe and thus there may be scope for
implementation in a European context.
The overall effect of tax changes depends on both the direct and
environmental effect. The difficulty in quantifying environmental benefits in
monetary terms means that no exact values for this combination, the
marginal social cost of funds, are given here. What is important however, is
the fact that the environment improves under any of the tax changes and the
MED estimates reflect the magnitude of this benefit. The marginal
environmental valuation of households is however important in considering
distributional issues and this is dealt with in the following section.
3.4.4 Distributional issues
The previous section showed that lower income households face a direct
welfare loss in all cases except that of a reduction in Alcohol taxes. However,
the tax changes may still be Pareto improving if the environmental benefit of
the changes offsets this direct loss. To this end, critical values of the marginal
environment value required by each household so that they are made no
worse off were calculated and are given in Appendix 2e. A household whose
welfare directly improves does not 'need' to value the environment and so
values are not reported for these households5. It should be remembered that
all values are in terms of the income of the lowest household.
These critical values are highest for household 1 in all cases except transport.
Examination of the critical values for transport shows them to be extremely
high - household 1 would have to place a marginal value on the
environment equal to around 70% of its expenditure. This is due to the fact
that the environmental improvement using Transport as a revenue
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redistributive instrument is very small. The other goods give more realistic
values and the highest required environmental valuations are reported in
Table 2.7.
Table 3.7 - Highest critical values for Marginal Environmental Valuation
across all models
Clean Good Food Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
Critical MEV 0.050462 0.126803 0.655142 0.055195 0.128692 0.097914
These are the 'worst case1 values across all models. The equity change
equation, equation (3.19) is not applied at this point as the fact that some
households lose and some gain directly coupled with the difficulty in
quantifying the value of the environmental effects mean it is somewhat
meaningless. For example, suppose household 1 placed a marginal
valuation of 9.79% of its non-durable expenditure, on the environment. In
this case, it's welfare would be unchanged if VAT was used as the revenue
redistributive instrument. If all households valued the environment the
same then they would all benefit the same from the environmental
improvement. This is unlikely to be the case, in reality. However, as a
demonstration it will be assumed it is. The MiSS model that this critical
value is associated with is now examined. Table 2.8 shows the application of
equation (3.19) to this scenario. The adjusted figure shows the welfare
change of each household is dividend by its expenditure6.
Table 3.8 - Welfare Change in MiSS model with MEV of all households equal
to critical MEV for household 1.
Welfare 0.00% 0.31% 1.68% 3.68% 5.08% 6.61% 7.90% 9.19% 12.00 19.65
Change % %
Adjusted 0.00% 0.25% 0.91% 1.57% 1.72% 1.99% 2.22% 2.13% 2.23% 2.64%
Thus in this case the impact is relatively regressive. What is more interesting
is to examine the MEV's required in order that all households receive the
same proportional welfare change. This is shown in the Table 2.9.
69
Table 3.9 - Required MEV of households to achieve same proportional welfare
change.




2.26% 0.177 0.186 0.184 0.155 0.153 0.130 0.104 0.118 0.103 0.000
2.5% 0.185 0.197 0.200 0.174 0.178 0.158 0.133 0.154 0.148 0.062
3% 0.203 0.218 0.232 0.215 0.230 0.216 0.196 0.229 0.242 0.192
4% 0.238 0.262 0.296 0.297 0.333 0.332 0.320 0.380 0.430 0.452
5% 0.273 0.306 0.360 0.379 0.436 0.448 0.445 0.531 0.617 0.712
10% 0.447 0.525 0.681 0.788 0.951 1.029 1.068 1.285 1.556 2.012
A proportional welfare increase of 2.26% is the smallest achievable by
household 10 without a non-positive environmental valuation. What is
interesting is that as the proportional welfare changes become higher, there
is a switch between lower income households having to value the
environment more and higher income households having to. The higher
proportional changes are achieved by all households valuing the
environment more, but what is important is that lower income have to value
the environment less highly than higher income households.
This tentative result can be interpreted as follows: the higher environmental
valuation generally, then the less regressive is revenue neutral tax reform.
More strongly, if environmental valuation is generally high then the firm
possibility arises that the tax reform may in fact be equity improving whilst
still Pareto improving i.e. everyone is made better off, but lower income
groups gain proportionally more. Intuitively, lower income households
benefit from the reduction in environmentally damaging consumption of
higher income households. This reduction in consumption is proportionally
less for the higher income households, hence they benefit directly, but the
indirect benefit is felt proportionally more by those on a low income7. This
must be qualified however by the fact, that in this particular scenario, 'high'




This chapter has defined a measure, the marginal social cost of public funds,
that allows the traditional idea of the double dividend to be analysed from
three different angles - the direct impact, the environmental impact and the
distributional impact. The analysis is conducted in a partial equilibrium
framework. However, no firm conclusions can be drawn on any of these
measures from a theoretical analysis, but it is possible to suggest what may
happen.
Firstly, the environmental dividend may not necessarily be positive. This is
due to the fact that the complex relationships between goods may mean that
by redistributing the revenue from the tax on the environmentally
destructive good, the reduction in other taxes may result in the consumption
of the externality producing good increasing.
Secondly, the second dividend may not exist in its strong form in that the
efficiency of the whole tax system improves. Increasing the tax rate on a
narrow base good and reducing the tax on a broad base may increase the
existing inefficiency in the tax system. This does not prevent the weak
second dividend from existing. Indeed the theory outlined suggests it will
always exist. These points are consistent with earlier work.
These effects cannot be determined by theoretical analysis alone, rather
empirical analysis is needed. The simple small, open economy model is set
up empirically and the effects of changes in the taxation of consumption of
non-durables, analysed. The results show that the environmental dividend is
always positive but the magnitude of this dividend depends very strongly
on the revenue redistribution instrument.
The empirical analysis shows that the strong form of the second dividend
exists only when externality tax revenue is used to reduce the tax rate on
Alcohol and Tobacco. However, the weak form holds in all cases. Lower
income households face a direct welfare decrease under all alternate tax
change options but less than without revenue-neutrality. Thus, lower income
household require positive environmental valuation in order to be better off.
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The most interesting result however, is that equity may be improved, or in
other words the tax changes are progressive, if environmental valuation is
high.
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Appendix 3a - Pashardes (1993) Results
MacroStone Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Trans. Other Services
Intercept 0.6417 0.0866 0.2275 0.079 0.0913 0.1085 -0.2344
LogEx -0.0715 -0.0034 -0.0398 0.0193 0.0187 0.0015 0.0751
Food 0.1175 0.0013 -0.0096 -0.0397 -0.0117 -0.0576 0
Alcohol 0.0013 -0.0272 0.0294 0.0142 0.0244 -0.0306 -0.0114
Fuel -0.0096 0.0294 0.0241 -0.0164 -0.0449 0.0235 -0.006
Clothing -0.0397 0.0142 -0.0164 0.0785 -0.0551 0.0541 -0.0356
Transport -0.0117 0.0244 -0.0449 -0.0551 0.0748 -0.008 0.0207
Other -0.0576 -0.0306 0.0235 0.0541 -0.008 0.0248 -0.0063
Services 0 -0.0114 -0.006 -0.0356 0.0207 -0.0063 0.0392
MacroTrue Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Trans. Other Services
Intercept 0.6458 0.0884 0.2383 0.0727 0.0861 0.0825 -0.2139
LogEx -0.0724 -0.0038 -0.0423 0.0208 0.0199 0.0076 0.0701
Food 0.0788 -0.0013 -0.036 -0.0279 -0.0026 -0.0509 0.0377
Alcohol -0.0013 -0.0268 0.0271 0.0152 0.0253 -0.0305 -0.0089
Fuel -0.036 0.0271 0.0095 -0.0088 -0.0401 0.0278 0.0182
Clothing -0.0279 0.0152 -0.0088 0.0751 -0.0573 0.0515 -0.0477
Transport -0.0026 0.0253 -0.0401 -0.0573 0.0719 -0.0086 0.0116
Other -0.0509 -0.0305 0.0278 0.0515 -0.0086 0.023 -0.0124
Services 0.0377 -0.0089 0.0182 -0.0477 0.0116 -0.0124 0.0019
MicStone Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Trans. Other Services
Intercept 0.5318 0.0052 0.1388 -0.0026 0.1595 0.0933 0.074
LogEx -0.1385 0.0435 -0.0675 0.0446 0.0925 -0.0079 0.0333
Food -0.0576 0.063 -0.0946 0.0343 0.0558 -0.0566 0.0557
Alcohol 0.063 -0.077 0.0738 -0.0019 -0.0172 -0.0213 -0.0194
Fuel -0.0946 0.0738 0.0091 0.0172 -0.0188 0.0204 -0.0071
Clothing 0.0343 -0.0019 0.0172 0.0105 -0.0525 0.0422 -0.0498
Transport 0.0558 -0.0172 -0.0188 -0.0525 0.0266 -0.0026 0.0087
Other -0.0566 -0.0211 0.0204 0.0422 -0.0026 0.0165 0.0012
Services 0.0557 -0.0194 -0.0071 -0.0499 0.0087 0.0011 0.0109
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MicTrue Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Trans. Other Services
Intercept 0.5318 0.0052 0.1388 -0.0026 0.1595 0.0933 0.074
LogEx -0.1385 0.0435 -0.0675 0.0446 0.0925 -0.0079 0.0333
Food -0.0576 0.063 -0.0946 0.0343 0.0558 -0.0566 0.0557
Alcohol 0.063 -0.077 0.0738 -0.0019 -0.0172 -0.0213 -0.0194
Fuel -0.0946 0.0738 0.0091 0.0172 -0.0188 0.0204 -0.0071
Clothing 0.0343 -0.0019 0.0172 0.0105 -0.0525 0.0422 -0.0498
Transport 0.0558 -0.0172 -0.0188 -0.0525 0.0266 -0.0026 0.0087
Other -0.0566 -0.0211 0.0204 0.0422 -0.0026 0.0165 0.0012
Services 0.0557 -0.0194 -0.0071 -0.0499 0.0087 0.0011 0.0109
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Appendix 3b - Calibrated Parameters
MaSS
Household Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l-Food 0.349757 0.336685 0.342335 0.347358 0.327523 0.330645 0.335305 0.327324 0.372534 0.3456 0.339788
l-Alcohol 0.101112 0.120019 0.100986 0.105089 0.096025 0.103679 0.109079 0.096326 0.100972 0.091721 0.085824
l-Fuel 0.105194 0.123287 0.114555 0.10252 0.089151 0.093126 0.088816 0.0847 0.091264 0.094036 0.101349
l-Clothing 0.042868 0.047298 0.054606 0.043348 0.046678 0.043326 0.048052 0.046653 0.046985 0.044731 0.038545
l-Transport 0.146179 0.097617 0.089262 0.131231 0.122706 0.16458 0.16513 0.19393 0.148737 0.189285 0.16971
l-Other 0.127775 0.100581 0.106231 0.109667 0.185304 0.123966 0.129789 0.133681 0.123396 0.133065 0.132578
l-Services 0.127114 0.174513 0.192025 0.160786 0.132612 0.140679 0.123829 0.117386 0.116113 0.101561 0.132206
MaST
Household Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l-Food 0.280744 0.072408 0.510051 0.495917 -0.30663 -0.31963 0.474021 0.378369 1.094396 -0.34663 0.38108
l-Alcohol 0.09783 0.107452 0.107786 0.112208 0.066757 0.072757 0.115734 0.098757 0.136758 0.058757 0.0877
l-Fuel 0.065782 -0.02298 0.208853 0.186775 -0.26385 -0.26885 0.167601 0.113154 0.510169 -0.29185 0.12431
l-Clothing 0.061495 0.119436 0.009334 0.002941 0.217855 0.218855 0.010275 0.032855 -0.15615 0.231855 0.02659
l-Transport 0.165155 0.166736 0.045398 0.09208 0.288561 0.335561 0.128683 0.180561 -0.01845 0.370561 0.1586
l-Other 0.129223 0.106125 0.102713 0.106527 0.198608 0.137608 0.126853 0.132608 0.107608 0.147608 0.13173
l-Services 0.19977 0.450827 0.015865 0.003553 0.798696 0.823696 -0.02317 0.063696 -0.67433 0.829696 0.08987
Plndex Co-ef 0.965673 3.655931 -2.322 -2.06871 8.784777 9.010259 -1.92781 -0.69719 -10.4053 9.611026 -0.5400
MaTS
Household Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l-Food 0.345833 0.331684 0.337544 0.342502 0.323288 0.326613 0.330144 0.323392 0.338152 0.343108 0.33758
l-Alcohol 0.100962 0.119388 0.100044 0.104702 0.096621 0.103478 0.108926 0.095870 0.101573 0.091761 0.08599
l-Fuel 0.104832 0.119915 0.111765 0.100671 0.087907 0.092445 0.089105 0.084495 0.091534 0.094857 0.10257
l-Clothing 0.042795 0.049832 0.055988 0.044167 0.047134 0.043444 0.047993 0.046485 0.046532 0.043948 0.03620
l-Transport 0.146969 0.098923 0.090289 0.131806 0.122990 0.165503 0.165158 0.193716 0.177934 0.188548 0.16809
I-Other 0.122391 0.102539 0.106769 0.107912 0.180782 0.119359 0.124463 0.127912 0.116468 0.124793 0.12232
l-Services 0.136219 0.177720 0.197601 0.168241 0.141278 0.149159 0.134211 0,128130 0.127808 0.112985 0.14662
75
MaTT
Household Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l-Food -0.61374 0.143767 0.266883 0.873256 0.098052 0.090301 0.819256 0.083256 0.808256 0.059939 0.768256
l-Alcohol 0.050597 0.109525 0.095564 0.132597 0.084799 0.091075 0.134597 0.083597 0.125597 0.076898 0.108597
l-Fuel -0.4558 0.010123 0.07135 0.411195 -0.04369 -0.04562 0.374195 -0.0558 0.366195 -0.07059 0.354195
l-Clothing 0.318474 0.103819 0.076289 -0.10853 0.111842 0.111334 -0.09253 0.115474 -0.08853 0.1253 -0.08753
l-Transport 0.41072 0.150574 0.109711 -0.01428 0.184899 0.230456 0.03072 0.25972 0.04872 0.26638 0.04972
l-Other 0.22312 0.122265 0.114187 0.05212 0.205716 0.144165 0.07312 0.15312 0.06712 0.154518 0.07712
l-Services 1.066637 0.359927 0.266017 -0.34636 0.358379 0.37829 -0.33936 0.360637 -0.32736 0.38755 -0.27036
MiSS
Household Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l-Food 0.422512 0.31901 0.342962 0.374786 0.374067 0.393943 0.406124 0.404692 0.433401 0.453535 0.386392
l-Alcohol 0.056611 0.14088 0.108027 0.092888 0.07157 0.066093 0.066095 0.048406 0.043732 0.021514 -0.00199
l-Fuel 0.121202 0.107155 0.104641 0.102646 0.095738 0.105733 0.104569 0.102389 0.114028 0.122684 0.13825
l-Clothing 0.028682 0.05634 0.058701 0.04075 0.039772 0.032407 0.035035 0.032346 0.029295 0.023119 0.07272
l-Transport 0.071455 0.112002 0.087229 0.100071 0.073445 0.099363 0.090344 0.113568 0.083798 0.078191 0.058662
l-Other 0.141299 0.097132 0.106066 0.115804 0.192853 0.135694 0.143179 0.148092 0.140487 0.153264 0.15735
l-Services 0.15824 0.167481 0.192375 0.173055 0.152553 0.166767 0.154653 0.150507 0.155259 0.147694 0.188619
MiST
Household Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l-Food 0.292683 0.160801 0.192492 0.25057 0.21579 0.249014 0.266706 0.270327 0.28988 0.307222 0.331428
l-Alcohol 0.101935 0.196461 0.160558 0.136586 0.126826 0.116689 0.113767 0.095161 0.093504 0.073175 0.048035
l-Fuel 0.061987 0.033539 0.03601 0.046657 0.024145 0.040079 0.041647 0.041258 0.048567 0.05519 0.073761
l-Clothing 0.062718 0.096852 0.096989 0.072358 0.080047 0.069285 0.070511 0.066536 0.065815 0.060773 0.046065
l-Transport 0.153712 0.213435 0.183724 0.179729 0.173349 0.190855 0.179752 0.199734 0.175837 0.173089 0.124541
l-Other 0.130079 0.083373 0.093063 0.10407 0.180175 0.12317 0.131131 0.136481 0.128084 0.140476 0.145131
l-Services 0.196885 0.214872 0.237165 0.21003 0.199667 0.210908 0.196153 0.190503 0.19798 0.191742 0.230706
PlndexCo-ef 0,894231 1.032256 0.984437 0.828069 1.062498 0.984533 0.953134 0.923228 0.991069 1.030139 1.000425
MiTS
Household Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l-Food 0.369585 0.274971 0.297224 0.325303 0.322818 0.341047 0.353368 0.351381 0.383397 0.397253 0.41317
l-Alcohol 0.080559 0.155921 0.124791 0.112434 0.092908 0.089099 0.088973 0.07282 0.068217 0.048966 0.027859
l-Fuel 0.103814 0.088563 0.086281 0.084663 0.077997 0.088217 0.087171 0.085064 0.096892 0.105769 0.121659
l-Clothing 0.034282 0.069967 0.070581 0.049811 0.047018 0.037962 0.039706 0.036473 0.031997 0.024168 0.008703
l-Transport 0.094815 0.134426 0.109886 0.125104 0.09772 0.122863 0.114962 0.137283 0.104347 0.102292 0.060293
l-Other 0.134338 0.095828 0.103668 0.110639 0.18855 0.129332 0.136263 0.140835 0.132337 0.144078 0.14664
l-Services 0.182608 0.180323 0.207569 0.192047 0.172989 0.191481 0.179556 0.176143 0.182814 0.177475 0.221676
MiTT
Household Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l-Food 0.244901 0.122187 0.152406 0.206173 0.171232 0.203285 0.218379 0.22112 0.239764 0.254874 0.283668
l-Alcohol 0.119438 0.203907 0.169961 0.14985 0.140518 0.131367 0.131056 0.113426 0.111885 0.093684 0.068532
l-Fuel 0.043847 0.013538 0.01619 0.027996 0.004119 0.021077 0.02187 0.022054 0.030653 0.036378 0.058545
l-Clothing 0.074143 0.11873 0.117894 0.088173 0.095832 0.082324 0.082854 0.078106 0.076425 0.070017 0.050406
l-Transport 0.177393 0.237466 0.205937 0.203274 0.198959 0.21587 0.20445 0.224604 0.200821 0.198383 0.145783
l-Other 0.127277 0.087114 0.095465 0.103844 0.179904 0.121474 0.12862 0.133461 0.124467 0.135956 0.139253
l-Services 0.213002 0.217058 0.242147 0.22069 0.210435 0.224603 0.211772 0.207228 0.215985 0.211708 0.252812
Plndex Co-ef 0.889967 1.03426 0.980758 0.824049 1.05885 0.972222 0.950085 0.920261 0.987712 1.027077 0.950311
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Appendix 3c - MCF and MEI for all households
MaSS Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV 0.104785 0.193875 0.11163 0.088246 0.092947 0.103702 0.102398 0.112865
1 0.040285 0.073332 0.06239 0.019785 0.016641 0.02394 0.024112 0.026743
2 0.048828 0.075387 0.068321 0.030018 0.02008 0.031858 0.036894 0.034876
3 0.066576 0.113833 0.078253 0.041365 0.043533 0.048438 0.053181 0.057332
4 0.074372 0.129937 0.076254 0.059434 0.054129 0.105407 0.064367 0.075554
5 0.088894 0.177063 0.089478 0.075831 0.089485 0.088669 0.092192 0.10129
6 0.098717 0.210773 0.087752 0.093716 0.102357 0.104875 0.099932 0.115027
7 0.100086 0.195057 0.083107 0.100475 0.126642 0.115926 0.106597 0.123471
8 0.137904 0.247685 0.098725 0.127731 0.125073 0.129805 0.137582 0.144928
9 0.143516 0.272395 0.108689 0.162737 0.193374 0.174668 0.172844 0.186274
10 0.172961 0.344379 0.132285 0.227134 0.253566 0.243301 0.303676 0.260815
MEI co-
ef
-0.03682 0.613905 -0.51676 -0.18077 -0.22098 0.17985 -0.02851 -0.0827
MaST Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV 0.101939 0.016596 0.112541 0.1056 0.081716 0.113004 0.16883 0.114009
1 0.191674 0.023984 0.072514 0.06826 0.097205 0.118382 0.192813 0.027075
2 0.101122 0.025362 0.042907 0.086452 0.102148 0.244879 0.174988 0.035118
3 0.091526 0.047502 0.043411 0.175046 0.105066 0.090644 0.183283 0.058004
4 0.093168 0.07356 0.048527 0.082073 0.105932 0.132468 0.169126 0.07642
5 0.103891 0.063191 0.056375 0.078675 0.097326 0.144765 0.340462 0.102364
6 0.108629 0.031136 0.07233 0.08966 0.192841 0.13004 0.122976 0.11621
7 0.039186 0.020024 0.129828 0.088832 0.076258 0.145808 0.232662 0.124466
8 0.072499 0.031917 0.069948 0.09776 0.104218 0.140202 0.252239 0.151014
9 0.057604 0.039108 0.061663 0.095539 0.126283 0.269291 0.243746 0.187225
10 0.020819 0.064517 0.053983 0.20838 0.116137 0.099642 0.321902 0.260881
MEI co-
ef





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3d - MCF and MEI for revenue-neutral tax changes
MaSS Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV -0.00684 0.082245 -0.02338 -0.01868 -0.00793 -0.00923 0.001235
1 -0.0221 0.010942 -0.0426 -0.04575 -0.03845 -0.03828 -0.03565
2 -0.01949 0.007067 -0.0383 -0.04824 -0.03646 -0.03143 -0.03345
3 -0.01168 0.03558 -0.03689 -0.03472 -0.02981 -0.02507 -0.02092
4 -0.00188 0.053683 -0.01682 -0.02212 0.029154 -0.01189 -0.0007
5 -0.00058 0.087584 -0.01365 6.66E-06 -0.00081 0.002714 0.011811
6 0.010965 0.123022 0.005965 0.014605 0.017124 0.01218 0.027275
7 0.016978 0.11195 0.017367 0.043534 0.032818 0.02349 0.040363
8 0.039178 0.14896 0.029006 0.026348 0.031079 0.038857 0.046203
9 0.034826 0.163705 0.054047 0.084685 0.065979 0.064155 0.077585
10 0.040676 0.212094 0.094849 0.121281 0.111016 0.171391 0.12853
MaTT Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV 0.001453 0.090604 -0.00552 -0.00508 0.006693 0.012102 0.016058
1 -0.0167 0.016397 -0.03403 -0.03855 -0.03089 -0.02928 -0.02791
2 -0.0142 0.011771 -0.02919 -0.04078 -0.02851 -0.02096 -0.02552
3 -0.00583 0.041914 -0.02558 -0.02564 -0.02002 -0.01172 -0.01087
4 0.003674 0.060813 -0.00465 -0.01319 0.039741 0.001861 0.009318
5 0.005867 0.0938 0.00098 0.010996 0.011021 0.020189 0.023714
6 0.016304 0.128239 0.021351 0.025054 0.028998 0.030519 0.039056
7 0.022201 0.117037 0.032685 0.053498 0.044407 0.041933 0.05158
8 0.029047 0.154597 0.047592 0.058225 0.044655 0.06158 0.06437
9 0.041818 0.170005 0.075906 0.097816 0.081578 0.090223 0.091619
10 0.050543 0.220607 0.12123 0.137871 0.131725 0.212913 0.144655
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MiSS Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV 0.016056 0.152253 -0.01619 -0.00673 0.005678 0.004281 0.015154
1 -0.01093 0.040015 -0.03568 -0.03825 -0.0306 -0.03046 -0.02804
2 -0.00672 0.036229 -0.03158 -0.03989 -0.02791 -0.02295 -0.02495
3 0.003543 0.07832 -0.02967 -0.02601 -0.01966 -0.01545 -0.01129
4 0.013991 0.102573 -0.0111 -0.014 0.03764 -0.00261 0.008714
5 0.018174 0.149917 -0.00735 0.009157 0.010056 0.013019 0.022802
6 0.029758 0.197666 0.010812 0.022807 0.027652 0.022642 0.038033
7 0.035794 0.17863 0.021152 0.050319 0.042669 0.033298 0.051002
8 0.045563 0.236459 0.032927 0.05468 0.042834 0.050422 0.063901
9 0.060505 0.255878 0.05685 0.092679 0.078696 0.076713 0.091984
10 -0.01175 0.331429 0.249172 0.160192 0.127709 0.187317 0.168491
MiST Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV 0.009489 0.226082 0.014093 0.012213 0.014621 0.017788 0.034426
1 -0.01115 0.070407 -0.02514 -0.03046 -0.02473 -0.02348 -0.01955
2 -0.00824 0.067257 -0.01868 -0.0314 -0.02192 -0.01535 -0.01541
3 -0.00029 0.123565 -0.01376 -0.01466 -0.0138 -0.00679 0.000511
4 0.008625 0.152789 0.008482 -0.00242 0.043517 0.006203 0.021825
5 0.011729 0.216511 0.017057 0.025475 0.016896 0.024445 0.038658
6 0.02135 0.272064 0.038613 0.040649 0.033828 0.033434 0.053725
7 0.027237 0.25038 0.050569 0.070697 0.048853 0.044464 0.067266
8 0.035167 0.327244 0.069885 0.078608 0.050517 0.064247 0.083134
9 0.048538 0.356585 0.102332 0.122375 0.08676 0.092653 0.11448
10 0.058204 0.464139 0.156399 0.169785 0.137003 0.209484 0.17703
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MiTS Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV 0.009113 0.354183 0.030404 0.024092 0.021537 0.028565 0.047698
1 -0.01057 0.119516 -0.0196 -0.02621 -0.02126 -0.01906 -0.01467
2 -0.00745 0.117671 -0.0114 -0.02642 -0.01776 -0.00972 -0.00935
3 0.000127 0.198849 -0.00432 -0.0069 -0.00864 0.000483 0.008974
4 0.008381 0.239454 0.019711 0.006094 0.048519 0.013434 0.03148
5 0.011211 0.332406 0.030749 0.036229 0.022697 0.033926 0.049906
6 0.02069 0.409139 0.054352 0.052045 0.039795 0.043394 0.065252
7 0.025591 0.377269 0.066132 0.081905 0.053935 0.053809 0.078589
8 0.034898 0.481772 0.089033 0.088841 0.056343 0.075568 0.095381
9 0.044283 0.532143 0.12568 0.138072 0.093112 0.105927 0.130112
10 0.053568 0.680565 0.18754 0.192133 0.144612 0.229178 0.197757
MiTT Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV 0.010515 0.543127 0.047612 0.038482 0.027393 0.038201 0.06052
1 -0.00833 0.193667 -0.01291 -0.02017 -0.01718 -0.0141 -0.00868
2 -0.00552 0.193343 -0.00239 -0.01996 -0.01349 -0.00416 -0.00246
3 0.001284 0.312133 0.005574 0.001167 -0.00451 0.006498 0.016748
4 0.009796 0.370391 0.032585 0.016318 0.052896 0.020856 0.041451
5 0.012806 0.501595 0.04666 0.051019 0.028152 0.042662 0.061317
6 0.021412 0.616576 0.07244 0.067394 0.045079 0.052315 0.076622
7 0.025934 0.569944 0.084838 0.099687 0.058885 0.062672 0.090139
8 0.031823 0.726674 0.111039 0.110883 0.061058 0.085151 0.10893
9 0.044615 0.801203 0.154166 0.164056 0.099526 0.118548 0.145955
10 0.054005 1.022276 0.225663 0.223043 0.152228 0.24702 0.217578
MEI coefficients for revenue-neutral tax change
MiTT Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
MaSS -0.47994 -1.13067 -0.33599 -0.29579 -0.69661 -0.48825 -0.43407
MaTT -0.49128 -1.19949 -0.49151 -0.40725 -0.82577 -0.68766 -0.55679
MiSS -0.24292 -1.80569 -0.31859 -0.10446 -0.52021 -0.23666 -0.28638
MiST -0.22945 -2.24268 -0.27696 -0.04793 -0.49121 -0.20612 -0.25541
MiTS -0.20942 -3.96773 -0.75392 -0.41315 -0.66958 -0.48103 -0.53079
MiTT -0.18579 -5.64812 -0.75121 -0.38025 -0.63856 -0.45641 -0.50605
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Appendix 3e - Critical values of MEV
MaSS Food Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV 0.014261 0.069595 0.063161 0.01138 0.018908 N/A
1 0.046057 0.126803 0.154667 0.055195 0.078398 0.082123
2 0.040614 0.114 0.163093 0.052343 0.064367 0.077051
3 0.024329 0.109787 0.117379 0.042799 0.05135 0.048198
4 0.003921 0.050059 0.0748 -0.04185 0.024345 0.001611
5 0.001217 0.040617 N/A 0.001161 -0.00556 N/A
MaTT Food Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV N/A 0.011226 0.01248 N/A N/A N/A
1 0.033988 0.069236 0.094662 0.03741 0.042583 0.050119
2 0.028895 0.059386 0.100123 0.034526 0.030486 0.045842
3 0.011862 0.05205 0.06295 0.02425 0.017038 0.019523
4 -0.00748 0.009469 0.032378 N/A N/A N/A
MiSS Food Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV N/A 0.050811 0.064445 N/A N/A N/A
1 0.044976 0.111995 0.366156 0.058826 0.128692 0.097914
2 0.027669 0.099128 0.381928 0.053649 0.096957 0.087136
3 N/A 0.093128 0.248991 0.037789 0.065275 0.039412
4 N/A 0.034837 0.134044 N/A 0.011041 N/A
5 N/A 0.023075 N/A N/A N/A N/A
MiST Food Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 0.048592 0.090759 0.635611 0.050345 0.113921 0.076556
2 0.035926 0.067429 0.655142 0.044622 0.074449 0.060333
3 0.001259 0.049694 0.305921 0.028089 0.03292 N/A
4 N/A N/A 0.050474 N/A N/A N/A
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MiTS Food Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 0.050462 0.025994 0.063429 0.031752 0.039629 0.02763
2 0.035564 0.015124 0.063946 0.02652 0.020208 0.017622
3 N/A 0.00573 0.01671 0.012905 N/A N/A
MiTT Food Clothing Transport Other Services VAT
AV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 0.044835 0.017179 0.053034 0.026909 0.030901 0.017154




2Unless good d is aGiffen good - the quantity demanded rises as the price rises.
3WeII founded suspicion as the next sectionwill show.
4 For the exact index model using micro data - the MITT model as defined here.
5In fact, a value can be calculated, but will be negative. This would give a measure of the extent
to which the household would have to disvalue the environment in order to be left equally well
off given the environmental improvement.
6In other words, expenditure is used as a proxy for welfare.
7Assuming a certain level of valuation.
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Chapter 4 - Theoretical explanation of the
Competitive General Equilibrium Model
This chapter explains the theoretical background to the competitive general
equilibrium (CGE) model used in the next three chapters. This model builds
significantly on the relatively simplistic general equilibrium model outlined
in Chapter 3. The theoretical background to the model is complex, so the
parameterisation and calibration of the model to its baseline scenario is
explained separately in Chapter 5. The model, in common with most CGE
models, generates a large set of results from each run. These results are dealt
with in Chapter 6. This chapter does not detail the nature of the
environmental taxes that will be imposed. This is dealt with in the relevant
part of Chapter 6.
This chapter is divided into several sections, each dealing with a particular
area of the model. Section 4.1 is an initial overview that details how the
individual areas of the model link together and gives a brief description of
each. The separate areas covered are Consumption (Section 4.2), Production
(Section 4.3), Government (Section 4.4), Investment (Section 4.5), International
Trade (Section 4.6) and Taxation (Section 4.7). Section 4.8 examines the
solution procedure for the model and finally, Section 4.9 details the features
of the model that make it especially suitable for its purpose - an examination
of the distributional implications of revenue neutral tax reform.
4.1 Overview
The model outlined in this chapter has been designed with a specific
purpose in mind, namely the analysis of the distributional consequences of
the double dividend hypothesis with particular regard to energy taxation.
As such, the formulation of the model is geared to a clear exposition of this
goal. The key feature that distinguishes it from an average or standard CGE
model is the inclusion of different households with different resources and
preferences. Further design features that aid this goal are detailed within the
text, but are considered separately in Section 4.9. While the inclusion of
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multiple households is necessary for what is required it greatly adds to the
complexity involved.
As mentioned in the introduction, the model is explained by breaking it
down into areas - Households, Production, Government, Investment, Trade
and Taxation. The first five of these represent sectors of the economy and the
sixth, linkages, primarily between the other sectors and the government.
However, there are numerous links between all the sectors. Due to this
complexity, a diagram is useful to provide a general overview. See Diagram
4.1.
Diagram 4.1 shows the relationships and linkages between sectors of the
economy in the model. Movements of goods and services, including factor
services are shown by black lines, financial movements are shown by blue
lines and taxation is shown in red. In addition financial movements from the
government (transfer payments and subsidies) are shown in green. The
diagram is somewhat stylised for simplicity - for example the production
sector pays VAT and duty on its intermediate inputs, but this link is not
shown directly.
There are ten households in the model who each supply labour and capital
to the production sector. These households are differentiated by income and
are ranked in income order. Household one represents the lowest decile of
households by income and household ten the highest decile. Generally, the
higher the income of a household the more labour and capital it will own
and thus supply. This makes immediate sense when one regards capital but
the larger supply of labour of higher income households may seem
unintuitive. This may simply be accepted or labour can be thought of as
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Each household receives income from its factor services (wages from labour
and interest from capital) and transfer payments from the government. Each
household buys consumption goods (Food, Alcohol and Tobacco, Fuel,
Clothing, Transport, Services and Other), which are fixed coefficient
composites of the output of the production sector, from the production
sector, receives the implicit benefit of government (public) expenditure and
adds to savings. These savings are converted into capital goods by the
investment process which then increases the capital stock, owned by
households, in the following period. The production sector comprises 19
sectors as shown in Table 4.1. The conversion matrix between producer
goods and consumer goods is detailed in the section on the production
sector in Chapter 5.
The model is standard, in terms of general equilibrium models, in that it
assumed that all sectors clear1. Indeed, the particular title used -
Competitive General Equilibrium implies this. This is obvious for the
commodities in the model (although does preclude the modelling of stocks
and inventories) but has distinct implications for analysing the effect on the
labour market. The approach used means that the labour market clears and
there is no possibility of involuntary unemployment. This is an issue that is
returned to in more detail in section 4$.
The energy sectors are represented in Table 4.1 by bold and italic type. Each
sector of production is represented by a single, perfectly competitive firm
operating under constant returns to scale. Each sector makes normal profits
at all times. Each sector uses the output of other sectors (including itself), in
the form of intermediate goods, to produce its output. The intermediate
good usage is given by a fixed co-efficient make matrix that gives the
amount of intermediate inputs per unit output. In addition, labour, capital
and energy appear directly in the firms production function. The inclusion of
energy in the production function is to allow substitution between energy
and labour/capital, when the price of energy changes (due to the imposition
of a tax). The energy use of each sector is broken down into the five
component energy types in a constant way.
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Table 4.1 - Production sectors in the model
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Each sector must pay production taxes (duty etc.) to the government on its
intermediate inputs if applicable, employment tax (National Insurance) on
its labour inputs and Value Added Tax (VAT) on the excess of its output
over its intermediate inputs. The firms payment to capital, its normal profit,
is subject to corporation tax. Each sector also benefits implicitly from
government expenditure, sells its output to both the private (consumption)
and public sector (government) and may receive government subsidies
directly. The output of each sector adjusts to fulfil the total demand for its
product: Consumption (C) plus Investment (I) + Government Expenditure
(G) + Intermediate Usage (U) + Exports (X) minus Imports (M).
International trade is modelled in the following way. The output of each
sector may be both exported and imported2. The demand for exports
depends on the price faced by external agents which is dependant on the
domestic price and the exchange rate and the demand for imports on the
price faced by domestic agents which will be dependant on the world price
and the exchange rate. The exchange rate adjusts, in equilibrium, to preserve
trade balance. Due to the difficulty in finding suitable data on the export and
import price elasticity of substitution for the 19 production sectors, exports
and imports are treated as fixed co-efficient composites of the output of the
production sectors.
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4.2 The Household Sector
As detailed in the overview, the household sector comprises ten distinct
households, each with their own allocation of factors (labour and capital)
and their own demand system parameters. The households each represent a
particular decile of the income range, ranging from the lowest 10%
(household 1) to the highest 10% (household 10). One feature of the model is
that no allowance is made for a lower ranked household catching up or
overtaking a higher ranked household. However, such is the distinction
between the different groups, this is unlikely to happen. If it does it is not
problematic, but simply means there has been an extremely large
transference of resources.
The behaviour of the household sector as a whole is calculated simply by
summing the behaviour of the individual household groups. This should be
thought of as a 'multiple to single' approach. The structure that generates the
behaviour of each household group is detailed below. This structure is the
same for all households and the differences come from the parameterisation.
It is important to stress that the importance of the inclusion of multiple
households cannot be overstated when dealing with distributional effects.
Although this may appear obvious, it is possible to take the opposite
approach to that used here, a 'single to multiple' approach. Instead of
treating each household group as an entity in it own right and then summing
the behaviour of these distinct entities to find the overall picture, it is
possible to set up the model with a single household, calculate results and
then disaggregate to smaller household groups. However, this approach,
although much simpler analytically, would result in a much poorer analysis.
This issue, along with a detailed discussion of those details of the household
structure that enhance the capacity of the model in dealing with
distributional considerations is dealt with in Section 4.9.
As all households groups have the same structure, references to household
group have been dropped for simplicity. Details on which parameters are
allowed to vary and which remain constant, between different households,
can be found in Appendix 4 and are dealt with in the following chapter.
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Each household is assumed to be Utility maximising and optimises a three-
stage, nested utility function as shown in Diagram 4.2.
In the first stage they allocate expanded or potential income, Ie, between the
consumption of leisure, 1, and what is best termed effort, . Expanded
income, Ie, is equal to the rental value of the household's labour and capital
endowments minus direct taxation plus transfer payments from government.
This stage should be thought of as a leisure-work trade-off. Leisure can be
thought of as costing, Pp, the net wage rate or after-tax return to labour as
consumption of leisure involves forgoing labour income.
The second stage involves allocation of actual income, I, between present
consumption, X, and saving, S. Saving is used to finance the purchase,
through the investment sector (See Section 4.4) of additional capital which
will be added to the household groups capital stock. Consumers are
assumed to use their saving to buy a saving good3, S, at a price, Ps. The price
of saving can be interpreted as the purchase price of capital, as saving is
invested immediately. The household groups are assumed to be myopic in
that they assume that prices in the future will be identical to prices now. Due
to the households' myopic outlook on life the income generated by the
additional capital is thought of as financing future planned additional
consumption
In the third stage consumers allocate current consumption income, more
properly termed expenditure, Ix, between the consumption goods. This
involves a fixed proportion being spent on durables and the remaining (non¬
durable) consumption being decided by an Almost Ideal Demand (AID)
system. Energy appears in the AID system and is, in a similar fashion to the
other goods, a fixed co-efficient composite of its production sector
components.
There is thus a restriction imposed that consumers are unable to substitute
between different types of energy. They are assumed to consider energy




Total Utility, U, is a CES function of
effort,|*|r, and leisure, 1.
Stage 2
Effort Utility, is a CES function
of goods expenditure, X, and future
consumption, Fc.
Stage 3
Goods expenditure, X, is fixed co-efficent
proportional division between durable
onsumption, D and Non- durable
consumption, X. Non-durable consumption,
Xl,...,Xn is determined by an AID system.
Diagram 4.2 - The structure of the household sector.
Each household supplies capital and labour and receives payment for these
factor services. The inclusion of the numerous labour types is a useful
complication. The labour types are shown in Table 4.1 and are denoted by an
i subscript/superscript. The total labour endowment of each of the
household groups is fixed sum and the, standard, relationship between
labour supply, Sp, and leisure for each household is given by:
(4.2.1) SL = El -I
where Ep is the labour endowment.
The relationship between gross wages received by households, w, and the
net wage rate which is termed the price of leisure, P] is given in Section 4.7.
The household group's expanded income, Ie, is given by the sum of total
labour endowment, Ep times the net wage rate faced by the household,
plus the total capital endowment, Ec times the net interest rate, Pj< plus any
transfer payments by the government, B. Payments to capital are subject to
corporation tax, hence the need for a net interest rate. See Section 4.7. This
relationship is given in Equation (4.2.2).
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(4.2.2) 4 =P,El +PkEk +B
In the first stage, the household groups choose between effort, EE, and
leisure, 1. They face the budget constraint:
(4.2.3) IE =PEfEf + P,l
where PEf is the price of effort. This is dealt with later in this section. Thus,
using (4.2.3), the first stage of the consumers utility maximisation problem
can be written:
(4.2.4) Max u\Ef,l], subject to IE = PEfEf + Ptl
where Ie is given by equation (4.2.2). The consumers constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) overall utility function, U, is given by:
(4.2.5) U
2_ ct2-i J_ g2-i
c£iEf +(1 —0^/^
cr2-1
where a is a weighting parameter and cr2 is the elasticity of substitution
between Ef and 1. Undertaking the constrained maximisation outlined in
(4.2.4) yields the demand for effort, Ef, to be:
(4.2.6) Ef=-p?£Ef 2
and leisure, 1 to be:
(4.2.7) I = — ^' , where
(4.2.8) e2=c(PEf)x-°i +(\-cc){P,T°i
The price of effort, Ifef is discussed below. The supply of labour, is
calculated using (4.2.7):
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(4.2.9) S,=E,-l = EL- (1 CX)I'\ > L L pa2 q|
This can be somewhat simplified to:
(4.2.10) SL = El{1-(1 ')-^(PA + B)C72 M ^
Although examination of (4.2.10) does not shed light on the effect of changes
in the net wage on labour supply (and hence the effect of changes in direct
taxation) due to the complex functional form, it can be seen from the second
expression on the right hand side that an increase in transfer payments, B, or
the price of capital, Pk, will tend to reduce labour supply.
In the second stage, each household group maximises its sub-utility of effort
by choosing between consumption, X, and Saving, S. They perform the
following optimisation:
where ft is a weighting parameter and cr, is, as before, the elasticity of
substitution between composite consumption, X, and saving, S. Actual
Income, I, is given by:
(4.2.13) I = SlP,+EkPk+B
This is basically equivalent to equation (4.2.2) with the endowment of labour
replaced by the actual supply of labour in accordance with the household
leisure-work trade-off. This constrained maximisation gives rise to the
demand for composite present consumption, X and saving, S:
1 <Tj—1 1






The household purchases S worth of saving (investment) goods and thus
spends PsS on saving This leaves the income available for goods
consumption expenditure, Ix as:
(4.2.17) Ix = I - PsS
In the third and final stage consumers choose the consumption components
of X. Expenditure is first divided between durable and non-durable goods
by a fixed co-efficent, £2, which represents the proportion of Ix spent on
durable goods. The remaining income, to be spent on non-durables, is given
by lyjD, where:
(4.2.18) ID = IX-Pda
This income is spent on non-durables in line with an Almost Ideal Demand
System . The budget shares, b, of each of the 7 non-durable goods are given
by:





(4.2.20) log PND + <Pk/ log Pk log P, and
k k I
Pi represents the price of consumption good i and (|>,(p and y are parameters.
The <j) parameters vary between households and this issue is taken up in
Chapter 6. It will be noted that the Price Index, I)\JD, defined by the AID
system can be used in conjunction with the price of durable goods, Pg), to
calculate the overall price index of goods expenditure, P>(. This is simply
given by:
(4.2.21) px =Qpo + (! - Q)Pnd
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An important property of the CES utility functions is that the indirect utility
functions can be easily derived. This allows calculation of the price of effort,
Ppf. This composite price for effort, F£f, is derived as follows. The effort
sub-utility function, Ef, is composed of X and S. Substituting the demand
functions for X and S, Equations (4.2.14) and (4.2.15) into Equation (4.2.11)
gives:










which can be written as:
Oj-l















Recapping on Equations (4.2.2) and (4.2.13) and rearranging each we have:
(4.2.25) IE ~ P,l = PEfH and I—IE— P,i
Thus:
(4.2.26) / = PsjEf
Using equations (4.2.24) and (4.2.26) we have:
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Taking out terms in 6} , simplifying and substituting in for 6} from (4.2.13)
we have:
(4.2.28) PEf = ((1 - * |(l - p)Px«-*■> + ppp'
A final simplification gives:
(4.2.29) PEf = ((l - (5)PX^ + frr
An identical procedure is used to derive the composite price of total utility,
U. This gives the price of utility, P]_j as:
(4.2.30) Pv = [oPe^ + (1 - }^
Thus all variables in the consumption sector are defined. All that remains is
to sum labour supply and goods demand over all the households.








It will be noted that the supply of capital is fixed, it is not dependant on the




(4.2.33) DD = X x
h Pd
for durables and by:
(4.2.34) =
h Pi
where DD represents the total demand for durables and DNDi represents the
total demand for non-durable good, i. It is appropriate at this point to
specify the relationship between the output of the production sector and the
consumption goods in the model. Each consumption good is a fixed co¬
efficient composite of the output of the production sectors. Using non¬
durable goods as an illustration, Equation (4.2.35) shows the demand for the
output of production sector j, Dj', given the demand for non-durable good i,
only.
(4.2.35) Dj = pcijDND.
In Equation (4.2.36) pqj represents the amount of production good j, that is
used in consumption (non-durable) good i. Thus the total consumption
demand for production good j is given by Equation (4.2.37).
(4.2.36) Dj = JJPci]1fDi +pcDjDD
i
where pcp>j represents the amount of production good j that is used in
durable consumption goods. Finally, using Equation (4.2.36) and (4.2.37) the
relationship between the consumer prices of the production sector, fjC and
the consumer prices PjND and PD can be laid out.
P-D =XPCijPj
(4.2.37) _ ^P° =lpcDjPf
j
The relationship between producer prices and the consumer prices of the
production sector can be found in Section 4.7.
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4.3 The Production Sector
The production sector is represented by 17 perfectly competitive firms each
producing a single, homogenous good. Each firm, which represents a sector,
makes normal profits at all times and operates under constant returns to






Each firm is assumed to minimise its costs per unit of output. Intermediate
inputs are modelled as a fixed amount of the output (including own) of the
other production sectors, excluding energy sectors, per unit output. This is
referred to as a per-unit make matrix. As intermediate inputs are fixed per
unit output they do not appear in the firms cost minimisation problem.
Sector i's intermediate use of the output of sector j represented by Iljj, is
given by:
(4.3.1) 7/,=Qm,
where ir^j is the amount of good j, sector i needs to produce one unit of
output and Qj is the output of sector i. Each firm also uses labour, L, Capital,
K, and composite Energy, E. Composite Energy is a fixed co-eficient
multiple of the energy types. The energy composites are shown in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3 - Energy Composites
Coal Extraction




Thus, the amount of each energy type is given by:
(4.3.2) E.k = eikE. where ^eik = 1
k
The make matrix and the composite Energy make-up vary across sectors, as
designated by the i subscripts. Capital, K, and Labour, L, are modelled
however, as identical goods across sectors and are owned by households.
Thus, the price of capital, Pk, and the price of labour, Pp, are constant across
sectors. The price of energy, Pg, is not and is given by Equation (4.3.3).
(4.3.3) PE=JJPjej
j
In equation (4.3.3) sector subscripts have been dropped. This conventionwill
be used throughout the remainder of the section. Each sector's output is
modelled by a constant elasticity of substitution production function
between labour, capital and composite energy as follows:
(4.3.4) Q = c(aLLd +aKKd +aEEd)^
where C is a shift parameter, 8 is the elasticity of substitution between inputs
and ap,aK and ag are share parameters and:
(4.3.5) 5>t=l
k=L.K .E
As each sector minimises its cost per unit output under constant returns to
scale it is convenient to work in terms of labour, capital and energy per unit
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output denoted by lower case 1, k and e. Thus each sectors cost minimisation
problem is expressed as:
PLl + PKk + PEe(4.3.6) min
s.t. c(aLld +aKkd +aEedfi = 1
Solution of this cost minimisation problem gives the per-unit output

























!1 trj 1 (I-d)
where :
(4.3.8) A = {aL\-dPLd-\ j + ^+^aE\-dPEd-\
The profit per unit output of each firm is given by:
(4.3.9) n =F +S-PLl-PKk-P^-PM-V
where Pr is the amount the sector receives per unit, S is subsidy per unit, PM




where IT is the price production sectors must pay for their output. The
relationship between Pr and PP is detailed in Section 4.7. The production tax
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is a fixed percentage of the price each sector receives for its output. This is
given by the Equation (4.3.11) and is dealt with in more detail in Section 4.7:
(4.3.11) V=tyPr
The total output of each sector adjusts so that total demand for the sector is
satisfied. The constant returns to scale assumption means that as output
changes, factor demands remain in the same proportion. In equilibrium the
price received for each sector's output is adjusted so that profit per unit is
equal to zero.
The total demand for each of the non-energy sector output is given by:
(4.3.12) 0, = TDi = C, +Ii +Gi+Xi-Mi + £//..
j
where Q is consumption demand, Ij is Investment Demand, Gj is
government demand, Xi is export demand and Mi is import demand for the
output of sector i. Investment, Government, Export and Import demand are
specified in the relevant Sections. Consumption demand for the output of
each sector is calculated from demand for the consumption goods by a
transition matrix of the form:
(4.3.13) C, = XDjpcNDij +DDpc°
j
where pcNDjj is the proportion of non-durable consumption good j that is
produced by sector i and pcDi is the proportion of durable consumption
goods produced by sector i. The final term in Equation (4.3.12) is simply the
total intermediate demand for the output of sector i. The Energy sectors are
treated slightly differently in that the output of each energy sector is given
by:
(4.3.14) Q, = TDj = Q +Ii + G, +Xi-Mi +
j
The final term in Equation (4.3.14) is the total demand for energy type i as an




(4.3.15) K< = Qfc
Ei = QPi
The demand for the individual of energy are given by Equation (4.3.16):
(4.3.16) E! = Hieij
The total demand for labour is given by:
(4.3.17) L„ = XA
i
It should be noted that the total demand for each energy type, as an input, is
covered in Equation (4.3.14). Finally, the total demand for capital is given by:
(4.3.18) KD = 5X
/
This completes the exposition of the production sector.
4.4 The Government Sector
Although in reality the government sector deals with government
expenditure and taxation, for the purpose of this analysis the two are treated
separately. Thus, this section simply details the composition and cost of
public expenditure, the Gi, term in Equation (4.3.12) and (4.3.14) and transfer
payments between the government and the private sector in the form of
benefits to households and subsidies to firms. The linkage between
government expenditure and taxation is detailed in Section 4.7.
The treatment of government expenditure is relatively simplistic in that it is
assumed to be constant. However, it should be noted that it is quantities
purchased by the government that remain constant as opposed to
expenditure . As prices change, the value, in monetary terms, of government
expenditure will change but the physical goods and services will not. It is
important to remember this distinction between constant expenditure and
constant purchases.
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The demand by the government for the output of each of the production
sectors is constant and equal to Q. Thus, the monetary value of public
expenditure is given by:
(4.4.1) PE = ^PiG,
i
Public expenditure should be thought of, in the terms of this model, as a
necessary prerequisite for the economy to function. The reason for this is that
public expenditure does not appear explicitly or implicitly in either the
utility functions of the household sector nor the production functions of the
production sector. This may seem restrictive, but given that it is held
constant, in quantity terms, it is satisfactory.
The other actions of the government sector, excluding taxation, are the
payment of benefits to households and subsidies to firms. Subsidies to firms
are approximated as a monetary value per unit produced. They appear in
the firms profit function (Equation 4.3.12) and thus have a direct effect on the
price of output (remembering that output price adjusts automatically so
normal profit, only, is made). An increase in the subsidy to any sector will
have its effect on the economy through its effect on the output price of that
sector and through the increased burden on the public finances.
Benefits to households, B, are simply a fixed amount given to each
household and are assumed to represent the wide range of benefits available
in reality. Again, it should be noted that this formulation is by no means
realistic but at the same time that the inclusion of transfer payments in a CGE
model, in any form, is unusual. The increased complexity generated by
attempting to formulate a mathematical representation of the benefit system
was deemed to be inappropriate. Indeed, given that levels of benefit vary
with household composition, in the sense of number and type of individuals
rather than income, and households in this model are differentiated solely
by income, the construction of such a mathematical approximation may well
be inappropriate.
Total government expenditure is given by the sum of all benefits, subsidies
and public expenditure as shown by Equation (4.4.2).
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(4.4.2) GE = PE + JdBi + JdStQt
h i
The interaction of public expenditure and taxes and the government sectors
budget position is dealt with in Section 4.7.
4.5 The Investment Sector
As detailed in section 4.2, each household group saves part of its income and
these savings are used to finance new capital stock which will be available to
the household in future periods. As the model is static, this future increase
in the capital stock does not impact directly within the model. Rather, saving
and thus investment represent primarily a demand for the output of those
sectors of the economy that produce capital goods.
The capital goods, which in use, from Section 4.3, are assumed to be
identical across all firms, are a constant fixed proportion mix of the output of
the production sectors. To provide one unit of capital goods requires a
certain, fixed, amount of the output of each of the production sectors. This is
represented in Equation (4.5.1)
(4.5.1) /=£/M
i
where IMj is the amount of the output of sector i required to produce one
unit of capital goods. Thus the cost of capital, or alternatively the price of
saving, is given by:
(4.5.2) PM = ^PtlM,
i
The total amount of capital stock formation is given by:
(4.5.3) NK =j
where NK is the total addition to the capital stock. This can be disaggregated




Finally, the demand from the investment sector for the output of the




The economy is modelled as a small open economy with trade in all sectors.
Due to the empirical difficulty in obtaining reliable estimates of the import
and export price elasticity of demand for all sectors, a simplistic approach is
taken to modelling trade. Exports and imports are taken as a composite
good, X and M respectively.
For simplicity the exchange rate is defined in terms of a single foreign
currency. This exchange rate is defined in Equation (4.6.1).
(4.6.1) ER=j
The Exchange rate, ER, is defined as the amount of domestic currency, d, per
unit of foreign currency, f. An example would be an ER of 2 representing
there being 2 pounds Sterling (the domestic currency) to 1 Dollar (the foreign
currency). It should be noted that this definition is purely a convention.
The composite price of exports, Px, is given by :
(4.6.2) P* =X V* P-
i
where \|/j is the share of sector i's output in the Export composite. The
demand for exports, X, is given by the following expression.
(4.6.3) Xi=A(pxj = A (PXER) where A < 0, A > 0
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where A is a shift parameter and X Given Equation (4.6.3) and the associated
sign constraints, it is easy to see that the demand for Exports is an inverse
function of their price, Pw. It should be noted that an increase in either the
domestic price or the exchange rate, as it is defined, will reduce the demand
for exports.
The supply of imports is:
(4.6.4) M, = B (PXERJ where /u <0,A>0
Given Equation (4.6.4) and its sign constraints, it can be seen that an increase
in the domestic price or the exchange rate, as defined, will increase the
supply of imports. Thus, from Equation (4.6.3) and (4.6.4), ceteris paribus, an
increase in the domestic price will reduce the amount of exports and
increase the amount of imports. This will affect the current account balance,
CA as defined by Equation (4.6.5).
(4.6.5) CA=yZP?Xi-^P°Mi
i i
It is assumed that in equilibrium the exchange rate adjusts so that there is a
zero balance6 on the balance of payments.
4.7 Taxation
The treatment of taxation in the model is complex and is intended to be as
realistic a representation of the actual tax structure of the economy as
possible. In looking at the structure of taxation it is useful to separate the
production and consumption sectors. Section 4.7.1 examines the taxation of
the household sector, Section 4.7.2 looks at production sector taxes and
Section 4.7.3 ties these together by examining government revenue in total
and the government's budget constraint.
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4.7.1 Taxation of the household sector
Households face both direct taxes on their income, arising from their supply
of factor inputs to the production process and indirect taxes on their
expenditure.
Direct taxes, in the sense of income tax must be modelled in a simplified
way. It would be desirable to realistically represent the actual structure of
income tax in the real economy but this is not possible. In reality, income tax
is charged at various rates, above a basic threshold, or income tax allowance,
level of income. As income levels rise, marginal tax rates rise, through a
series of bands. This is represented algebraically in Equation 4.7.1.
/ < a => t = 0 => TR= 0
(4.7.1) a < I < b ==> /=?,=> TR = ;,(/- a)
b<I t = t2=$ TR = (b - a)tx + (/- b)t2
Equation (4.7.1) shows an income tax structure comprising a tax allowance, a,
and two marginal tax rates, tq and t2- Any income, I, above the allowance but
below the threshold level for the higher rate, b, is subject to a marginal tax
rate of tq. Income above b is subject to a marginal tax rate of t2- Total income
tax paid is given by TR. This represents the UK income tax system pre 1994.
Unfortunately, the tax structure represented by Equation (4.7.1) is a
discontinuous function. As such, it is not suitable for incorporation into a
general equilibrium model. The presence of a discontinuous function, such
as Equation (4.7.1), in the structure of a general equilibrium model may
result in an unstable solution, several solutions or no solution at all. Thus, a
simplified structure is required. More specifically, the income tax function,
in keeping with all functions in the model, needs to be smooth and
continuous. With this in mind, the income tax structure is modelled by a
single equation as shown by Equation (4.7.2).
(4.7.2) t=tm^TR = ITm
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In Equation (4.7.2) Tm represents the marginal tax rate faced and will differ
between households. It would be possible to include a term that represented
a tax allowance by the inclusion of a negative constant on the RHS of
Equation (4.7.2). Unfortunately, in reality, income tax allowances vary with
the composition of the household that faces them in terms of single or
married individuals, children etc. In the context of the model however,
households are differentiated only by income and thus the calculation of an
implied tax allowance is difficult and given data constraints, overly
complicated.
This raises an issue of particular importance in the context of the double
dividend hypothesis. The fact that an increase in the income tax allowance, a,
following an increase in environmental taxation is equivalent to the lump¬
sum return of revenue detailed in Section 1 would seem to be a major
problem when the purpose of the analysis is to investigate the alternative.
There would thus seem to be no grounds for a comparison. However, this
lump-sum return of revenue can be simulated in the model by a rise in the
level of benefits paid. As such, the omission of an approximation to tax
allowances would seem acceptable given the resultant decrease in analytical
complexity.
It must be admitted that the loss of separate tax bands is particularly
regrettable in the context of an examination of distributional effects as such a
tax structure may be altered to become more regressive or progressive very
easily. In an equity context, there would thus be scope for the regressive
effects of a change in the environmental tax structure to be offset by
adjustment of the income tax structure in this manner. It is again possible to
simulate such effects and this is dealt with in Section 6.
Thus each household will face a marginal tax rate of Tm. This does not
immediately allow the exposition of the relationship between the gross
return to labour (the gross wage) and capital (the gross rate of interest) and
the net rates. This is due to the inclusion of taxes on the inputs to
production, labour and capital, that are paid by the production sector. As
defined in the model, the gross return to an input refers to the price paid by
firms. This price must include labour taxes and corporation tax7 respectively.
Thus, the gross/net return to inputs relationship is detailed in Section 4.7.2.
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The indirect taxation of the household sector is straightforward. Value
Added Tax is paid in addition to any taxes paid by producers. Thus the
consumer prices of the production sector are given by Equation 4.7.3.
(4.7.3) pf = TVF} if sector j is subject to VAT
where Ty, is the VAT rate. Two issues should be noted from Equation
(4.7.3). Firstly it is assumed that consumers pay all taxes that producers pay
as VAT is added to the prices producer pay rather than the price producers
receive (See Section 4.7.2). Secondly, some production sectors are zero-rated
for VAT8.
4.7.2 Taxation of the production sector
The taxation of the production sector falls into two categories: the taxation of
inputs, labour and capital, and the taxation of output.
It is assumed that producers pay taxes on labour , e.g. employers' National
Insurance contributions in the UK, payroll tax in the US. Using Equations
(4.2.3), (4.3.3) and (4.7.2) the relationship between gross wages or the price of
labour, Pp, paid by producers and the net wage received by households, Pi,
can be specified.
(4.7.4) p, = w(l - T,) = (1 - T.
k U +Ul
where Tp is the tax paid by producers on labour. It is assumed that this tax
is constant across all labour types.
The cost of capital to firms, or the gross interest rate, Pp, is treated as the
'normal' profit of the production sector. As such it is subject to corporation
tax. The relationship between the gross interest rate, Pp, and the net interest
rate, PnJC received by households is derived in a similar fashion to the




where Tk is the corporation tax rate.
The relationship between the price producers pay, PP and the price
producers receive, Pr, is given by Equation (4.7.6).
(4.7.6) P? = (I+ T„)p
where Tp is the producer tax rate. Note that sector subscripts have been
dropped. Thus the relationship between the price producers receive and
consumers pay, Pc, is specified using Equation (4.7.3) and (4.7.6).
The total tax revenue, TR, raised is given by the sum of the tax raised by
each of the five main taxes: Income tax (TRm), Corporation tax (TRk), Labour
taxes (TRp) and producer taxes (TRp) and is shown in Equation (4.7.8).
TR - TR + 77? + TR +77? where
my K L r
(4.7.8) TRK = TKKDPK
TRL=TLLSPL = TLLDPL
( \ f




The governments budget surplus is given, using Equation (4.4.2) and (4.7.8),
by Equation (4.7.9).
(4.7.9) BS = GE - TR
The governments budget position in the baseline case is important in that it
provides the benchmark by which revenue-neutral changes are imposed.
This is dealt with in Chapter 5.
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4.8 Solution Procedure
Although the setup of the model is somewhat complicated, the solution
procedure is relatively simple. Appendix 4 details which of the components
of the model are parameters, which are variables and which are the 'primary'
variables that all other variables may be derived from. It is these primary
variables that form the core of the solution procedure.
As shown by Equation (4.3.12) and (4.3.14) the output of each production
sector adjusts automatically to equal the net demand. Quantities in the
model are thus in terms of parameters and prices and hence are not solved
for, directly. Simplistically, the solution procedure finds a set of the
'primary' price variables such that all markets clear.
These 'primary' prices that are solved for in the model are the prices
received by each of the production sectors (Pr=18), the prices paid for labour
and capital and the exchange rate (ER=1). The conditions that must be
satisfied for an equilibrium are that all sectors make normal profit (18), the
labour and capital markets clear (2) and the balance of payments is in






It is vital to note that the model is not a closed system due to that fact that the
government sector does not 'clear'. There is no stipulation9 that the
government must balance its budget. As such, Walras' Law does not apply.
Walras' Law states that in a system of n markets, if (n-1) are in equilibrium,
then the nth must be in equilibrium also. This usually necessitates the use of
a numuaire, or constant variable in a CGE model. As this model is not a
closed system, this is not the case.
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The solution to the model is the solution to the above system of 21 equations
in 21 unknowns. Once a solution for these 21 variables is known, all other
variables in the model are known.
4.9 Features of the model
As mentioned in the introduction, the model was developed with a specific
purpose in mind - an analysis of the distributional implications of revenue-
neutral tax reform, specifically with the imposition of environmental taxes.
The specific environmental taxes that are imposed are taxes on energy. See
Chapter 1.
There are thus two criteria that the model must be able to fulfil - it must be
suitable for analysing distributional effects and it must also be suitable for
analysing the effects of energy taxes. This section examines each of these
issues in turn. The features that ease the analysis of distributional effects are
considered first, as to a large extent they are unique, to this model, in this
context. A final section (4.9.3) examines the consequences of the fact that the
competitive general equilibrium framework implies labour market clearing,
or no involuntary unemployment.
4.9.1 Distributional Effects
The main feature that the analysis of distributional effects necessitates is the
inclusion of the analysis of multiple households. This issue was touched
upon briefly in Section 4.2 but will be elaborated on in this section.
The approach chosen to include more than the standard, single
representative household must be scrutinised in some detail. As mentioned
in Section 4.2 it is possible to use either a 'single to multiple' approach or the
reverse, a 'multiple to single approach'. The 'single to multiple' approach
constructs a model for the entire economy, solves for the relevant variables -
prices, quantities etc. and then disaggregates to separate households. This is
analytically relatively simple as the equations that comprise the solution set
of the model are reasonably straightforward. It is then simply a matter of
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applying disaggregation criteria to examine the effect of any imposed
changes on a subset of the economy.
This approach was rejected for a number of reasons. Firstly, as was
demonstrated in Chapter 3, with the inclusion of an average household for
initial expositional simplicity, when dealing with the revenue-neutral tax
changes in the context of the double dividend hypothesis, a single
representative household approach can give misleading results. Certain,
small, sectors of the economy may gain (or lose) so much that the overall
effect is positive (or negative) even if the remaining, large portion of the
economy loses (or gains). Thus average results can be very misleading if one
cares about equity.
A major reason for the rejection of the single to multiple approach is simply
that it wastes information. As an example, a specification of the individual
separate demand structures of numerous households, particularly if these
demand structures are complex in nature (such as the AID system10), will
contain much more information and will give much more realistic results
than representing the entire household sector by a single household. More
specifically, it is almost certain that the demand characteristics of those
households which have smaller market power will be 'lost' in such an
amalgamation. This may be relatively unimportant for the economy as a
whole, but will be very important when considering the effect on the
particular household. This loss of information cannot be compensated for by
then disaggregating the single household downwards. However, the issue of
disaggregation is another major problem as it is not immediately clear how
this disaggregation should be undertaken. More importantly, it will now be
demonstrated how this disaggregation in itself can cause major problems.
To take the example of the AID system outlined in Section 4.2., the intercept
terms in Equation (4.2.20) and (4.2.21) are allowed to vary between
households. Expressing equation (4.2.20) in terms of demands rather than
budget shares and adding household subscripts where appropriate we have:
where
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log Pmh = 0,* + X 0* togA + ;IX q\, logpk log/?,
k z k I
In the AID system, the parameters (jqh and cj)0h must be calibrated to reflect the
actual demands of each household. The other parameters, (p and y, are
estimated econometrically. For simplicity assume all prices are equal to
unity. This gives:
(4.9.2) D*=Ih(tf + tf(tog /-</>/))
Assume, again for simplicity, that we have two households, denoted a and b.
The total demand is given by:
(4.9.3)
D- = (</>/' + (log I" - 0/ ))=/"(</>" + ^(log Ia - 0/))+ Ih (0/ + 7; (log /" - 0/
h=a,b
This simple, two household demand structure could be represented by a
single household, c. Household c could be modelled as having income equal
to the average income of households a and b and the demand side economy
would be represented by twice the demand of household c. This would
represent the household sector as comprising numerous identical
households and will be termed Scenario 1. Alternatively, household c could
be modelled as having the joint income of household a and b. In this case the
demand side of the economy would be represented by a single household
and will be termed Scenario 2.
The total demand in the economy is now represented in the two scenarios
by:
(4.9.4) D/ = 2/' ($'' + Yi (log 1° ~ 0O)) Scenario 1, or
D. = Ic (</>' + Yi (log JC ~ 0,)) Scenario 2.
Substituting in the relevant terms for the income of household c gives:
( ( ra I Tb \\
(4.9.5) D' =(/" + /) <t>i+7i log (7 )~0o
\ \ z jj
Scenario 1, or
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D- = (J" + Ih ){<p- + y (log (/" +/'')- </>/)) Scenario 2.
In either case, the total demand represented by Equations (4.9.5) must be
equal to the total demand represented by Equation (4.9.3) so giving:
I" (0," + 7,(log I" ~ 0/ ))+ (06 + y (log /6 - 0/ ))=
(C ja + rb Yi Scenario 1# + y[ log (;LYl)-0ocJJ
(4.9.6) and
/" (0" + y (log r - 0/))+ ib (0" + y (log /" - 0" ))=
Scenario 2
(r+/A)(0.c+ y(iog {Ia+Ib)-<p;))
The relevant part of Equations (4.9.6) must hold for the model to be correctly
specified. However, due to the complex functional form of the demand
system neither of the equations can be simplified further. Thus in either
Scenario 1 or Scenario 2, there are additional restrictions imposed on the
parameters that must be calibrated for households a and b. This results in it
being unlikely that the demand system for the two households can be
specified in terms of real world data.
The use of the 'multiple to single' approach, where households are specified
individually and the total position calculated by summing them together
does not suffer from either of these problems. It does have the disadvantage
of making the entire model significantly more complicated.
The question of households are distinguished should be considered, briefly.
The most obvious, and the chosen, way is by income. An equal number of
households make up each income group. As will be seen in Chapter 5, there
are ten household groups in the parameterised model, each representing a
decile of income. It is of course possible to categorise households in many
other ways, but when dealing with equity considerations this would seem to
be the most sensible.
The choice of demand system has an effect on the ability of the model to
analyse both distributional issues and the effects of energy taxes. The AID
system, which is significantly more complex than the more common linear
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expenditure system, is used to specify the demand structure of the
household sector for the primary reason that it incorporates cross price
effects. This has important distributional implications but is vital in
determining the effects of energy taxes, particularly in the context of revenue
neutrality. See the discussion in section 1.2.1.
4.9.2 Energy Taxes
The key feature of the model in regard to its analysis of the effect of energy
taxes is the inclusion of energy as a direct input to the production function of
the private sector. There is thus substitutability between energy and labour
and capital. This is vital if the analysis of the model is to be accurate. It is
quite common for energy to be treated as any other (non-labour/capital)
input to the production process, but this means that a model will fail to
capture all effects of a rise in energy price. Possibly the worst case is where
energy is included in the make matrix specified in Equation (4.3.1). If this
route is followed, then the effect of rising energy prices will be transmitted
simply by rising producer prices reducing demand for goods and services.
Overall energy consumption will fall but only at the same rate as overall
output.
Allowing substitution between energy and other inputs allows the
production sector to act in a more realistic way. There will still be upward
pressure on producer prices, but there will be scope for firms to use less
energy per unit output. Thus, overall energy use may fall in two ways.
The inclusion of this ability does however raise the issue of adjustment time.
The production sector in the model is assumed to minimise the cost per unit
output and operate under constant returns to scale. This, coupled with the
ability to substitute between energy and other inputs means that the model
should not be thought of as considering short-run effects. The set-up is
geared to analysing the effects of changes in the tax structure in the medium
to long term. A single run of the model should be considered to represent a
period of around five to ten years. This would seem a sensible time scale for
changes of the magnitude that may take place.
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Ideally, this whole issue could be clarified by the inclusion of some form of
technological change, explicitly, within the model. One possible idea would
be the use of a 'vintage' model of capital, where there would be an incentive
from higher energy prices, to invest in machinery that is more energy
efficient. At this stage, such an approach is too complex and more generally
the issue of modelling technical change is fraught with empirical difficulty.
4.9.3 The consequences of labourmarket clearing.
As mentioned in section 4.1, the competitive general equilibrium nature of
the model means that, by definition, the labour market clears and there is
thus no possibility of involuntary unemployment being considered. It will
be noted from the first chapter that those papers that do include involuntary
unemployment tend to be more favourable to the notion of the double
dividend than those that do not.
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) model involuntary unemployment in
terms of a household wishing to supply more hours of labour than the
production sector is demanding. They find that there is scope for a double
dividend in terms of a reduction in pollution and a reduction in
unemployment. However, as pointed out by Bonetti and Fitzroy (1999) this
form of unemployment is, in effect, underemployment of existing workers.
Bonetti and Fitzroy go on to point out that in practice, labour market
rationing takes a rather different form in that full-time workers may prefer
shorter hours and part-time workers may be content as they are. This issue
has obvious distributional implications.
The model presented here does not distinguish between part and full-time
work. In practice, lower income households tend to comprise more part-time
workers than higher income households and data is available for the
calibration, in such a manner, of the household sector. However, if this were
the focus of the model it may be more sensible to differentiate households
by labour type, rather than, as is done here, by income. The major problem is
that data is not readily available for the proportion of each labour type
employed by the various production sectors and as such the inclusion of
such analysis is not practical in this model.
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An obvious way of including involuntary unemployment in the this model
is to keep wages constant and stop the labour market from clearing. This
would, in effect, simplify the solution procedure as there would be one less
variable to find a solution for. The effect of such a setup is not clear as the
complexity of the model and it's 'black-box' nature makes prediction
difficult. However, it is surmised that as capital is not fixed the effect may
not be a strong as that found by Bonetti and Fitzroy. There is a major
problem, however, in using such an approach. If the supply of labour
outstripped the demand for labour from firms there is no difficulty - there is
simply involuntary unemployment. The problem occurs if the demand for
labour outstrips supply at the given wage rate and there is then an issue
with how to allocate, or ration, the available labour to the production sector.
One point is that any such rationing is likely to be unrealistic, as in reality
different production sectors will face different constraints and data
restrictions mean different labour types are not possible. The major issue is
that in the course of finding a solution to the model it is likely that the
solution procedure will switch between these two states. The fact that under
this variation of the model, the actual level of labour used by firms is no
longer a continuous function will simply mean that a solution to the model
is not possible.
A way around this problem is for the model to consider endogenous wage
determination through collective bargaining or efficiency wages. If tax
reform were to increase employment then wage setters may sacrifice
employment gains for higher wages. This issue is again pointed out in
Bonetti and Fitzroy (1999). Such a system is not included due to the
additional complexity involved. It is, unfortunately, extremely difficult to
surmise what the result of such an addition would be (and it would
obviously depend on the exact specification used). However, it may be
expected that such an approach may enhance the possibilities for the
existence of a double dividend as the more simplistic inclusion of
involuntary unemployment does in the papers above.
In summary, although involuntary unemployment is not included in the
model due to both the vastly increased complexity involved and data
constraints, it is surmised that its omission may decrease the strength of the
results in terms of finding a double dividend. As such, the results of the
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model should perhaps be viewed, with caution, as perhaps underestimating
the extent of any double dividend.
4.10 Conclusion
This chapter has explained the theoretical setup of the model to be used in
the next two chapters. Each component part of the economy has been
explained separately in full detail and the linkages between each sector
explained (Section 4.1 to 4.7). The solution procedure was explained in
Section 4.8. Finally, the features of the model that were designed with its
specific purpose in mind were outlined in Section 4.9.
Parameterisation and calibration is a complicated issue and is dealt with in
Chapter 5 before results generated by the model are given in Chapter 6.
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Notes:
1 With the exception of the government sector - there is no stipulation that the government must
balance its budget. See Section 4.8.
2Cross trading of goods is a prominent real world phenomenon.
3This notation is used for simplicity in dealing with the household sector. In the model, all
savings go to the purchase of investment goods (capital).
4 Ballard et. al. use the notation, H, for the household's sub-utility of effort, termed here Ef. The
notation is changed to avoid confusion. H is usually used for effort and may be interpreted in
more simple models as hours worked. In this case, with a nested utility function, hours
worked are just one component of the household's sub-utility of effort.
5The production tax, V, is equivalent to a composite of Value Added Tax and any excise duties.
Due to informational constraints and the inclusion of energy as a specific factor of production,
these two forms of tax - a percentage on the price of output over the cost of intermediate inputs
and a fixed per unit amount - are modelled as a percentage of output price.
6It will be seen in the following section that the data used to calibrate the model is such that
there is a trade deficit. The exchange rate is adjusted so that this deficit remains as was.
7As detailed in Section 4.3, the return to capital is thought of as the 'normal' profit of the
production sector.
8Also, it is possible that VAT rates may vary across sectors although this is not explicitly
stated.
9Until the issue of revenue-neutrality is considered - but in this case the revenue returning
instrument is an additional variable.
,0The reasons for using the AID system are dealt with later in this section.
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Chapter 5 - Model data, Calibration and
Sensitivity Analysis
This chapter deals with the data used in the model, the calibration of the
model to this data and performs sensitivity analysis of the model to those
parameters that were uncalibrated. Section 5.1 covers the data sources and
manipulation required in detail, section 5.2 details the calibration
procedures used and section 5.4 gives the results of a 'basic' run using the
central parameters and section 5.5 performs the sensitivity analysis.
5.1 Model data
Data from two separate sources is used in the model. The primary data
source is the Input-Output Tables for the UK 19901. Although this is
primarily production data, and it is detailed in section 5.1.1 below, it also
contains aggregate measures of consumption, investment, exports and
imports by production sector. It does not however contain disaggregated
household data. This data was sourced for Economics Trends (1990) and is
detailed in section 5.1.2. The use of two differing data sources and their use
together is detailed in section 5.1.3. The overall, combined data for the
economy is detailed in section 5.1.4.
5.1.1 Production, Investment, Government Spending and Trade
The source for data on production is the Input-Output Tables for the UK
19902. This was the most recent data available of the form required3. The first
part of the Tables consists of a Make Matrix (henceforth, MM), Domestic Use
Matrix (henceforth, DUM) and Imports Use Matrix (henceforth, IUM). The
MM provides a breakdown of domestic supply for each of the 123
commodities in terms of the producing industry - in other words, 'who
makes what'. It shows, for each commodity, how much is produced by the
industry for which it is the principal product and how much is produced by
other industries as secondary products. The two Use Matrices show the
input structure of industries in terms of either domestic (the DUM) or
imported (the IUM) goods and services - in other words 'who uses what'.
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Each column in a use matrix breaks down the inputs of an industry between
intermediate and primary inputs. An industry pays wages to workers and
indirect taxes to government. The excess of its output over the payment for
intermediate inputs gives the gross operating surplus or the total return to
capital in this model. Each row in the use matrix show how a particular
commodity is distributed to other industries in terms of intermediate
demand, or as a final demand to consumers expenditure, government
expenditure (termed general government final consumption (GGFC)),
investment (termed gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF)), change
in stocks and exports.
Thus, the use matrices contain sufficient information to calibrate the
production sector of the model4 as well as providing a large amount of data
on the remainder of the economy. There are four major issues however:
• Commodities versus Industries
An important issue with the Input-Output tables is the distinction between
industries and commodities (products). Industries are defined using the
Standard Industry Classification, Revised 1980, (HMSO 1979), and
commodities are defined as the principle output of each of these 123
industries. Each production unit is classified according to the main
commodity they produce but it is, of course, possible that a particular
production unit may produce more than one commodity. Because of this it
is not possible to define the elements in the two classifications in such a way
that there is a one to one correspondence between them.
This problem is easily overcome as the tables also include derived input-
output tables in the form of a commodity by commodity5 DUM and IUM.
Use of this data means that the production sectors in the model reflect
commodity output. Although, it is production sectors that are referred to,
this distinction should be remembered.
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Aggregation
The Input-Output tables contain data on 123 separate industries which is
much too large to be manageable. The data was aggregated into 18
production sectors. Table 5.1 (overleaf) shows the 18 sectors and the
Standard Industry Classification groups that comprise them.
The sectors were chosen to represent sensible, broad product types.
Although the division is somewhat arbitrary, it matches that used by Ballard
et. al. (1985).
• Energy Sectors
There are five energy producing sectors included in the 123 sectors in the
input-output tables. These sectors appear unaggregated in the model:
• Coal extraction etc.
• Extraction - Oil and Gas
• Coke production, oil production, nuclear fuel
• Electricity production
• Gas
The first two are primarily 'raw' energy materials production, the final two
are 'final' energy products and the middle sector is somewhat of a mixture. It
will be recalled from the previous chapter that energy appears as a input,
along with labour and capital, in each firms production function. Thus, care
must be taken to exclude the energy sectors as intermediate goods.
• Values to Quantities
The input-output tables are denoted in units of millions of pounds sterling
at basic prices (excluding taxation). By assuming that all producer receives
prices are initially set to unity (see Section 5.2.1), one unit of output in the
model represents £1 million pounds of 1990 output in reality. This allows a
simple interpretation of the model's results.
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Table 5.1 - Aggregation of 123 Standard Industry Classification commodities























Alcoholic drink, Soft drinks, Tobacco
Clothing and furs, Footwear, Hosiery and other knitted goods, Leather and
leather goods, Textile finishing, Woollen and worsted,
Other machinery and mechanical equipment, Office machinery and computer
equipment, Basic electrical equipment, Electrical equipment for industry,
batteries, etc., Telecommunication etc. equipment, electronic capital goods,
Domestic electric appliances3, Electric lighting equipment, etc., Motor vehicles
and parts, Shipbuilding and repairing, Aerospace equipment manufacturing
and repairing, Other vehicles, Instrument engineering, Timber processing and
wood products (not furniture), Wooden furniture, shop and office fittings,
SEE SECTION 5.1.1.3
Agriculture and horticulture, Oils and fats, Slaughtering and meat processing,
Milk and milk products, Fruit, vegetables and fish processing, Grain milling
and starch, Bread, biscuits and flour confectionery, Sugar, Confectionery,
Animal feeding stuffs, Miscellaneous foods
Public administration, Education, Research and development, Health services
Electronic consumer goods, records and tapes, Carpets and other textile floor
coverings, Jewellery and coins, Ownership of dwellings
Water supply, Glass, Refractory and ceramic goods, Paints, dyes, pigments,
printing ink, Specialised chemicals for industry and agriculture,
Pharmaceutical products, Soap and toilet preparations, Electronic components
and sub-assemblies, Household and other made-up textiles, Paper and board
products, Rubber products, Processing of plastics, Sports goods and toys, Other
goods
Cement, lime and plaster, Concrete, stone, asbestos and abrasive products,
Metal goods, Insulated wires and cables, Construction
Printing and publishing, Hotels, catering, public houses, etc., Postal services,
Telecommunications, Banking and finance, Insurance, Auxiliary financial
services, Accountancy services, Computing services, Renting of movables,
Sanitary services, Recreational and welfare services, Personal services,
Domestic services
Wholesale distribution, Distribution & repair of vehicles, filling stations &
other goods, Retail distribution, Legal services, Other professional services,
Advertising, Other business services
Railways, Road and other inland transport, Sea transport, Air Transport,
Transport services
Structural clay products, Chemical products, Metal doors, windows, etc.,
Industrial plant and steelwork, Agricultural machinery and tractors, Metal-
working machine tools, Engineers small tools, Textile machinery, machinery
for working other materials, Process machinery and contractors, Mining,
construction and mechanical handling equipment, Mechanical power
transmission equipment, Ordnance, small arms and ammunition
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Raw Materials (zm) Forestry, Fishing, Extraction of metalliferous ores and minerals, Iron and steel,
and steel products, Aluminium and aluminium alloys, Other non-ferrous
metals (including precious metals), Extraction of stone, clay, sand and gravel,
Inorganic chemicals, Organic chemicals, Fertilisers, Synthetic resins and plastic
materials, synthetic rubber, Man-made fibres, Metal castings, forgings,
fastenings, springs, etc., Packaging products of metal, Cotton etc. spinning and
weaving, Jute etc. yarns and fabrics, and miscellaneous textiles, Pulp, paper and
board, Owning and dealing in real estate'3
Notes:
a: Domestic electric appliances are included in durables, rather than Household durables as
£771 mill is used as intermediate inputs, as opposed to £335mill for consumption,
b: Real estate can be considered land and as such a 'Raw material' of production
5.1.1.1 The DUM and IUM
Bearing in mind the four points raised above the DUM and IUM for the
model were calculated (by summing the appropriate values from the Input
Output Tables from the relevant disaggregated sectors) and can be found in
Appendix 5a and 5b respectively. As an example, the highlighted square in
the DUM indicates that the Alcohol and Tobacco sector uses 723.2 units of
the food sector's output as an intermediate goods, a total of 4150.6 units of
intermediate goods and produces 8592.9 units of it's own product. From the
opposite perspective, the food sector sells 723.2 units of it's output to the
Alcohol and Tobacco industry as a intermediate input.
5.1.1.2 The Intermediate Use Matrix per unit output matrix
The Intermediate Use Matrix, i.e. 'how much of each sectors output, each
sector uses to produce one unit of its own output'. Is calculated by adding
the values in the corresponding cells in the DUM to those in the IUM and
dividing each of these values (the total intermediate - domestic and
imported - inputs of each sectors output that each sector uses) by the output
of the sector concerned (by column). The Intermediate Use matrix is given in
Appendix 5c. By way of illustration, the durables sector uses 0.0424 units of
Construction Materials per unit of its output (the shaded cell in the table).
Note that there are no rows in the Intermediate Use Matrix for the energy
sectors (el, e2, e3 ,e4 e5) as Energy in a modelled as a factor of production
rather than a fixed intermediate good.
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5.1.1.3 Factors of production
Information on the use per unit output of the factors of production in the
model - labour, capital and energy - is taken from the DUM and IUM, and
are shown in Table 5.2. The return to capital, pjy, and wage costs of
producers, pp, are set, initially to unity. Thus the labour and capital inputs
of each sector are given by the appropriate row in the DUM. Dividing by
each sector's output gives the per unit labour and capital demand.
The energy inputs of each sector comprise a composite of output of the five
energy producing sectors. The energy composite demand per unit is simply
total energy demand divided by output, for each sector. The shares of each
energy component, eij, are calculated as the fraction of each energy type that
comprises the sectors energy input. This information is clearly available
from the DUM and IUM.
Table 5.2 - Factor use per unit.
Factor use per unit Proportion of each energy type per unit
energy input
L/Unit K/Unit E/Unit bEl bE2 bE3 bE4 bE5
a 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.32 0.38 0.25
c 0.33 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.56 0.29
d 0.31 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.35 0.47 0.17
el 0.46 0.03 0.05 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.02
e2 0.08 0.41 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
e3 0.06 0.15 0.66 0.01 0.84 0.14 0.00 0.00
e4 0.11 0.09 0.66 0.22 0.00 0.07 0.71 0.00
e5 0.21 0.14 0.57 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.07
f 0.24 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.33 0.44 0.15
8 0.92 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.58 0.26
hd 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.55 0.18
o 0.29 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.31 0.43 0.20
cm 0.20 0.13 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.33 0.39 0.13
s 0.36 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.59 0.15
bs 0.44 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.53 0.21
t 0.30 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.67 0.22 0.10
z 0.36 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.34 0.44 0.19
zm 0.23 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.42 0.23 0.14
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Examining the table, it is immediately noticeable that sector e2 (Oil and Gas
extraction) primarily appears as an input, as one would expect, to sectors e3
and e5 - Oil and Coke production and gas production respectively.
5.1.1.4 Investment
The composite capital good I, which comprises Investment in the model, as
given by equation (4.5.1), requires knowledge of IMj, the amount of output
of sector i required to produce one unit of capital goods. This is calculated
from the DUM and IUM. Again, the two use matrices are summed together
to give the total amount of each sector's output that comprises investment,
and each value is divided by total investment to give the share of each
sector's output in the investment composite. This is shown in Table 5.3
below.
Table 5.3 - Investment, Government Quantity purchased and producer tax
rates.




a 0 55.12639 0.069135
c 0 601.2469 0.034611
d 0.014673 765.9456 0.022812
el 0 83.48779 -0.11709
e2 0 0 0.004483
e3 0 687.1051 0.100753
e4 0 896.569 0.121156
e5 0 525.3222 0.185328
f 0 1524.884 -0.03298
£ 0 75710.99 0.138738
hd 0 0 0.004712
o 0.000157 5200.992 0.039851
cm 0.515484 5152.83 0.009107
s 0.005259 4204.636 0.083732
bs 0.069401 3861.003 0.113445
t 0.1233 6747.896 0.024714
z 0.268484 8255.359 0.028745
zm 0.003242 1611.091 0.065101
131
5.1.1.5 Government Expenditure and Taxes
Government expenditure in terms of quantity purchased of the output of
each sector is simply taken from the DUM and IUM in a similar manner to
above and is reported in Table 5.3. It is important to remember, from section
4.4, that although the quantity of government output remains constant,
expenditure will not, as prices change.
Producer taxes rates are calculated from the DUM, using the Taxes-
Subsidies, row by solving a system of equations of the form:
V 'V
'A.i - Am " J3 00
Aj - A„ • As,/ - RJ
Am •• Amb • A 8,18 yv
vV
where Dpj is the element in the ith row and jth column of the DUM, tj is the
producer tax rate on good j, and 1^ is the tax revenue from good j. This
system of 18 equations in 18 unknowns, (the Ij's), may be solved for the
producer tax rates in each sector. The results are again shown in Table 5.3.
5.1.1.6 Trade
As detailed in section 4.6, exports and imports are treated as composite
goods, due to the difficulty in obtaining reliable estimates of trade
elasticities, separately, for the 18 production sectors.
The level of exports and imports of each of the production sectors is
determined from the appropriate column in the DUM (for exports) and the
appropriate row in the DUM (for imports)6. By dividing each sectors
contribution by the appropriate total the share of each production sector in
the Export and Import composites is determined. This data is shown in
Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4 - Composition of Export and Import composites
Share of sector in total
Sector Exports Imports Sector Exports Imports
a 0.0219 0.0162 £ 0.0003 0.0112
c 0.0438 0.0763 hd 0.12 0.16
d 0.0072 0.0145 o 0.1182 0.1208
el 0.0013 0.005 cm 0.0161 0.0189
e2 0.0448 0.0326 s 0.0403 0.0202
e3 0.0221 0.0206 bs 0.0301 0.0205
e4 0.0015 0.0015 t 0.1969 0.1843
e5 0 0 z 0.2616 0.1715
0.0823 0.1289 zm 0.1115 0.157
5.1.2 Consumption Side
Consumption data was taken from Economic Trends, 1990, and its
Supplement. Data was available on the household demand for consumption
goods and household income, for each decile of the income distribution. In
both cases the data had to be matched to the production data taken from the
input-output tables. This process is dealt with in section 5.1.3. Section 5.1.2.1
details the data available on expenditure and section 5.1.2.2, the data on
income.
5.1.2.1 Expenditure data
Data was available on the weekly household expenditure on consumption,
broken down by consumption good category, for each decile of household
income. The expenditure data is for the categories used by Pashardes (1993)
in estimating his AID system (see section 4.1, equation 4.2.20 and 3.3.1). The
seven non-durable categories form the AID system and expenditure on
durables makes up the remainder. As households in the model are
differentiated this way this data was in an ideal form. The first stage was to
split the data into durable and non durable goods. Then, for each household,
it was trivial to calculate the budget share of each of the consumer goods for
each household. This is shown in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5 - Breakdown of household expenditure





Food Alcohol Fuel Clothing Transport Other Services
1 0.159 0.841 0.297 0.143 0.028 0.026 0.05 0.345 0.111
2 0.146 0.854 0.283 0.129 0.026 0.033 0.062 0.351 0.116
3 0.142 0.858 0.268 0.096 0.026 0.035 0.087 0.365 0.122
4 0.136 0.864 0.217 0.085 0.029 0.037 0.105 0.38 0.146
5 0.129 0.871 0.235 0.074 0.029 0.042 0.111 0.368 0.14
6 0.138 0.862 0.23 0.06 0.028 0.04 0.112 0.385 0.145
7 0.133 0.867 0.224 0.059 0.027 0.042 0.116 0.369 0.163
8 0.128 0.872 0.219 0.053 0.025 0.044 0.116 0.37 0.172
9 0.133 0.867 0.209 0.047 0.024 0.048 0.115 0.392 0.164
10 0.121 0.879 0.185 0.041 0.022 0.051 0.113 0.371 0.216
When used in conjunction with data on the breakdown of household income
into savings and expenditure (see following section), Table 5.5 is sufficient to
calibrate consumption demand.
5.1.2.2 Household income
Data was available on household income across the 10 households of the
income distribution. This data was in terms of the weekly income of each
decile, broken down by income source - in the terms of the model: Labour,
Capital and Government transfers. From this data the share of total income
accrued by each of the household types could be calculated, as could the
share of each household's income by source. This is shown in Table 5.6.
The first column in table 5.6 can be interpreted as follows: the top 10% of
households account for 28.2% of household income. As one would expect
the share of income from transfers declines dramatically as one moves up
through the household groups. It is, at first glance, perhaps surprising that
the increase in the share of labour income is more dramatic that the increase
in the share of capital income. This should be interpreted as the fact that the
top 10% of households still include a large number actively supplying
labour, rather than living off capital. It is interesting to note that the share of
income for labour for this highest category does decline from the share in the
previous category (Household 9). In the model, income from capital
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includes private pensions7 etc. as well as other savings/investments. It is
surmised that the bi-modality of the share of income due to capital at
household 4 and 10 is due to the effect of pensions - a significant proportion
th
on those in the 4 household decile - slightly below average income - are
pensioners who do not supply labour income.
Table 5.6 - Breakdown of total income by household and household income
by category
Breakdown of household income by
category
Household Share of total
income
Labour Capital Transfers
1 0.02 0.016 0.076 0.908
2 0.027 0.037 0.166 0.721
3 0.039 0.139 0.223 0.534
4 0.054 0.298 0.248 0.312
5 0.072 0.399 0.243 0.195
6 0.093 0.484 0.215 0.125
7 0.112 0.523 0.216 0.095
8 0.135 0.555 0.208 0.068
9 0.166 0.574 0.209 0.051
10 0.282 0.558 0.267 0.035
Data is also available on the amount of income taxation paid by each
household decile. Given the absolute income levels of each decile, and
excluding transfers from taxable income, the marginal tax rates faced by each
household type may be calculated. This is shown in table 5.7.
Table 5.7 - Marginal tax rates by household.












These marginal tax rates allow for: a) the assumption of no taxation on
transfers and b) the existence of income tax allowances which are not
modelled explicitly8.
Section 5.1.3 now details how the production and household data, from two
separate sources, were matched.
5.1.3 Matching of the production and household data
The household side data described above allowed consumption shares of
the household consumption goods, household income and income tax rates
to be determined. This data was now matched with the production side data.
The first issue was that the consumption data for the AID system contained 7
consumption commodities (the addition of durables gives the total
consumption picture) whilst the production data is for 18 sectors. The
production sectors were allocated to the consumption commodities
according to table 5.8.





Alcohol and Tobacco Alcohol and Tobacco (a)
Clothing Clothing (c)
Transport Transport (t)
Other Other (o), Government (g), Construction Materials (m), Raw
Materials (zm)
Services Services (s), Business Services (bs)
Durables Durables (d), Household (Durables), Capital Goods (z)
Energy Coal Extraction (el), Oil and Gas Extraction (e2), Coke, Oil
Production (e3), Electricity (e4), Gas (e5)
Thus, there is a one to one relationship between Food, Alcohol and Tobacco,
Clothing and Transport. The remaining consumption commodities (Other,
Services, Durables and Energy) are composites of the remaining production
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sectors. The Consumption columns in the DUM and IUM allow the form of
this composition to be determined by dividing the sum of the DUM and IUM
consumption values for each production sector in each consumption
composite by the total of the sum of the DUM and IUM values for the
production sectors allocated to that consumption composite. The results are
shown in table 5.9.
As an illustration, the consumption commodity, Services, comprises 97.48%
Services and 2.52% Business Services, in terms of the production sectors.
Finally, the initial consumption tax rates are those used in chapter 3 and
shown in Table 3.3.
Table 5.9 - Production sector composition of the consumption commodities.
Food Alcohol Clothing Transport Other Services Durables Energy
a - 1 - - - - - -
c - - 1 - - - - -
d - - - - - - 0.089 -
el - - - - - - - 0.0239
e2 - - - - - - - -
e3 - - - - - - - 0.2294
e4 - - - - - - - 0.4207
e5 - - - - - - - 0.3260
f 1 - - - - - - -
8
- - - - 0.1036 - - -
hd - - - - - - 0.7721 -
o - - - - 0.1581 - - -
cm - - - - - - 0.1389 -
s - - - - - 0.9748 - -
bs - - - - - 0.0252 - -
t - - - 1 - - - -
z - - - - 0.7245 - - -
zm - - - - 0.0138 - - -
Turning to household income, the data on household share of total labour,
capital and transfer income in table 5.5 allows the calculation of individual
household income. This is done by using total payments to labour and
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capital from the DUM to calculate individual household labour and capital
income using the breakdown of income data. Then transfer payments are
determined (which are not given directly in the Input-Output tables but
appear in a Sales by final demand component) using the share of transfer
payments in each household income.
5.1.4 The whole economy data
The data constructed in sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.3 above translates relatively
simplistically to a picture of the entire economy. Given the information in
the DUM and IUM of total output of Production and Imports and the
allocation to Consumption, Investment, Government Spending and Exports,
it is a simple process to determine data for the economy as a whole. Due it's
size, this 'snapshot' of the economy is given in Appendix 5d.
The inclusion of Stocks in the Input-Output data which are not modelled
explicitly here means that this component is used as a adjustment variable to
ensure matching of the output and expenditure of the economy.
Section 5.2 now details the procedures used to calibrate the model using this
data.
5.2 Calibration
This section deals with the calibration of the model to the data outlined in
section 5.1. Production is dealt with initially, in section 5.2.1, followed by
investment, government expenditure and trade in section 5.2.2. The
household side of the model is considered in section 5.2.3 and finally,
section 5.2.4 summarises the non-calibrated parameters that are subjected to
sensitivity analysis in section 5.3.
5.2.1 Production
This section makes constant reference to section 4.3 of the preceding chapter.
The first stage of the calibration process is to ensure that, with unit producer
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receives prices, each sector is making normal profits. This is given by
equation (4.3.9). Unfortunately, the data is such that (4.3.9) is not
automatically such that zero normal profits exist9. The solution is to specify a
level of 'capital utilisation' for each sector such that each sector makes zero
profit. The 'capital utilisation' parameter takes the form of a percentage
reduction in the per-unit capital required by each sector. This results in a
imbalance between total capital use in the economy and total capital
available from households. Thus the process of matching the household
income (by type) data detailed above must be repeated for the revised
production capital usage data.
By calculating the 'capital utilisation' parameter so that, given the data,
equation (4.3.9) shows zero profits for all sectors the zero normal profit
assumption is satisfied. The capital utilisation parameters, as may be seen
from (4.3.9) are independent of any other parameters in the model and are
shown in table 5.10.
Table 5.10 - Capital utilisation by sector and production function coefficients
Sector Capital
Utilisation
parameter aL aK aE C d
a 0.92919 0.344 0.470 0.185 7.062 -0.175
c 0.692216 0.462 0.353 0.185 3.603 -1.118
d 0.615011 0.480 0.335 0.185 3.687 -1.115
el 1.994441 0.432 0.324 0.244 2.824 -0.822
e2 0.968573 0.237 0.532 0.231 3.172 -0.703
e3 0.778531 0.210 0.355 0.436 2.138 -0.439
e4 0.783935 0.249 0.299 0.451 2.110 -0.420
e5 0.50544 0.298 0.296 0.406 2.529 -0.457
f 1.049644 0.378 0.426 0.196 5.426 -1.379
£ 0.064428 0.654 0.205 0.141 1.174 -0.055
hd 0.969978 0.000 0.885 0.115 1.953 -0.046
0 0.72478 0.416 0.384 0.200 4.323 -1.406
cm 1.504534 0.353 0.490 0.157 5.274 -0.643
s 0.774027 0.415 0.417 0.168 3.686 -0.904
bs 0.469967 0.489 0.344 0.166 2.715 -0.704
t 0.861966 0.389 0.395 0.216 4.306 -1.271
z 1.114445 0.417 0.401 0.182 3.629 -0.992
zm 1.087854 0.370 0.379 0.251 5.518 -1.790
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The second stage of the calibration process involves the calibration of the
production function parameters. Each production sector's production
function is given by (4.3.4). Examination of this function shows that the
parameters C, a\, ap,ap and d, the shift parameter, the share parameters and
elasticity of substitution between inputs respectively, require calibration for
each production sector. Given the constant returns to scale assumption,
rephrasing (4.3.4) in terms of per-unit inputs (given by table 5.2), recalling
that the share parameters sum to unity and including the three factor
demand functions given by (4.2.7) gives 4 equations in four unknowns for
each production sector. Thus, the use of CES production functions means
that it is possible for all parameters in the production sector to be calibrated
by the data. The calibrated production parameters are given in table 5.10.
In examining table 5.10 it can be seen that the elasticity of substitution
between inputs is less than 1 in absolute terms for all but 5 of the sectors and
is below 0.8 (in absolute terms) for half of the sectors. Thus, the
substitutability between imports is, generally speaking, not high. This is
consistent with the thought of the model being one that deals with the short
to medium run.
5.2.2 Investment, GovernmentExpenditure and Trade
The total level of investment is given by the level of saving and the
investment demand for each of the sector's output is simply the share times
the total level of investment. Thus, no additional calibration is required.
Government consumption is fixed so again no calibration is required.
Trade consists of a composite export good and a composite import good.
Export and Import demand are given in (4.6.2) and (4.6.3) respectively. Given
the composite price of each the shift parameter must be calibrated to the
uncalibrated (determined) elasticity parameter so as the initial demands are
correct. This is a areas where sensitivity analysis is important. See section
5.3.1. However, in line with Ballard et. al. (1985), -1.4 and 0.4 are used as the
central case for the export and import price elasticities respectively.
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5.2.3 Consumption and the household
The calibration of the household sector is relatively complicated. Marginal
tax rates are calculated for each household from the basic data. Given the
income information detailed in section 4.1.3, the parameters remaining are
the share and elasticity parameters in the two utility functions and the
intercepts of the AID for each household.
Initially, the AID system is calibrated, using the calculated household
income and savings data (to match the production data) detailed in section
5.1.3. Given each household's expenditure (income minus savings) and
durable share, the expenditure of each household on the AID system can be
determined, as well as durable demand. The only parameters that vary
between households are the intercept terms in (4.2.20) and it is relatively
straightforward to calculate the values required such that actual budget
shares are equal to those in the data (detailed in table 5.5). This is invariant
to changes in any other parameters and is reported in Appendix 5e.
The next stage of the procedure is to calibrate the household utility function
so that, given the sub-utility demand functions, household income and
savings (and thus expenditure) match the data. There are two unknown
parameters in each utility function (see (4.2.7) and (4.2.12)) and two
equations - the supply of labour (or conversely the demand for leisure given
the previous calculation of household labour endowments), see (4.2.8), and
the level of savings, see (4.2.16). Thus there are two equations in four
unknowns. Hence, the choice to calibrate either the shift or the elasticity
parameters. The obvious choice is the shift parameters and they are thus
calibrated to given elasticity parameters.
This leaves the elasticity of substitution parameters - the elasticity of
substitution between leisure and effort and the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and savings - to be determined outside the model.
Considering the elasticity of substitution between leisure and effort, it is
possible to calculate a value for a given uncompensated wage elasticity of
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labour supply, UWELS, - a value for which many empirical estimates exist.










The derivation of this formulae is complex and can be found in Ballard et.al
(1985) equations (6.15) to (6.28).
It is not possible to undertake the same process for the elasticity of
substitution between savings and consumption due to the mathematical
complexity involved. Instead, for a given savings elasticity estimate an
iteration process must be undertaken to calculate the elasticity of
substitution. The savings elasticity is given by:
<&Ps_ w
Ps S ^ s $ (5.3)
Thus, for a given level of r), the savings elasticity, the elasticity of
substitution may be calculated by using equation (4.2.15). The method is to
change the price of saving by a given proportion from its initial value, thus
giving a change in the level of saving. Thus, for a given ai the savings
elasticity, q, can be determined. It is thus a question of iterating on
al until the calculated savings elasticity is equal to the required, empirical
value.
Once the two elasticity of substitution parameters have been determined, it
is relatively straightforward to calibrate the shift parameters in each
household's utility function so that the labour supply, and savings match the
data. This calibration process is complex mathematically, due to the
complicated nature of the functions and requires several iterations to
converge.
A large number of studies have been undertaken to calculate the wage
elasticity. See Ballard et.al. (1985) or Borjas and Heckman (1978) for a
survey. Estimates vary between male and female workers due to differences
in participation patterns10 . Estimates for the male elasticity range from -0.40
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to 0, a range figure reduced by reviewing the econometric s of the studies to
-0.07 to -0.19 by Borjas and Heckman (1978). Female estimates range from 0.2
to 1.6 with a cluster around 0.9. Taking the 'best' estimate for males to be -
0.15 and the best estimate for females to be 0.9 and weighting by shares in
total earnings gives a baseline value for the uncompensated wage elasticity
of 0.15.
There is some variation in estimates of the savings elasticity but a central
value of 0.4 is used from Boskin (1978) and sensitivity analysis is performed
in the following section.
The estimates of wage and savings elasticity are not differentiated by
household but when the elasticity of substitution values are derived and the
shift parameters calibrated the parameters vary across households and are
given, for the central cases, in Table 5.11.
A solution of the model for this baseline case, with a representative increase
in energy taxes is now outlined in section 5.3.
5.3 An example solution to the model
To illustrate the model two simple scenarios are considered - energy taxes
on production are increased by 100%11 - Scenario 2 and by 200% - Scenario 3.
For comparison purposes scenario 1 is the initial state of the model.
The basic results of the two scenarios are reported in table 5.12 and a more
comprehensive listing can be found in appendix 5f.
It should be noted that the tax rises, although high in proportional terms are
not high in absolute terms. Referring to table 5.3, a 100% rise in the tax rate
on sector e3 (Coke, Oil production) raises the tax rate from around 10% to
around 20%. All other things being equal this equates to a rise in the (pre-
solution) price of sector e3 of 9.1%. Indeed, given that sector el, is initially
receiving a subsidy of 11.7%, scenario 1 simply removes this subsidy.
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Table 5.12 - Example run of the model
% change from baseline - Scenario 1
Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Wages -0.36 -0.69












It is quite difficult, due to the 'black-box' nature of the model to give a
comprehensive, intuitive explanation for what is taking place. This is
especially difficult given the simultaneity of the changes. However, an
attempt will be made.
The increase in the producer price of energy means that firms substitute
labour and capital for energy and raise prices in order to achieve normal
profits. Thus demand for labour would tend to increase. However, this effect
is outweighed by the effect on the household sector. Here, the increase in the
price level changes the incentives to supply labour. The effect is markedly
different across households. Lower income households increase their labour
supply and higher income households reduce it (see Appendix 5f). This
may be because energy takes up a larger amount of the budget share in
lower income households.
However, because higher income households supply proportionally more
labour and reduce their labour supply, overall labour supply falls, hence the
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wage must fall to achieve equilibrium. In addition, consumption and saving
, fall as household income falls (due to the reduction in the wage level)
which reduces output, putting further downward pressure on output. This
effect is exacerbated by the reduction in output reducing the demand for
capital and thus putting downward pressure on the interest rate that further
reduces household income.
The overall effect is a reduction in output. Examining the reduction in
output by each sector (again, given in appendix 5f) it is noticeable that the
output of the alcohol and tobacco sector increases significantly, despite a fall
in the output of all other sectors (barring small rises in the output of oil and
gas extraction and raw materials). This is interesting as it mirrors the result
of Chapter 3 (section 3.4.2) that showed an strong substitutability
relationship between Energy (specified as Fuel in Chapter 3) and Alcohol.
This is perhaps unsurprising as the same household demand structure was
used in both models, but is reassuring none the less.
The focus now turns to the sensitivity of these results to the uncalibrated
parameters.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
This section contains analysis of the sensitivity of the results of the model to
changes in the uncalibrated parameters, namely the export and import
elasticities, the uncompensated wage elasticity and the savings elasticity12.
It is surmised that the model will be more sensitive to changes in the
household parameters so a thorough examination of this issue is
undertaken.
5.4.1 Trade elasticities
First however, the export and import elasticities are examined. Appendix 5g
shows the model results for two scenarios. In each scenario the tax change
imposed on the model is a tripling of the producer tax rates on energy. In
appendix 5g, Scenario 1 is the baseline of the model with the central export
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and import elasticity parameters of -1.4 and 0.4 respectively. Scenario 2
imposes an export elasticity of -0.8 whilst Scenario 3 imposes an import
elasticity of 0.8 (whilst returning the export elasticity to its baseline value of -
1.4). The effect of the tax tripling with the central export/import parameters
was given by Scenario 3 in section 5.3. For convenience, Table 5.13 reports
the changes in key variables for the central case, and Scenarios 2 and 3
outlined above.
As can be seen from Table 5.13 changes in the major variables of output, Q,
and consumption, C, are minimal. There is a small variation in the change in
the level of exports and imports13, as one would expect, but this has no
discernible impact on the model.
It would seem fair to comment that the trade elasticities do not have a major
impact on the model's results. This is almost certainly due to the simplistic
structure imposed, explained in section 4.7 and justified in section 4.9.
Table 5.13 - Sensitivity to changes in the trade elasticities.





Export elasticity = -0.8
Scenario 3 -
Import elasticity = 0.8
Q -4110.12 -4109.24 -4108.91
c -3297.34 -3296.06 -3296.39
X 91.28 76.79 80.84
M -17.36 -31.31 -27.97
w -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
r -0.0327 -0.327 -0.327
E -0.0061 -0.0063 -0.0060
Attention is now turned to the household parameters. The effect of changes
in the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply is detailed in section
5.4.2 and the effect of changes in the savings elasticity in section 5.4.3.
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5.4.2 The uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply.
The sensitivity analysis for changes in the uncompensated wage elasticity of
labour supply can be found in Appendix 5h and Appendix 5i. In the first
case, an uncompensated wage elasticity (UWES) of -0.3 was used (results in
Appendix 5h) and in the second a UWES of -0.15. In each case the
appropriate elasticities of substitution were calculated as outlined in section
5.2.3 and the remaining household parameters calibrated. The results are to
be compared with the baseline run shown in Appendix 5f. In each case
producer energy taxes were doubled and tripled.
An examination of the relevant data shows that there was significant
variation due to the changes in the UWES, in absolute terms. For example,
output falls by 4110 in the baseline case, by 4519 with UWES of -0.3 and by
4022 with an UWES of -0.05 when energy taxes are tripled. However, the
difference in the percentage changes from the benchmark are small.
Table 5.14 - Effect of uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply.
Percentage changes from benchmark under
differing estimates of UWES.
Baseline UWES =-0.3 UWES—0.05
Q -0.45 -0.49 -0.44
c -1.12 -1.25 -1.09
i -0.88 -0.94 -0.89
X 0.07 0.06 0.06
M -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
G revenue 7.68 7.61 7.68
LS -0.15 -0.28 -0.06
w -0.69 -0.60 -0.85
r -3.27 -3.76 -2.93
E -0.60 -0.60 -0.60
Producer receives price index 0.40 0.36 0.40
Producer pays price index 1.55 1.51 1.55
Consumption price index 0.28 0.26 0.29
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Table 5.14 shows these percentage changes, in the three cases, from the base
of the model (which is the same in each instance) when the larger of the two
tax rises was imposed.
The results shown in Table 5.14 are sensible in that the higher the UWES, the
more employment adjusts when faced by the tax rise, the more the wage rate
must fall to compensate and thus, the more consumption and hence output
fall. The increased fall in investment (saving) under UWES=-0.05 compared
with the baseline is confusing but must be due to the interaction between
income, expenditure and saving. Prices rise in all cases, with the lowest rise
being when the UWES is highest. This is again consistent - if labour supply
does not adjust such a great deal, it must be output prices that 'soak up' the
tax rise.
Turning to the breakdown by household detailed in the appendices it is
noticeable that in the base run the lower 5 households increase their labour
supply and the top 5 households reduce it14. With an UWES of -0.3, the
situation is the same but the changes are stronger, whilst with an UWES of -
0.05, the lower 6 household increase labour supply and the top 4 only
reduce it. Household net income falls for all households in all three cases
and this change is greatest for all households with the high UWES.
It would thus appear that the model is relatively sensitive to changes in the
uncompensated wage elasticity of supply. This no great surprise but it
would seem that the changes are consistent with theory and that the chosen
parameter of -0.15 is sensible.
5.4.3 The savings elasticity
The sensitivity analysis for changes in the savings elasticity can be found in
Appendix 5j and Appendix 5k. Savings elasticities of 0.1 and 0.7 were
imposed compared with the base case of 0.4. The uncompensated wage
elasticity of supply remained at -0.15. Again, in each case the appropriate
elasticities of substitution were calculated as outlined in section 5.2.3 and the
remaining household parameters calibrated. The results are again to be
compared with the baseline run shown in Appendix 5f and again in each
case producer energy taxes were doubled and tripled.
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Table 5.15 - Effect of savings elasticity
Percentage changes from benchmark under
differing estimates of UWES.
Baseline SE =0.7 SE=0.1
Q -0.45 -0.44 -0.46
c -1.12 -1.20 -1.05
i -0.88 -0.59 -1.17
X 0.07 0.06 0.06
M -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
G revenue 7.68 7.66 7.70
LS -0.15 -0.15 -0.15
w -0.69 -0.68 -0.70
r -3.27 -3.23 -3.32
E -0.60 -0.60 -0.60
Producer receives price index 0.40 0.41 0.39
Producer pays price index 1.55 1.56 1.54
Consumption price index 0.28 0.28 0.28
In this case the effects are negligible except for the, to be expected
differences, in consumption and investment. It will be noticed that the
changes in investment reported in table 5.15 appear to be in the 'wrong
direction'. One would expect the change in investment to be less, the lower
the savings elasticity. The reason the changes are as they as, serves to
demonstrate the 'black-box' nature of the model and the need for care in
analysing its output. Although the overall price index rises, the price of
investment actually falls from 1.023 in the bench mark case to 1.015 in each of
the scenarios above. Thus, in this case a greater fall in investment when the
savings elasticity is low is explained by the low response of savings (and
hence investment) when the price of investment falls not compensating, to
such an extent, for the fall in savings due to the fall in household income.
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It is apparent from a close examination of the results that the savings
elasticity is not a major cause for concern and that the bench mark estimate
would seem sensible.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has examined and explained the data used in the model and
detailed how it was transformed into an appropriate form. The chapter then
covered the process of calibrating the model outlined in Chapter 4 to the
data.
A simple run of the model for the benchmark parameters was examined and
gave the result that an increase in the rate of producer taxes on energy had
the effect of reducing output and the other main macroeconomic variables.
This was due to a overall reduction in the labour supplied by households
and is in line with the findings of the simplistic general equilibrium model
in Chapter 2. At the same time, the output of the Alcohol and Tobacco sector
rose, which is in line with the findings of the partial equilibrium analysis of
Chapter 3 which showed a strong substitutability relationship between the
Fuel and Alcohol and Tobacco sectors.
From a distributional point of view, this baseline run of the model showed
that household labour supply increase for the lower end of the income
distribution (and fell for the higher end) but hat all households suffered a
fall in net income which coupled with the rise in consumer prices meant that
all households suffered a net loss under the basic tax change (ignoring any
environmental effects from changes in energy usage). Indeed such is the
complexity of the model that direct environmental effects are not discernible
- it is simply taken that a reduction in energy use is a desirable goal.
There were four main parameters that were not calibrated but were taken
from empirical estimates - the price elasticity of exports, the price elasticity
of imports, the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply and the
savings elasticity. Sensitivity analysis was performed for these parameters
to determine the effect of changes in their value on the basic results of the
model.
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This sensitivity analysis showed that the model was relatively insensitive to
changes in the two trade elasticities. The model was shown to be relatively
sensitive to the uncompensated wage elasticity of supply which was used to
(indirectly) calibrate each of the 10 household utility functions. This was due
to the differential effect of labour supply by households which is a major
influence on the model. The level of this parameter, -0.15, used for the bench
mark case, appeared to be sensible and will be used in the following
chapter.
Turning to the savings elasticity, which again was used to calibrate the
appropriate household sub-utility function, it was found that the effect of
changes in this parameter was small. The major impact was a relatively
minor change in the relative shares of consumption and investment with
little effect on output or any of the other model's variables. This change
appeared, at first glance, to be in the wrong direction given the changes in
the savings elasticity parameter but may be explained by a fall in the price of
investment15 whilst overall prices rose.
The focus of Chapter 6, which presents a comprehensive selection of results
from the model, is on revenue-neutrality and specifically which revenue
returning instrument (from a choice of general producer taxes on output,
producer taxes on labour inputs16, consumption commodity taxation,
corporation and income taxation and lump-sum transfers - an increase in
transfer payments to households) produces the most efficient and equitable
outcome. Efficiency is in terms of the entire economy - namely does output
etc. fall by a lesser or greater amount whilst equity considerations




1 Published by the Central Statistical Office (now Office for National Statistics), February 1995.
2 Published by the Central Statistical Office (now Office for National Statistics), February 1995.
3 The UK Input-Output tables are published every ten years approximately, between 2 and 5
years after the year they represent.
4 Including the production function parameters as may be seen below.
5 The way in which the DUM and IUM are transformed into the commodity by commodity
DUM and IUM is detailed in the introduction to the tables.
6 The row detailing Imports in the DUM is an aggregate of the IUM.
7 State pensions are included in transfer payments.
8 The omission of income tax allowances is explained in section 4.7.1 and is due to stability
issues under general equilibrium.
9 It is not possible to reformulate the model, by allowing initial producer prices to vary from
unity, in order that (4.3.9) shows zero profits for all sectors. This is due to the inclusion of
intermediate inputs.
10Female workers may be part time or a household's second income.
"An increase in energy taxes of 100% means that if the tax rate was 10% it will now be 20%,
rather than 10% becoming 110%.
12It will be recalled from the previous section that it is empirical values for the uncompensated
wage elasticity and the savings elasticity that are used to determine the two substitution
elasticities in the household utility functions and hence calibrate the shift parameters.
13By referring to Appendix 5g it will be seen that the difference, when expressed as a
percentage does not register at an level of 2 decimal places.
14Although the change in household 6 is marginal.
15This fall in the price of investment is simply due to the fact that whilst overall prices rose,
prices in the sectors which comprise the composite investment good tended to fall.
,6Equivalent to employer's National Insurance contributions.
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Appendix: 5f Baseline Run of the model





Q P index 1







Imports - Final Demand 143322.9
G expenditure (£) 277885.3
G revenue £ 259782.9
TLD 310481.9

































QD - Output by sector




Oil and Gas Extraction 11812.04













2 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 3 %1-2 %2-3 %1-3
0.905788 0.902839 -0.003303 -0.00295 -0.00625 -0.36% -0.33% -0.69%
0.982638 0.967272 -0.017362 -0.01537 -0.03273 -1.74% -1.56% -3.27%
919621.5 917676.8 -2165.381 -1944.74 -4110.12 -0.23% -0.21% -0.45%
1.001995 1.003999 0.0019947 0.002005 0.003999 0.20% 0.20% 0.40%
1.059724 1.067889 0.0081381 0.008164 0.016302 0.77% 0.77% 1.55%
1.117871 1.119446 0.0015484 0.001575 0.003124 0.14% 0.14% 0.28%
291422.6 289861.9 -1736.655 -1560.68 -3297.34 -0.59% -0.54% -1.12%
104994.2 104994.2 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
103943.5 103505.3 -483.1978 -438.234 -921.432 -0.46% -0.42% -0.88%
3294.541 3294.541 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
128632 128677.5 45.757306 45.52549 91.2828 0.04% 0.04% 0.07%
143314.2 143305.5 -8.714485 -8.65009 -17.3646 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
278062.4 278249.5 177.15915 187.107 364.2662 0.06% 0.07% 0.13%
269737.4 279740.5 9954.4481 10003.12 19957.57 3.83% 3.71% 7.68%
310249.6 310021.6 -232.2458 -228.015 -460.261 -0.07% -0.07% -0.15%
207.2825 207.5559 0.2824458 0.273467 0.555913 0.14% 0.13% 0.27%
641.4579 642.8189 1.4579142 1.361033 2.818947 0.23% 0.21% 0.44%
3478.776 3486.855 8.7762705 8.078453 16.85472 0.25% 0.23% 0.49%
10367.98 10386.13 19.980412 18.14985 38.13026 0.19% 0.18% 0.37%
18571.88 18590.5 20.884848 18.6154 39.50025 0.11% 0.10% 0.21%
28977.49 28975.92 -0.510189 -1.56716 -2.07735 0.00% -0.01% -0.01%
37632.36 37611.74 -20.63353 -20.6239 -41.2574 -0.05% -0.05% -0.11%
48240.33 48183.14 -59.66254 -57.1988 -116.861 -0.12% -0.12% -0.24%
61176.1 61082.92 -97.89788 -93.1779 -191.076 -0.16% -0.15% -0.31%
100956 100854.1 -105.0092 -101.925 -206.935 -0.10% -0.10% -0.20%
1.163255 1.165643 0.0024194 0.002388 0.004807 0.21% 0.21% 0.41%
1.161061 1.163526 0.0024972 0.002465 0.004962 0.22% 0.21% 0.43%
1.151019 1.153556 0.0025711 0.002537 0.005108 0.22% 0.22% 0.44%
1.145454 1.147846 0.0024147 0.002393 0.004807 0.21% 0.21% 0.42%
1.140433 1.142739 0.0023204 0.002306 0.004626 0.20% 0.20% 0.41%
1.12792 1.12998 0.0020614 0.00206 0.004122 0.18% 0.18% 0.37%
1.118724 1.120394 0.0016485 0.00167 0.003319 0.15% 0.15% 0.30%
1.10877 1.1101 0.0012886 0.00133 0.002619 0.12% 0.12% 0.24%
1.102541 1.103684 0.0010909 0.001143 0.002234 0.10% 0.10% 0.20%
1.084095 1.084486 0.0002937 0.000391 0.000685 0.03% 0.04% 0.06%
12634.76 12624.62 -11.46906 -10.1373 -21.6064 -0.09% -0.08% -0.17%
15946.47 15916.45 -33.96072 -30.0203 -63.981 -0.21% -0.19% -0.40%
21334.66 21279.24 -62.75351 -55.4155 -118.169 -0.29% -0.26% -0.55%
26824.22 26735.1 -100.7362 -89.113 -189.849 -0.37% -0.33% -0.71%
33818.79 33689.65 -145.5034 -129.138 -274.641 -0.43% -0.38% -0.81%
41782.21 41603.11 -200.8504 -179.102 -379.952 -0.48% -0.43% -0.91%
49346.98 49114.81 -259.7622 -232.166 -491.929 -0.52% -0.47% -0.99%
58687.78 58387.83 -334.7573 -299.948 -634.705 -0.57% -0.51% -1.08%
71237.61 70855.17 -426.3249 -382.44 -808.765 -0.59% -0.54% -1.13%
120790.5 120122.7 -746.3195 -667.749 -1414.07 -0.61% -0.55% -1.16%
8062.371 8088.364 23.619939 25.99308 49.61302 0.29% 0.32% 0.62%
9980.138 9952.082 -33.17323 -28.0561 -61.2293 -0.33% -0.28% -0.61%
77211.7 77053.68 -176.719 -158.022 -334.741 -0.23% -0.20% -0.43%
3828.599 3828.306 -0.300064 -0.29308 -0.59315 -0.01% -0.01% -0.02%
11814.31 11816.56 2.2683851 2.25625 4.524635 0.02% 0.02% 0.04%
11085.73 11083.35 -2.451149 -2.38592 -4.83707 -0.02% -0.02% -0.04%
22098.33 22091.73 -6.733126 -6.60139 -13.3345 -0.03% -0.03% -0.06%
6975.525 6970.343 -5.284452 -5.182 -10.4665 -0.08% -0.07% -0.15%
55876.04 55491.67 -414.473 -384.367 -798.84 -0.74% -0.69% -1.42%
78968.27 78928.26 -45.43982 -40.0158 -85.4556 -0.06% -0.05% -0.11%
39235.29 39104.01 -147.6293 -131.284 -278.914 -0.37% -0.33% -0.71%
45635.12 45592.63 -48.92442 -42.4885 -91.4129 -0.11% -0.09% -0.20%
103482.2 103233.6 -274.6501 -248.615 -523.265 -0.26% -0.24% -0.50%
172881.3 172623.3 -287.7821 -257.939 -545.721 -0.17% -0.15% -0.32%
48644.76 48615.08 -32.93216 -29.6857 -62.6178 -0.07% -0.06% -0.13%
48126.54 47863.04 -289.6368 -263.501 -553.137 -0.60% -0.55% -1.14%
124778.6 124398.4 -430.698 -380.195 -810.893 -0.34% -0.30% -0.65%
50936.79 50942.43 5.5568461 5.643955 11.2008 0.01% 0.01% 0.02%
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Appendix: 5g Export and Import elasticity sensitivity
Baseline (1): EE=- 1.4, iE=0.4 EE=0.8 iE=0.8
1 2 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 3 %1-2 %2-3 °/o1-3
w 0.909091 0.902842 0.902842 -0.006249 -7.4E-07 -0.00625 -0.69% 0.00% -0.69%
r 1 0.967284 0.96728 -0.032716 -3.2E-06 -0.03272 -3.27% 0.00% -3.27%
E 1 0.993702 0.993997 -0.006298 0.000295 -0.006 -0.63% 0.03% -0.60%
Q 921786.9 917677.7 917678 -4109.244 0.335064 -4108.91 -0.45% 0.00% -0.45%
Q P index 1 1.003998 1.003997
Q P t index 1.051586 1.067887 1.067886
C P Index 1.116322 1.119447 1.119447
Consumption 293159.3 289863.2 289862.9 -3296.059 -0.32688 -3296.39 -1.12% 0.00% -1.12%
Government Expenditure 104994.2 104994.2 104994.2 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Capital Expenditure 104426.7 103505.4 103505.4 -921.289 -0.05358 -921.343 -0.88% 0.00% -0.88%
Stocks 3294.541 3294.541 3294.541 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exports 128586.2 128663 128667 76.786421 4.060374 80.84679 0.06% 0.00% 0.06%
Imports - Final Demand 143322.9 143291.6 143294.9 -31.3175 3.344844 -27.9727 -0.02% 0.00% -0.02%
G expenditure (£) 277885.3 278249.7 278249.6
G revenue £ 259782.9 279741.2 279741.1
TLD 310481.9 310021.8 310021.7 -460.1485 -0.01939 -460.168 -0.15% 0.00% -0.15%
HLD - Household labour supply
1 207 207.556 207.556 0.5559476 -4.5E-06 0.555943 0.27% 0.00% 0.27%
2 640 642.8187 642.8188 2.8186659 9.57E-05 2.818762 0.44% 0.00% 0.44%
3 3470 3486.852 3486.853 16.85203 0.000844 16.85287 0.49% 0.00% 0.49%
4 10348 10386.12 10386.13 38.123121 0.002308 38.12543 0.37% 0.00% 0.37%
5 18551 18590.49 18590.5 39.492977 0.002657 39.49563 0.21% 0.00% 0.21%
6 28978 28975.93 28975.93 -2.07404 0.000156 -2.07388 -0.01% 0.00% -0.01%
7 37653 37611.75 37611.75 -41.24561 -0.00193 -41.2475 -0.11% 0.00% -0.11%
8 48300 48183.17 48183.16 -116.8332 -0.00631 -116.839 -0.24% 0.00% -0.24%
9 61274 61082.97 61082.96 -191.0322 -0.01041 -191.043 -0.31% 0.00% -0.31%
10 101061 100854.1 100854.1 -206.9066 -0.00681 -206.913 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20%
HP -Consumption price index
1 1.160835 1.165643 1.165643 0.0048077 -5.2E-08 0.004808 0.41% 0.00% 0.41%
2 1.158564 1.163526 1.163526 0.004962 -5.2E-08 0.004962 0.43% 0.00% 0.43%
3 1.148448 1.153557 1.153557 0.0051085 -5.1E-08 0.005108 0.44% 0.00% 0.44%
4 1.143039 1.147847 1.147846 0.0048078 -8.7E-08 0.004808 0.42% 0.00% 0.42%
5 1.138112 1.142739 1.142739 0.0046269 -1.1E-07 0.004627 0.41% 0.00% 0.41%
6 1.125859 1.129981 1.129981 0.0041222 -1.4E-07 0.004122 0.37% 0.00% 0.37%
7 1.117076 1.120395 1.120395 0.0033199 -2.1E-07 0.00332 0.30% 0.00% 0.30%
8 1.107481 1.110101 1.110101 0.0026199 -2.6E-07 0.00262 0.24% 0.00% 0.24%
9 1.10145 1.103685 1.103685 0.0022352 -2.9E-07 0.002235 0.20% 0.00% 0.20%
10 1.083802 1.084488 1.084488 0.0006867 -4.1E-07 0.000686 0.06% 0.00% 0.06%
HNI - Household net income
1 12646.23 12624.63 12624.63 -21.59867 -0.00217 -21.6008 -0.17% 0.00% -0.17%
2 15980.43 15916.47 15916.46 -63.95814 -0.00643 -63.9646 -0.40% 0.00% -0.40%
3 21397.41 21279.29 21279.28 -118.1238 -0.01247 -118.136 -0.55% 0.00% -0.55%
4 26924.95 26735.18 26735.16 -189.7729 -0.02058 -189.793 -0.70% 0.00% -0.70%
5 33964.3 33689.77 33689.74 -274.5306 -0.02948 -274.56 -0.81% 0.00% -0.81%
6 41983.06 41603.26 41603.22 -379.8016 -0.03967 -379.841 -0.90% 0.00% -0.90%
7 49606.75 49115.01 49114.96 -491.7381 -0.05019 -491.788 -0.99% 0.00% -0.99%
8 59022.54 58388.08 58388.01 -634.4659 -0.06305 -634.529 -1.07% 0.00% -1.08%
9 71663.95 70855.48 70855.4 -808.466 -0.0791 -808.545 -1.13% 0.00% -1.13%
10 121536.8 120123.3 120123.1 -1413.553 -0.13831 -1413.69 -1.16% 0.00% -1.16%
QD - Output by sector
Alcohol and Tobbacco 8038.752 8088.302 8088.33 49.550315 0.027718 49.57803 0.62% 0.00% 0.62%
Clothing 10013.31 9952.407 9952.347 -60.90519 -0.05933 -60.9645 -0.61% 0.00% -0.61%
Durables 77388.42 77054.01 77054.08 -334.4097 0.067466 -334.342 -0.43% 0.00% -0.43%
Coal Extraction 3828.899 3828.35 3828.34 -0.549079 -0.00992 -0.559 -0.01% 0.00% -0.01%
Oil and Gas Extraction 11812.04 11816.37 11816.45 4.3366468 0.07054 4.407187 0.04% 0.00% 0.04%
Coke, Oil Production 11088.18 11083.31 11083.33 -4.872837 0.022364 -4.85047 -0.04% 0.00% -0.04%
Electricity 22105.07 22091.73 22091.73 -13.33629 0.001385 -13.3349 -0.06% 0.00% -0.06%
Gas 6980.809 6970.342 6970.343 -10.46675 9.91 E-05 -10.4666 -0.15% 0.00% -0.15%
Food 56290.51 55492.48 55492.3 -798.0343 -0.17598 -798.21 -1.42% 0.00% -1.42%
Government 79013.71 78928.46 78928.41 -85.25044 -0.04964 -85.3001 -0.11% 0.00% -0.11%
Household Durables 39382.93 39104.29 39104.23 -278.6328 -0.06164 -278.694 -0.71% 0.00% -0.71%
Other 45684.05 45592.57 45592.64 -91.47587 0.072607 -91.4033 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20%
Construction Materials 103756.8 103233.7 103233.7 -523.1407 -0.03116 -523.172 -0.50% 0.00% -0.50%
Services 173169 172623.1 172623.2 -545.9061 0.09553 -545.811 -0.32% 0.00% -0.32%
Business Services 48677.7 48614.93 48614.98 -62.76702 0.053459 -62.7136 -0.13% 0.00% -0.13%
Transport 48416.18 47862.96 47863.02 -553.2219 0.055393 -553.167 -1.14% 0.00% -1.14%
Capital Goods 125209.3 124397.4 124397.7 -811.8736 0.311721 -811.562 -0.65% 0.00% -0.65%
Raw Materials 50931.23 50942.94 50942.89 11.712028 -0.05555 11.65648 0.02% 0.00% 0.02%
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Appendix: 5h Uncompensated wage elasticity sensitivity
Baseline (1): UWES=-0.15,(2) UWES=-0.3, Et=2x ,(3) UWES=-0.3, Et=3x (3)
1 2 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 3 %1-2 %2-3 %1-3
w 0.909091 0.906235 0.903649 -0.002856 -0.00259 -0.00544 -0.31% -0.29% -0.60%
r 1 0.980158 0.962423 -0.019842 -0.01774 -0.03758 -1.98% -1.81% -3.76%
E 1 0.99699 0.993997 -0.00301 -0.00299 -0.006 -0.30% -0.30% -0.60%
Q 921783.6 919417.1 917264.6 -2366.52 -2152.5 -4519.02 -0.26% -0.23% -0.49%
Q P index 1 1.001785 1.003561 0.001785 0.001776 0.003561 0.18% 0.18% 0.36%
Q P t index 1.051586 1.059521 1.067466 0.0079348 0.007945 0.01588 0.75% 0.75% 1.51%
C P Index 1.116333 1.117764 1.119222 0.0014309 0.001458 0.002889 0.13% 0.13% 0.26%
Consumption 293158 291246.5 289506.8 -1911.5 -1739.69 -3651.19 -0.65% -0.60% -1.25%
Government Expenditure 104994.2 104994.2 104994.2 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Capital Expenditure 104424.7 103915.1 103448 -509.5796 -467.068 -976.647 -0.49% -0.45% -0.94%
Stocks 3294.541 3294.541 3294.541 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exports 128586.2 128626.7 128667 40.521334 40.32546 80.84679 0.03% 0.03% 0.06%
Imports - Final Demand 143322.9 143308.9 143294.9 -14.03778 -13.9349 -27.9727 -0.01% -0.01% -0.02%
G expenditure (£) 277885.3 278061.4 278243.2 176.16394 181.7411 357.905 0.06% 0.07% 0.13%
G revenue £ 259773.3 269636.4 279534.9 9863.086 9898.485 19761.57 3.80% 3.67% 7.61%
T L D - Total labour supply 310481.4 310046.2 309618.5 -435.1376 -427.763 -862.9 -0.14% -0.14% -0.28%
HLD - Household labour supply
1 207 207.1537 207.305 0.1536842 0.151292 0.304976 0.07% 0.07% 0.15%
2 640 641.1369 642.1948 1.1369185 1.057848 2.194766 0.18% 0.16% 0.34%
3 3470 3477.182 3483.758 7.1818278 6.576519 13.75835 0.21% 0.19% 0.40%
4 10348 10363 10376.42 14.997933 13.42418 28.42211 0.14% 0.13% 0.27%
5 18551 18561.85 18570.84 10.845699 8.995313 19.84101 0.06% 0.05% 0.11%
6 28978 28959.71 28940.89 -18.29091 -18.8221 -37.113 -0.06% -0.06% -0.13%
7 37653 37608.82 37565.15 -44.18465 -43.6606 -87.8452 -0.12% -0.12% -0.23%
8 48300 48208.31 48119.52 -91.68772 -88.7952 -180.483 -0.19% -0.18% -0.37%
9 61274 61133.89 60998.87 -140.115 -135.013 -275.128 -0.23% -0.22% -0.45%
10 101061 100885.2 100713.5 -175.7882 -171.677 -347.465 -0.17% -0.17% -0.34%
HP - Consumption price index
1 1.160835 1.163226 1.165586 0.002391 0.002359 0.00475 0.21% 0.20% 0.41%
2 1.158564 1.161033 1.163469 0.0024688 0.002436 0.004905 0.21% 0.21% 0.42%
3 1.148448 1.150991 1.1535 0.0025429 0.002509 0.005052 0.22% 0.22% 0.44%
4 1.143039 1.145406 1.147751 0.002367 0.002345 0.004712 0.21% 0.20% 0.41%
5 1.138112 1.140372 1.142617 0.0022597 0.002245 0.004505 0.20% 0.20% 0.40%
6 1.125899 1.127882 1.129863 0.001983 0.001981 0.003964 0.18% 0.18% 0.35%
7 1.117113 1.118649 1.120206 0.0015356 0.001557 0.003092 0.14% 0.14% 0.28%
8 1.107495 1.108642 1.10983 0.001147 0.001188 0.002335 0.10% 0.11% 0.21%
9 1.101435 1.102368 1.103354 0.0009338 0.000985 0.001919 0.08% 0.09% 0.17%
10 1.083816 1.083887 1.084055 7.125E-05 0.000168 0.000239 0.01% 0.02% 0.02%
HNI - Household net income
1 12646.23 12633.15 12621.47 -13.07339 -11.6807 -24.7541 -0.10% -0.09% -0.20%
2 15980.43 15941.72 15907.12 -38.71213 -34.5918 -73.304 -0.24% -0.22% -0.46%
3 21397.41 21326.22 21262.57 -71.19737 -63.6445 -134.842 -0.33% -0.30% -0.63%
4 26924.95 26811.78 26710.31 -113.1692 -101.476 -214.645 -0.42% -0.38% -0.80%
5 33964.3 33802.15 33656.2 -162.1458 -145.953 -308.099 -0.48% -0.43% -0.91%
6 41983.06 41761.75 41561.52 -221.313 -200.228 -421.541 -0.53% -0.48% -1.00%
7 49606.74 49322.09 49063.98 -284.6534 -258.109 -542.762 -0.57% -0.52% -1.09%
8 59022.54 58657.48 58325.61 -365.0606 -331.87 -696.93 -0.62% -0.57% -1.18%
9 71663.94 71199.58 70776.94 -464.364 -422.642 -887.006 -0.65% -0.59% -1.24%
10 121536.8 120714.3 119967.9 -822.5219 -746.437 -1568.96 -0.68% -0.62% -1.29%
QD - Output by sector
Alcohol and Tobbacco 8035.671 8054.939 8076.428 19.267841 21.48903 40.75687 0.24% 0.27% 0.51%
Clothing 10013.05 9974.32 9940.566 -38.72541 -33.754 -72.4795 -0.39% -0.34% -0.72%
Durables 77387.92 77197.56 77025.06 -190.355 -172.497 -362.852 -0.25% -0.22% -0.47%
Coal Extraction 3828.943 3828.662 3828.386 -0.281732 -0.27525 -0.55698 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
Oil and Gas Extraction 11812.04 11814.25 11816.45 2.2094898 2.197697 4.407187 0.02% 0.02% 0.04%
Coke, Oil Production 11088.61 11086.16 11083.78 -2.446362 -2.38472 -4.83109 -0.02% -0.02% -0.04%
Electricity 22105.84 22099.13 22092.54 -6.712249 -6.5871 -13.2994 -0.03% -0.03% -0.06%
Gas 6981.409 6976.141 6970.97 -5.268223 -5.17088 -10.4391 -0.08% -0.07% -0.15%
Food 56292.7 55853.25 55443.43 -439.4555 -409.82 -849.275 -0.78% -0.73% -1.51%
Government 79013.77 78962.66 78916.81 -51.11599 -45.8434 -96.9594 -0.06% -0.06% -0.12%
Household Durables 39383.08 39218.73 39070.3 -164.3585 -148.424 -312.782 -0.42% -0.38% -0.79%
Other 45684.12 45628.34 45578.82 -55.77389 -49.5182 -105.292 -0.12% -0.11% -0.23%
Construction Materials 103755.8 103464.8 103198.4 -291.0487 -266.358 -557.407 -0.28% -0.26% -0.54%
Services 173169 172851.5 172563 -317.5422 -288.413 -605.956 -0.18% -0.17% -0.35%
Business Services 48677.57 48642.51 48610.54 -35.05474 -31.9733 -67.0281 -0.07% -0.07% -0.14%
Transport 48413.42 48099.86 47811.97 -313.5578 -287.892 -601.45 -0.65% -0.60% -1.24%
Capital Goods 125209.5 124727.5 124294.5 -481.9558 -433.008 -914.964 -0.38% -0.35% -0.73%
Raw Materials 50931.23 50936.89 50942.62 5.6544436 5.736237 11.39068 0.01% 0.01% 0.02%
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Appendix: 5i Uncompensated wage elasticity sensitivity
Baseline (1): UWES=-0.15,(2) UWES-0.05, Et=2x ,(3) UWES=-0.05, Et=3x (3)
1 2 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 3 %1-2 %2-3 %1-3
w 0.909091 0.904962 0.901321 -0.004129 -0.00364 -0.00777 -0.45% -0.40% -0.85%
r 1 0.984406 0.970717 -0.015594 -0.01369 -0.02928 -1.56% -1.39% -2.93%
E 1 0.99699 0.993997 -0.00301 -0.00299 -0.006 -0.30% -0.30% -0.60%
Q 921789.4 919658.2 917766.4 -2131.201 -1891.74 -4022.94 -0.23% -0.21% -0.44%
Q P index 1 1.001979 1.004004 0.0019793 0.002025 0.004004 0.20% 0.20% 0.40%
Q P t index 1.051586 1.059708 1.06789 0.0081219 0.008182 0.016304 0.77% 0.77% 1.55%
C P Index 1.116319 1.117929 1.119568 0.00161 0.001639 0.003249 0.14% 0.15% 0.29%
Consumption 293161.9 291466 289959.7 -1695.978 -1506.25 -3202.23 -0.58% -0.52% -1.09%
Government Expenditure 104994.2 104994.2 104994.2 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Capital Expenditure 104426.5 103936.7 103497 -489.7814 -439.743 -929.524 -0.47% -0.42% -0.89%
Stocks 3294.541 3294.541 3294.541 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exports 128586.2 128626.7 128667 40.521334 40.32546 80.84679 0.03% 0.03% 0.06%
Imports - Final Demand 143322.9 143308.9 143294.9 -14.03778 -13.9349 -27.9727 -0.01% -0.01% -0.02%
G expenditure (£) 277885.3 278033.2 278198.4 147.95378 165.1532 313.107 0.05% 0.06% 0.11%
G revenue £ 259781.3 269725.4 279733.7 9944.1114 10008.27 19952.38 3.83% 3.71% 7.68%
T L D - Total labour supply 310483.1 310385.1 310290 -98.01483 -95.1136 -193.128 -0.03% -0.03% -0.06%
HLD - Household labour supply
1 207 207.3786 207.7415 0.3785751 0.362975 0.74155 0.18% 0.18% 0.36%
2 640 641.7004 643.2858 1.7004224 1.585389 3.285812 0.27% 0.25% 0.51%
3 3470 3479.993 3489.194 9.9932787 9.20039 19.19367 0.29% 0.26% 0.55%
4 10348 10371.66 10393.23 23.656871 21.57417 45.23104 0.23% 0.21% 0.44%
5 18551 18578.77 18603.91 27.77077 25.13907 52.90984 0.15% 0.14% 0.29%
6 28978 28988.57 28997.74 10.566992 9.176054 19.74305 0.04% 0.03% 0.07%
7 37653 37646.61 37640 -6.385304 -6.60981 -12.9951 -0.02% -0.02% -0.03%
8 48300 48259.07 48220.6 -40.92503 -38.4742 -79.3992 -0.08% -0.08% -0.16%
9 61274 61200.62 61132.12 -73.38146 -68.4956 -141.877 -0.12% -0.11% -0.23%
10 101061 101010.7 100962.2 -50.26012 -48.572 -98.8321 -0.05% -0.05% -0.10%
HP - Consumption price index
1 1.160835 1.163269 1.165672 0.0024339 0.002403 0.004837 0.21% 0.21% 0.42%
2 1.158564 1.161076 1.163555 0.0025117 0.00248 0.004991 0.22% 0.21% 0.43%
3 1.148448 1.151033 1.153585 0.0025854 0.002552 0.005138 0.23% 0.22% 0.45%
4 1.143039 1.145478 1.147896 0.002439 0.002418 0.004857 0.21% 0.21% 0.42%
5 1.138112 1.140463 1.142802 0.0023513 0.002338 0.00469 0.21% 0.21% 0.41%
6 1.125859 1.12796 1.130063 0.0021016 0.002102 0.004204 0.19% 0.19% 0.37%
7 1.117076 1.118782 1.120513 0.0017062 0.001731 0.003437 0.15% 0.15% 0.31%
8 1.10746 1.108821 1.110227 0.0013608 0.001406 0.002767 0.12% 0.13% 0.25%
9 1.101429 1.1026 1.103827 0.0011707 0.001227 0.002398 0.11% 0.11% 0.22%
10 1.083812 1.08422 1.08473 0.0004075 0.00051 0.000918 0.04% 0.05% 0.08%
HNI - Household net income
1 12646.23 12635.81 12626.68 -10.41906 -9.12646 -19.5455 -0.08% -0.07% -0.15%
2 15980.43 15949.56 15922.53 -30.86253 -27.0363 -57.8988 -0.19% -0.17% -0.36%
3 21397.41 21339.24 21288.39 -58.17813 -50.8498 -109.028 -0.27% -0.24% -0.51%
4 26924.95 26828.91 26744.91 -96.04728 -83.994 -180.041 -0.36% -0.31% -0.67%
5 33964.3 33823.03 33699.17 -141.2683 -123.861 -265.129 -0.42% -0.37% -0.78%
6 41983.06 41784.23 41609.19 -198.8339 -175.041 -373.875 -0.47% -0.42% -0.89%
7 49606.74 49348.29 49120.28 -258.4491 -228.013 -486.463 -0.52% -0.46% -0.98%
8 59022.54 58687.96 58392.11 -334.5822 -295.846 -630.428 -0.57% -0.50% -1.07%
9 71663.94 71237.81 70860.62 -426.129 -377.19 -803.319 -0.59% -0.53% -1.12%
10 121536.8 120810.7 120169.5 -726.0945 -641.232 -1367.33 -0.60% -0.53% -1.13%
QD - Output by sector
Alcohol and Tobbacco 8035.664 8060.373 8087.785 24.708515 27.41288 52.1214 0.31% 0.34% 0.65%
Clothing 10013.26 9981.52 9955.345 -31.7446 -26.1751 -57.9197 -0.32% -0.26% -0.58%
Durables 77388.36 77211.52 77055.28 -176.8477 -156.239 -333.087 -0.23% -0.20% -0.43%
Coal Extraction 3828.914 3828.63 3828.353 -0.283937 -0.27711 -0.56105 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
Oil and Gas Extraction 11812.04 11814.25 11816.45 2.2094898 2.197697 4.407187 0.02% 0.02% 0.04%
Coke, Oil Production 11088.33 11085.86 11083.46 -2.467529 -2.40259 -4.87012 -0.02% -0.02% -0.04%
Electricity 22105.33 22098.58 22091.96 -6.751061 -6.61987 -13.3709 -0.03% -0.03% -0.06%
Gas 6981.015 6975.717 6970.52 -5.298302 -5.19627 -10.4946 -0.08% -0.07% -0.15%
Food 56290.63 55882.38 55506.15 -408.2498 -376.24 -784.489 -0.73% -0.67% -1.39%
Government 79013.72 78969.67 78931.5 -44.05005 -38.1697 -82.2198 -0.06% -0.05% -0.10%
Household Durables 39382.94 39239.31 39113.33 -143.6362 -125.977 -269.613 -0.36% -0.32% -0.68%
Other 45684.05 45636.7 45596.32 -47.35893 -40.3785 -87.7374 -0.10% -0.09% -0.19%
Construction Materials 103756.7 103479.3 103230.7 -277.4481 -248.559 -526.007 -0.27% -0.24% -0.51%
Services 173169.1 172888.1 172639.3 -281.0162 -248.812 -529.828 -0.16% -0.14% -0.31%
Business Services 48677.68 48644.37 48614.66 -33.31136 -29.7106 -63.0219 -0.07% -0.06% -0.13%
Transport 48421.07 48136.62 47880.22 -284.4475 -256.403 -540.851 -0.59% -0.53% -1.12%
Capital Goods 125209.3 124788.3 124422.2 -421.0228 -366.099 -787.122 -0.34% -0.29% -0.63%
Raw Materials 50931.23 50937.05 50942.96 5.8155278 5.911177 11.7267 0.01% 0.01% 0.02%
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Appendix: 5j Uncompensated wage elasticity sensitivity
Baseline (1): SE=0.4,(2) SE=0.7, Et=2x ,(3) SE=0.7, Et=3x (3)
1 2 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 3 %1-2 %2-3 %1-3
w 0.909091 0.905839 0.902934 -0.003252 -0.0029 -0.00616 -0.36% -0.32% -0.68%
r 1 0.982892 0.967746 -0.017108 -0.01515 -0.03225 -1.71% -1.54% -3.23%
E 1 0.99699 0.993997 -0.00301 -0.00299 -0.006 -0.30% -0.30% -0.60%
Q 921783 919666.1 917765 -2116.91 -1901.13 -4018.04 -0.23% -0.21% -0.44%
Q P index 1 1.002047 1.004096 0.0020469 0.002049 0.004096 0.20% 0.20% 0.41%
Q P t index 1.051587 1.059774 1.067979 0.0081874 0.008205 0.016393 0.78% 0.77% 1.56%
C P Index 1.116883 1.118453 1.120047 0.0015705 0.001594 0.003164 0.14% 0.14% 0.28%
Consumption 293155.2 291309.4 289644.5 -1845.809 -1664.91 -3510.72 -0.63% -0.57% -1.20%
Government Expenditure 104994.2 104994.2 104994.2 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Capital Expenditure 104426.8 104101.2 103810.7 -325.6598 -290.484 -616.144 -0.31% -0.28% -0.59%
Stocks 3294.541 3294.541 3294.541 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exports 128586.2 128626.7 128667 40.521334 40.32546 80.84679 0.03% 0.03% 0.06%
Imports - Final Demand 143322.9 143308.9 143294.9 -14.03778 -13.9349 -27.9727 -0.01% -0.01% -0.02%
G expenditure (£) 277885.3 278068.2 278260.4 182.96507 192.1586 375.1236 0.07% 0.07% 0.13%
G revenue £ 259781.5 269712.1 279685.7 9930.5663 9973.615 19904.18 3.82% 3.70% 7.66%
T L D - Total labour supply 310480.2 310249.7 310021.9 -230.5564 -227.823 -458.379 -0.07% -0.07% -0.15%
HLD - Household labour supply
1 206.9999 207.2824 207.5558 0.282466 0.273419 0.555885 0.14% 0.13% 0.27%
2 640 641.4492 642.8025 1.4492177 1.353293 2.802511 0.23% 0.21% 0.44%
3 3470 3478.703 3486.717 8.703297 8.014115 16.71741 0.25% 0.23% 0.48%
4 10348 10367.78 10385.74 19.775852 17.96833 37.74418 0.19% 0.17% 0.36%
5 18551 18571.62 18590.01 20.624953 18.38358 39.00854 0.11% 0.10% 0.21%
6 28978 28977.37 28975.7 -0.625837 -1.67128 -2.29711 0.00% -0.01% -0.01%
7 37653 37632.36 37611.74 -20.63932 -20.6237 -41.263 -0.05% -0.05% -0.11%
8 48300 48240.59 48183.64 -59.40812 -56.9515 -116.36 -0.12% -0.12% -0.24%
9 61274 61176.58 61083.87 -97.41873 -92.7116 -190.13 -0.16% -0.15% -0.31%
10 101061 100955.9 100854.1 -105.0589 -101.857 -206.916 -0.10% -0.10% -0.20%
HP - Consumption price index
1 1.16106 1.163483 1.165874 0.0024236 0.002391 0.004815 0.21% 0.21% 0.41%
2 1.158788 1.161289 1.163757 0.0025014 0.002468 0.004969 0.22% 0.21% 0.43%
3 1.148666 1.151242 1.153782 0.0025752 0.00254 0.005115 0.22% 0.22% 0.45%
4 1.143379 1.145801 1.148198 0.0024216 0.002398 0.004819 0.21% 0.21% 0.42%
5 1.13852 1.140849 1.143161 0.0023291 0.002312 0.004642 0.20% 0.20% 0.41%
6 1.126291 1.128363 1.130432 0.0020725 0.002068 0.004141 0.18% 0.18% 0.37%
7 1.117681 1.119345 1.121028 0.0016642 0.001682 0.003346 0.15% 0.15% 0.30%
8 1.108145 1.109453 1.110798 0.001308 0.001345 0.002653 0.12% 0.12% 0.24%
9 1.102132 1.103244 1.104404 0.0011122 0.001159 0.002271 0.10% 0.11% 0.21%
10 1.084612 1.084935 1.085349 0.0003236 0.000414 0.000738 0.03% 0.04% 0.07%
HNI - Household net income
1 12646.23 12634.93 12624.94 -11.2975 -9.98882 -21.2863 -0.09% -0.08% -0.17%
2 15980.43 15946.98 15917.39 -33.45238 -29.5802 -63.0326 -0.21% -0.19% -0.39%
3 21397.41 21335.63 21281.05 -61.78526 -54.578 -116.363 -0.29% -0.26% -0.54%
4 26924.95 26825.78 26738.01 -99.17542 -87.7658 -186.941 -0.37% -0.33% -0.69%
5 33964.3 33820.99 33693.75 -143.3024 -127.24 -270.543 -0.42% -0.38% -0.80%
6 41983.06 41785.13 41608.53 -197.9378 -176.592 -374.53 -0.47% -0.42% -0.89%
7 49606.74 49350.64 49121.64 -256.0982 -229.004 -485.102 -0.52% -0.46% -0.98%
8 59022.54 58692.35 58396.36 -330.1878 -295.994 -626.182 -0.56% -0.50% -1.06%
9 71663.94 71243.33 70865.84 -420.6106 -377.487 -798.097 -0.59% -0.53% -1.11%
10 121536.8 120800.6 120141.6 -736.2427 -658.989 -1395.23 -0.61% -0.55% -1.15%
QD - Output by sector
Alcohol and Tobbacco 8040.931 8062.031 8085.576 21.099967 23.54488 44.64485 0.26% 0.29% 0.56%
Clothing 10013.42 9976.726 9945.308 -36.69796 -31.418 -68.1159 -0.37% -0.31% -0.68%
Durables 77388.45 77251.5 77130.72 -136.9462 -120.785 -257.731 -0.18% -0.16% -0.33%
Coal Extraction 3828.899 3828.618 3828.343 -0.28107 -0.27464 -0.55571 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
Oil and Gas Extraction 11812.04 11814.25 11816.45 2.2094898 2.197697 4.407187 0.02% 0.02% 0.04%
Coke, Oil Production 11088.18 11085.74 11083.36 -2.440009 -2.37884 -4.81885 -0.02% -0.02% -0.04%
Electricity 22105.06 22098.36 22091.78 -6.700598 -6.57632 -13.2769 -0.03% -0.03% -0.06%
Gas 6980.803 6975.544 6970.382 -5.259194 -5.16252 -10.4217 -0.08% -0.07% -0.15%
Food 56290.27 55861.13 55462.8 -429.1441 -398.328 -827.472 -0.76% -0.71% -1.47%
Government 79013.7 78964.74 78921.35 -48.96335 -43.3857 -92.3491 -0.06% -0.05% -0.12%
Household Durables 39382.91 39225.06 39084.01 -157.8511 -141.056 -298.907 -0.40% -0.36% -0.76%
Other 45684.03 45630.85 45584.29 -53.18289 -46.5652 -99.748 -0.12% -0.10% -0.22%
Construction Materials 103756.9 103562.8 103389.8 -194.0679 -173.069 -367.137 -0.19% -0.17% -0.35%
Services 173169 172862.4 172586.5 -306.5954 -275.887 -582.483 -0.18% -0.16% -0.34%
Business Services 48677.7 48654.49 48633.91 -23.21375 -20.5779 -43.7917 -0.05% -0.04% -0.09%
Transport 48410.3 48106.65 47829.84 -303.6491 -276.814 -580.463 -0.63% -0.58% -1.20%
Capital Goods 125209.2 124768.3 124377.9 -440.9304 -390.387 -831.317 -0.35% -0.31% -0.66%
Raw Materials 50931.23 50936.93 50942.73 5.703518 5.792265 11.49578 0.01% 0.01% 0.02%
Appendix: 5k Uncompensated wage elasticity sensitivity
Baseline (1): SE=0.4,(2) SE=0.1, Et=2x ,(3) SE=01, Et=3x (3)
1 2 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 3 %1-2 %2-3 %1-3
w 0.909091 0.905744 0.902753 -0.003347 -0.00299 -0.00634 -0.37% -0.33% -0.70%
r 1 0.982423 0.96684 -0.017577 -0.01558 -0.03316 -1.76% -1.59% -3.32%
E 1 0.99699 0.993997 -0.00301 -0.00299 -0.006 -0.30% -0.30% -0.60%
Q 920591.2 919574.3 917586.7 -1016.916 -1987.6 -3004.52 -0.11% -0.22% -0.33%
Q P index 1 1.001951 1.003912 0.0019505 0.001961 0.003912 0.20% 0.20% 0.39%
Q P t index 1.05769 1.059684 1.067807 0.0019933 0.008124 0.010117 0.19% 0.77% 0.96%
C P Index 1.118159 1.117319 1.118877 -0.00084 0.001558 0.000718 -0.08% 0.14% 0.06%
Consumption 293033.3 291530.7 290073 -1502.6 -1457.76 -2960.36 -0.51% -0.50% -1.01%
Government Expenditure 104994.2 104994.2 104994.2 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Capital Expenditure 104196.2 103788.1 103204 -408.1034 -584.103 -992.207 -0.39% -0.56% -0.95%
Stocks 3294.541 3294.541 3294.541 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exports 128085 128626.7 128667 541.76455 40.32546 582.09 0.42% 0.03% 0.45%
Imports - Final Demand 143660.9 143308.9 143294.9 -352.0233 -13.9349 -365.958 -0.25% -0.01% -0.25%
G expenditure (£) 278138.2 278057.5 278239.6 -80.7596 182.135 101.3754 -0.03% 0.07% 0.04%
G revenue £ 270580 269754.4 279787 -825.641 10032.66 9207.02 -0.31% 3.72% 3.40%
T L D - Total labour supply 310675.4 310249.6 310021.3 -425.794 -228.249 -654.043 -0.14% -0.07% -0.21%
HLD - Household labour supply
1 207.2714 207.2824 207.556 0.0110481 0.27352 0.284568 0.01% 0.13% 0.14%
2 640.8258 641.4653 642.834 0.6394653 1.368676 2.008141 0.10% 0.21% 0.31%
3 3473.603 3478.838 3486.98 5.2350167 8.141941 13.37696 0.15% 0.23% 0.39%
4 10353.38 10368.15 10386.48 14.77051 18.32894 33.09945 0.14% 0.18% 0.32%
5 18552.93 18572.11 18590.95 19.172925 18.84419 38.01711 0.10% 0.10% 0.20%
6 28967.62 28977.59 28976.12 9.9696311 -1.46402 8.505615 0.03% -0.01% 0.03%
7 37629.86 37632.36 37611.74 2.5074535 -20.628 -18.1206 0.01% -0.05% -0.05%
8 48256.19 48240.11 48182.66 -16.08496 -57.4508 -73.5358 -0.03% -0.12% -0.15%
9 61208.19 61175.67 61082.02 -32.52068 -93.6502 -126.171 -0.05% -0.15% -0.21%
10 100959.7 100956 100854 -3.700406 -102.014 -105.714 0.00% -0.10% -0.10%
HP - Consumption price index
1 1.16323 1.163026 1.165411 -0.000204 0.002385 0.002181 -0.02% 0.21% 0.19%
2 1.161043 1.16084 1.163301 -0.000203 0.002461 0.002258 -0.02% 0.21% 0.19%
3 1.151027 1.150825 1.15336 -0.000202 0.002534 0.002332 -0.02% 0.22% 0.20%
4 1.145478 1.145137 1.147524 -0.000342 0.002388 0.002046 -0.03% 0.21% 0.18%
5 1.140481 1.140046 1.142346 -0.000435 0.0023 0.001865 -0.04% 0.20% 0.16%
6 1.128049 1.127483 1.129535 -0.000566 0.002052 0.001486 -0.05% 0.18% 0.13%
7 1.118987 1.118174 1.119833 -0.000813 0.00166 0.000847 -0.07% 0.15% 0.08%
8 1.109133 1.108116 1.109432 -0.001017 0.001316 0.000299 -0.09% 0.12% 0.03%
9 1.102992 1.101866 1.102994 -0.001125 0.001128 2.34E-06 -0.10% 0.10% 0.00%
10 1.08489 1.083293 1.083662 -0.001598 0.000369 -0.00123 -0.15% 0.03% -0.11%
HNI - Household net income
1 12646.45 12634.61 12624.33 -11.8426 -10.2837 -22.1263 -0.09% -0.08% -0.17%
2 15981.12 15946.04 15915.58 -35.08417 -30.454 -65.5382 -0.22% -0.19% -0.41%
3 21400.21 21333.84 21277.6 -66.36932 -56.2407 -122.61 -0.31% -0.26% -0.57%
4 26928.92 26822.89 26732.45 -106.0295 -90.4398 -196.469 -0.39% -0.34% -0.73%
5 33965.68 33816.92 33685.92 -148.7595 -131.006 -279.766 -0.44% -0.39% -0.82%
6 41975.72 41779.74 41598.16 -195.982 -181.573 -377.555 -0.47% -0.43% -0.90%
7 49590.59 49343.86 49108.58 -246.7282 -235.284 -482.012 -0.50% -0.48% -0.97%
8 58992.27 58683.89 58380.04 -308.3813 -303.848 -612.229 -0.52% -0.52% -1.04%
9 71619.34 71232.75 70845.42 -386.5903 -387.329 -773.919 -0.54% -0.54% -1.08%
10 121470.5 120781.9 120105.5 -688.616 -676.391 -1365.01 -0.57% -0.56% -1.12%
QD - Output by sector
Alcohol and Tobbacco 8080.841 8061.814 8090.175 -19.02672 28.36112 9.334407 -0.24% 0.35% 0.12%
Clothing 9996.051 9983.921 9959.417 -12.13015 -24.5038 -36.634 -0.12% -0.25% -0.37%
Durables 77098.18 77172.93 76978.48 74.757042 -194.45 -119.693 0.10% -0.25% -0.16%
Coal Extraction 3826.53 3828.657 3828.378 2.1269022 -0.27857 1.848328 0.06% -0.01% 0.05%
Oil and Gas Extraction 11779.49 11814.25 11816.45 34.758335 2.197697 36.95603 0.30% 0.02% 0.31%
Coke, Oil Production 11065.44 11086.12 11083.7 20.679568 -2.41662 18.26295 0.19% -0.02% 0.17%
Electricity 22097.23 22099.05 22092.4 1.8103447 -6.6456 -4.83526 0.01% -0.03% -0.02%
Gas 6975.758 6976.077 6970.861 0.3189876 -5.21621 -4.89722 0.00% -0.07% -0.07%
Food 56061.19 55891.68 55521.59 -169.5083 -370.097 -539.605 -0.30% -0.66% -0.96%
Government 79016.89 78971.98 78935.42 -44.90943 -36.5647 -81.4741 -0.06% -0.05% -0.10%
Household Durables 39374.3 39245.86 39124.35 -128.4424 -121.508 -249.95 -0.33% -0.31% -0.63%
Other 45610.68 45639.43 45600.94 28.74827 -38.49 -9.74169 0.06% -0.08% -0.02%
Construction Materials 103623.5 103402.8 103079.6 -220.7186 -323.168 -543.886 -0.21% -0.31% -0.52%
Services 173080.5 172900.2 172659.8 -180.301 -240.46 -420.761 -0.10% -0.14% -0.24%
Business Services 48639.06 48635.08 48596.3 -3.979758 -38.78 -42.7597 -0.01% -0.08% -0.09%
Transport 48293.26 48138.72 47888.24 -154.537 -250.478 -405.015 -0.32% -0.52% -0.84%
Capital Goods 125150.9 124788.6 124417.6 -362.2344 -371.054 -733.289 -0.29% -0.30% -0.59%
Raw Materials 50821.43 50937.1 50943.05 115.67289 5.947767 121.6207 0.23% 0.01% 0.24%
Chapter 6 ■ Results of the general equilibrium
model
After the explanation of the theoretical background to the general
equilibrium model in chapter 4 and the description of the data used and the
calibration processes under taken in chapter 5, this chapter presents a
comprehensive selection of general equilibrium results.
The focus in this chapter is on revenue-neutral changes in the tax mix1.
Namely, the tax rate on energy is increased (either on energy consumption or
the producer tax on the energy production sectors) and this additional
revenue is returned by lowering other tax rates. Government spending
remains fixed in terms of the quantity of goods purchased, but will vary in
terms of money expenditure as prices in the model adjust to equilibrium,
revenue neutrality implies that the government's budget position is left
unchanged after the rise in the energy tax and the reduction in the other form
of tax.
The structure of the model allows the revenue returning instrument to be
any of the following:
• General consumption taxes
• Producer taxes on labour inputs
• Corporation (capital) taxation
• Income taxation
• Lump-sum transfer
The effect of different forms of energy taxes in the context of each of the
above potential revenue returning instruments are analysed. In each case,
the rates of energy taxation are varied in two ways. Firstly, the initial tax rate
on each energy good is doubled, and secondly, it is tripled. This second
instance is somewhat extreme but does give an indication of the levels of tax
increases required to reduce energy use by a significant amount.
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Section 6.1 considers the imposition of a consumption tax - producers pay no
more for energy as an input but households pay more for the consumption
good, Fuel. This section may be compared relatively directly, when the
revenue recycling instrument in consumption taxation, with the results for
the marginal cost of funds (under revenue neutrality) presented in chapter 3.
Section 6.2 considers a tax on energy at the producer level - the price that
producers must pay for energy increases. This increase in the cost of a factor
of production will cause substitute between energy and the other (direct)
inputs to the production process, namely Labour and Capital.
As detailed above, in each section, the level of the revenue-returning
instrument is adjusted so that the government's budget position is the same
as in the baseline case - a deficit of 18102. This adjustment takes the form of
a tax cut in all cases except lump-sum transfers when the level of transfers
are increased. These changes in lump-sum transfers are made at a
proportionally equal level for all households.
6.1 Consumer energy taxes
In this section the two energy tax scenarios considered are a doubling and a
tripling of the existing tax on the consumer energy good, FUEL. For each tax
change the five possible revenue recycling methods - consumption taxes
(excluding energy), producer taxes on labour, corporation tax (a tax on the
return to capital), income tax and lump-sum transfers are analysed.
The effect of the two energy tax change scenarios on the levels of the FUEL
tax are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 - Level of FUEL taxes under the two scenarios





FUEL tax 0.149 0.298 0.447
The full set of results for this section can be found in appendix 6a and 6b.
The required levels of changes in each of the five revenue recycling
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instruments for an equilibrium in the model under the two scenarios are
given in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 - Change in revenue instrument required for equilibrium.








Consumption tax - %age change in
all consumer taxation except Fuel
- -5.78 -11.55
Producer labour taxes - level 0.1 0.14 0.18
Corporation tax - level 0.4 0.37 0.35
Income tax - %age change in rate
faced by each household
- -3.31 -6.15
Lump-sum transfer - %age change - 1.38 2.65
Given the two scenarios and 5 recycling instruments there are 10 'runs' of the
model presented in this section2. The results are divided into two sub¬
sections. Section 6.1.1 deals with what are termed efficiency effects. This is
the overall impact of the tax reform on the economy as a whole, in terms of
macro-economic variables and production sector output. Section 6.1.2
examines the impact of each run of the model at a household level
6.1.1 Efficiency effects
The change in the output of each of the production sectors under the two
scenarios and five revenue recycling instruments is shown in Figure 6.1 (a
and b respectively for the two scenarios). This figure will be returned to
subsequently but initially just the effect on the energy producing sectors is
considered. It is, after all, a reduction in energy usage (or production) that is
primary aim of the tax reform being considered.
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Figure6.1a-Outputchang swithdoublingfonsumptiotax















































































































































































































































It is worth, at this stage, recalling the exact nature of the five energy
producing sectors. El is coal extraction, e? is oil and gas extraction, 33 is
coke and oil production, ej is electricity and 65 is gas. An examination of
figure 6.1 shows that the output of sector e2, oil and gas extraction is
unaffected in any of the 10 runs. Referring back to the domestic use matrix
in appendix 5a, it may be seen that the output of sector e2 is primarily used
as an input to sector e3, coke and oil production, and to a lesser extent sector
e5 (gas production). It does not appear in the FUEL consumption composite
at all. There is thus only an indirect effect on this sector through changes in
demand for the two energy goods for which it is a primary input and this
indirect effect appears to be negligible.
All the other energy sectors experience a reduction in output. The effect is
generally speaking double when the consumption energy tax is tripled as
opposed to doubled. However, the overall effect is relatively small (in
percentage terms) for all sectors except e5, gas. The highest percentage
change for each run occurs for sector e5, sectors e3 and e4 face broadly even
percentage changes in each run and sector ei faces the smallest percentage
change. This is perhaps surprising in that, although sector ei makes up only
2.4% of the FUEL composite, sector ej accounts for 42.1% whilst sectors qj
and e5 account for 22.9% and 32.6% of the FUEL composite. It would be thus
expected that it would be sector ej. that is most affected. Examining the
model data in terms of absolute rather than percentage changes shows that it
is indeed sector e4 that experiences the highest absolute fall in output.
Indeed, the magnitude of the relative absolute effect on each sector is
broadly in line with the share of that sector in the consumption composite.
What is also noticeable is that the extent of the effect on the output of the
energy sectors varies considerably with the recycling instrument chosen.
The change is the supply of energy is greatest with consumption taxes, and
lowest with producer labour taxes as the revenue recycling instrument.
Corporation and income taxes and lump-sum transfers have broadly the
same effect which is of an order of magnitude of around a quarter that of
consumption taxes.
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□ C taxes -1.77% -3.19% -0.59% -1.32% -1.50% -0.47% -0.50% -0.77%
■P Labour -2.06% -1.73% -0.81% -1.78% -2.13% 0.22% 0.23% -1.20%
□ Corporation -1.84% -1.58% -0.69% -1.75% -1.19% -0.50% -0.53% -0.93%
□ Income -2.97% -2.02% -0.59% -1.51% -0.94% -0.65% -0.69% -0.44%
■ Lump-sum -2.30% -3.83% -0.75% -1.86% -1.39% 0.21% 0.23% 1-0.96%
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Figure 6.2b - Results for a tripling of
consumption energy tax
IP 11






0 C taxes -3.64% -6.51% -1.21% -2.72% -3.06% -0.96% -1.03% -1.60%
0 P Labour -4.02% -3.35% -1.57% -3.46% -4.16% 0.44% 0.47% -2.34%
□ Corporation -3.79% -3.60% -1.44% -3.62% -2.53% -1.01% -1.09% -1.91%
□ Income -5.87% -4.12% -1.18% -3.04% -1.92% -1.29% -1.38% -0.91%
a Lump-sum -4.57% -7.62% -1.50% -3.73% -2.80% 0.36% 0.38% -1.95%
172
Figure 6.2 (a and b) presents changes in other selected variables. The wage
level and the interest rate fall in both scenarios and again the effect is
approximately twice as strong when the energy tax rate is tripled as opposed
to doubled. The return to capital falls most when lump-sum transfers are
used for recycling. There is only a negligible effect on the exchange rate in all
instances. See Appendices.
Output also falls in all cases. The fall in output is greatest when the
producer labour tax is the revenue returning instrument and lowest when it
is income tax3. Lump-sum transfers are inferior to all means of recycling
except producer labour taxes in terms of output. Thus, the weak form of the
double dividend holds (provided the recycling instrument is not the
producer labour tax). This result is in line with the existing empirical
literature discussed in chapter 1 with the exception of Brinner et. al. (1992)
who find that producer labour taxes are the most suitable instrument. Given
that they consider a producer based energy tax it is unfair to make a
comparison until the following section4.
Consumption falls in all runs of the model and unsurprisingly the fall is
least when consumption taxes are used as the recycling instrument.
Investment, on the other hand, falls least when income tax is used for the
return of the energy tax revenue.
Figure 6.3 (a and b) shows the effect on producer prices. The overall
producer price index falls in all runs except those where producer labour
taxes are adjusted and indeed it is only in this case that any of the producer
prices rise. The greatest fall in producer price is faced by the e2 sector and
this ties in nicely with the fact raised above that the output of this sector is
not affected by the energy tax rise. Remembering that sector e2 is not a
component of composite energy consumption it is clear that this sector,
which primarily supplies other energy sectors, accepts a lower price for it
output when demand falls due to the fall in other energy type use. The
overall impact on producer prices is highest with lump-sum transfers
although there is some variation across sectors.
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The intuitive idea that revenue neutral tax reform is regressive arose from
the fact that lower income households spend proportionately more of their
income on energy. This reasoning is reinforced by the fact that under all
revenue recycling instruments, broadly speaking, lower income household
reduce their energy consumption proportionately more. However, this
consumption effect is outweighed by the income effect explained above and
the overall impact of the tax reform is progressive. This finding serves to
illustrate the importance of applied empirical analysis.
6.2 Producer energy taxes
The analysis of the previous section is now repeated for a change in the
producer tax rates on energy. The effect of the two energy tax change
scenarios on the levels of the five producer energy taxes are shown in Table
6.3.
Table 6.3 - Level of producer energy taxes under the three scenarios







el -11.7% 0 11.7%
e2 4.5% 8.9% 13.4%
e3 10.0% 20.1% 30.2%
e4 12.1% 24.2% 36.3%
e5 18.5% 37.0% 55.6%
It will be noted that sector ei is initially receiving a subsidy. The changes in
the tax rate are imposed in such a way that the doubling of the tax rate is
equivalent to removal of the subsidy and the tripling of the tax rate is
equivalent to a tax rate equal to the initial subsidy rate.
The full set of results for this section can be found in appendix 6c and 6d.
The required levels of changes in each of the five revenue recycling
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instruments for an equilibrium in the model under the two scenarios are
given in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 - Change in revenue instrument required for equilibrium.








Consumption tax - %age change in
all consumer taxation except Fuel
- -6.28 -15.06
Producer labour taxes - level 0.1 0.21 0.33
Corporation tax - level 0.4 0.37 0.35
Income tax - %age change in rate
faced by each household
- -8.23 -16.93
Lump-sum transfer - %age change - 7.19 14.7
Two issues are raised by Table 6.4. Firstly the changes in the revenue
recycling instruments required for revenue neutrality under the producer tax
reform are much higher than those under the consumer tax reform. Secondly,
that a rise in the producer labour tax level is required5. This is somewhat
counterintuitive and must be due to labour supply effects. Hence, although
results for this recycling instrument are reported they are not included in
analysis.
6.2.1 Efficiency effects
The change in the output of each of the production sectors under the two
scenarios and five revenue recycling instruments is shown in Figure 6.5 (a
and b respectively for the two scenarios). Again, initially just the effect on the
energy producing sectors is considered.
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The pattern of the previous section is repeated in this one. In this case sector
e2's output actually increases in all runs, although by a small proportion.
The output of all the other energy sectors falls by a larger proportion than
with the consumption based energy tax. This is indeed what one would
expect but the magnitude of this increased change is perhaps not as high as
expected. The fall is highest for sector e5 (Gas).
There is again significant variation in the effect by the different revenue
instruments and again the use of consumption taxes causes the biggest fall in
energy usage.
Figure 6.6 (a and b) presents changes in other selected variables. The wage
level and the interest rate fall in both scenarios, but this time the effect is less
linear as the effect is less than twice as strong when the energy tax rate is
tripled as opposed to doubled. The return to capital falls most in this case
when consumption taxes are used for recycling and the wage rate falls most
when income tax is used. There is only a significant decline in the exchange
rate in all instances. See Appendices.
Output falls in all cases, except lump-sum transfers where it actually
increases. This is because the significantly larger revenue, when returned as
a lump-sum transfer results in a large increase in consumption. Under the
other recycling instruments the fall in output is largest with consumption
taxes and lowest when income taxes are used.
In this case no form of the double dividend holds. The reasoning is that
households include transfer payments in their leisure-effort decision and
thus, as modelled, lump-sum transfers have a distortionary impact in the
model. Indeed total labour supply declines by the same (low) proportion if
the recycling instrument is income tax or lump-sum transfer.
As detailed above consumption rises under lump-sum transfers and falls in
all other cases. The greatest fall in consumption is caused by the reduction in
corporation tax.
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□ C taxes -4.19% -8.05% -1.48% -3.47% -0.93% -0.99% -1.66%
El P Labour -3.24% -2.52% -1.26% -2.62% 1.36% 1.45% -2.01%
□ Corporation -5.19% -7.33% -2.04% -5.12% -1.17% -1.25% -2.27%
□ Income -5.77% -3.57% -0.75% -2.09% -1.05% -1.12% -0.07%
■ Lump-sum -1.35% -6.08% 0.34% 0.68% 3.89% 4.16% -0.07%
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□ C taxes -9.96% -17.82 -3.69% -8.87% -7.82% -2.27% -2.42% -4.23%
0 P Labour -6.00% -4.66% -2.36% -4.81% -7.40% 2.97% 3.18% -3.86%
□ Corporation -10.41 -15.30 -4.11% -10.30 -7.49% -2.38% -2.55% -4.70%
□ Income -11.45 -7.20% -1.51% -4.18% -1.69% -2.09% -2.23% -0.15%
■ Lump-sum -2.66% -11.92 0.75% 1.54% 2.20% 7.98% 8.54% -0.15%
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In this section changes in producer prices are not illustrated diagramatically
but may be found in the Appendix. The overall producer price index falls in
all runs except those where producer labour taxes are adjusted (which has
been discounted). The lowest fall is with lump-sum transfers. Indeed with
lump-sum transfers only energy prices fall (remember that these producer
prices do not include the increased energy tax). For the other instruments,
looking at individual sectors, the output price of sector g? rises in all cases
and there is a further rises in producer prices with Alcohol rising
significantly with consumption taxes as the instrument.
6.2.2 Distributional issues
This section considers the distributional implications of the revenue-neutral
production energy tax. Figure 6.7 (a and b) shows the percentage change in
household income by household income group.
The situation is very similar to that under the energy consumption tax. The
only case in which any household's income rises is lump-sum transfers when
all but the top 2 households receive income gains. In all cases lower income
households lose proportionally less than higher income households.
Although this again is somewhat offset by a greater proportionate rise in the
consumer price index faced by lower income households, the net outcome is
more progressive than that of the consumption energy tax.
There is much less of a discernible pattern in the changes in household
labour supply in the producer tax results. The households in the lower
middle of the income range tend to increase their labour supply in all cases
and the there are positive changes in labour supply for all but the top 4
households under lump-sum transfers.
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This chapter has presented the results of the applied general equilibrium
model outlined in the preceding two chapters. Two forms of revenue neutral
energy taxation were examined using the model - an energy tax on consumer
prices and an energy tax on producer prices. In each case revenue neutrality
was achieved by adjusting one of five possible revenue recycling
instruments - consumption (non-energy) taxes, producer labour taxes,
corporation tax, income tax and lump-sum transfers. Thus, 20 runs of the
model were undertaken and analysed.
The results for the consumption tax were relatively straightforward and in
keeping with the existing literature. The strong form of the second dividend
was not found to exist. However, all the tax based revenue recycling
instruments were preferable to lump-sum transfers in terms of the effect on
output. This is equivalent to a second dividend of an improvement in the
efficiency of the rest of the tax system. The weak form of the double
dividend hypothesis, as defined by Goulder (1995) was found to hold.
With an energy tax on producer prices the results were less in keeping with
the literature. It was found that the double dividend did not exist in any
form and that lump-sum transfer was preferable as the revenue recycling
instrument. The reason for this is that the significant revenue raised from the
energy tax, when redistributed to households in a lump-sum fashion causes
a substantial increase in consumption and thus output. This result is driven
by the inclusion of transfer payments as a form of household income.
The formulation of the production functions in the model may also have an
impact. The modelling of energy as a direct input into production along
with labour and capital is a sensible approach. The complicated nature of the
model and its 'black-box' characteristics mean that the effect of this
functional form may not be determined. Intuitively however, the alternative
approach of having energy as a fixed co-efficient inside an intermediate use
matrix means that the only way in which energy use in the production sector
can be reduced is by a reduction in output. Here in the case of lump-sum
transfer of the revenues of a producer energy tax, output generally increases
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whilst the output of the energy sectors decline. The ability to capture this
sort of effect is a key characteristic of the model.
Turning to distributional issues, the results of the model suggest that fears
that revenue-neutral environmental tax reform will have a regressive effect
are unfounded. Regardless of the revenue recycling instrument used, the
changes to the income distribution are progressive in nature. This result is
driven by the uncontroversial assertion that lower income households
receive a greater proportion of their income form transfer payments are so
are less exposed to changes in the payments to labour and capital.
Lump-sum transfers are found to be preferable in distributional terms, but
as outlined above any recycling instrument produces a lower relative loss or
higher relative gain to lower income households.
'The simple imposition of an energy tax, as used in the sensitivity analysis is not considered as
it represents a net 'disappearance' from the model. This could be considered to be an
alternative use of government revenue, e.g., debt repayment, ut as this is not modelled
explicitly, it is preferable to concentrate on instances where revenue is returned.
2As a matter of technical interest, each run takes around 20 minutes to converge to a solution
on a 200 MHz Pentium II with 32 MB of RAM. Each run is calculated twice in order to ensure
that the model is obtaining consistent results. In all cases this repetition process gave identical
solutions.
3The effect is identical with both consumption taxes and income under scenario 1 but in
scenario 2 the fall in output is lower with income taxes.
"•Unfortunately, it will be see in the following section that the producer labour tax rate requires
a rise in its level to achieve revenue neutrality.
5This result was examined in detail and does not appear to be an error in the formulation of the
model or solution procedure.
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Appendix 6a - Model results for a doubling of current consumption taxes
Revenue returning instrument
Baseline C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum
Percentage changes from baseline
C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum




Q P index 1
Q P t index 1.051586






G exp (£) 277885.3























































0.968142 0.982727 0.984151 0.979833 0.961687






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HP -Consumption price index
1 1.160835 1.162555 1.163336 1.1627474 1.162837 1.162659 0.15% 0.22% 0.16% 0.17% 0.16%
2 1.158564 1.16064 1.161141 1.1605535 1.160643 1.160465 0.18% 0.22% 0.17%
'
0.18% 0.16%
3 1.148448 1.151204 1.151097 1.1505145 1.150603 1.150427 0.24% 0.23% 0.18% 0.19% 0.17%
4 1.143039 1.145626 1.145614 1.1446269 1.144778 1.144478 0.23% 0.23% 0.14% 0.15% 0.13%
5 1.138112 1.140586 1.140648 1.1393931 1.139585 1.139204 0.22% 0.22% 0.11% 0.13% 0.10%
6 1.125859 1.128004 1.128215 1.1265809 1.12683 1.126335 0.19% 0.21% 0.06% 0.09% 0.04%
7 1.117076 1.118283 1.119168 1.1168198 1.117178 1.116466 0.11% 0.19% -0.02% 0.01% -0.05%
8 1.107481 1.107925 1.109336 1.1063988 1.106847 1.105957 0.04% 0.17% -0.10% -0.06% -0.14%
9 1.10145 1.101497 1.103172 1.0999231 1.100419 1.099434 0.00% 0.16% -0.14% -0.09% -0.18%
10 1.083802 1.082067 1.085011 1.0803994 1.081103 1.079706 -0.16% 0.11% -0.31% -0.25% -0.38%
HNI • ■ Household net income
1 12646.23 12622.73 12631.42 12632.709 12629.49 12782.06 -0.19% -0.12% -0.11% -0.13% 1.07%
2 15980.43 15910.63 15936.17 15940.028 15931.54 16083.31 -0.44% -0.28% -0.25% -0.31% 0.64%
3 21397.41 21245.86 21282.29 21292.964 21280.41 21420.8 -0.71% -0.54% -0.49% -0.55% 0.11%
4 26924.95 26635.95 26669.24 26693.769 26688.9 26757.87 -1.07% -0.95% -0.86% -0.88% -0.62%
5 33964.3 33507.66 33529.86 33573.593 33591.54 33583.53 -1.34% -1.28% -1.15% -1.10% -1.12%
6 41983.06 41299.73 41291.8 41367.025 41409.39 41317.44 -1.63% -1.65% -1.47% -1.37% -1.59%
7 49606.75 48703.91 48672.2 48782.97 48863.58 48673.66 -1.82% -1.88% -1.66% -1.50% -1.88%
8 59022.54 57827.1 57750.02 57918.466 58041.38 57740.4 -2.03% -2.16% -1.87% -1.66% -2.17%
9 71663.95 70125.04 70003.46 70238.479 70464.56 69988.13 -2.15% -2.32% -1.99% -1.67% -2.34%
10 121536.8 118932.1 118739.7 119188.44 119816.6 118699.8 -2.14% -2.30% -1.93% -1.42% -2.33%
Food
Total 61166.66 60259.88 60258.62 60276.321 60368.08 60257.43 -1.48% -1.48% -1.46% -1.31% -1.49%
1 2747.536 2741.732 2738.442 2738.1328 2737.659 2763.811 -0.21% -0.33% -0.34% -0.36% 0.59%
2 3364.242 3349.648 3348.568 3348.5638 3347.259 3372.131 -0.43% -0.47% -0.47% -0.50% 0.23%
3 4288.012 4259.584 4259.002 4259.8532 4258.029 4279.543 -0.66% -0.68% -0.66% -0.70% -0.20%
4 4251.976 4206.599 4209.326 4210.7604 4210.415 4217.862 -1.07% -1.00% -0.97% -0.98% -0.80%
5 5704.18 5634.5 5633.397 5636.3365 5638.967 5637.195 -1.22% -1.24% -1.19% -1.14% -1.17%
6 6566.139 6471.174 6466.999 6471.6094 6477.131 6465.259 -1.45% -1.51% -1.44% -1.36% -1.54%
7 7078.485 6963.323 6959.661 6963.9839 6973.523 6951.454 -1.63% -1.68% -1.62% -1.48% -1.79%
8 7731.061 7590.648 7586.378 7591.2444 7604.651 7572.603 -1.82% -1.87% -1.81% -1.64% -2.05%
9 8597.003 8430.679 8427.275 8432.9345 8454.526 8409.272 -1.93% -1.97% -1.91% -1.66% -2.18%
10 10838.03 10611.99 10629.57 10622.902 10665.92 10588.3 -2.09% -1.92% -1.98% -1.59% -2.30%
Ale
Total 6075.122 6365.984 6015.071 6017.9922 6032.595 6019.778 4.79% -0.99% -0.94% -0.70% -0.91%
1 456.222 479.6265 457.6454 457.57198 457.4596 463.6767 5.13% 0.31% 0.30% 0.27% 1.63%
2 525.5059 551.6613 526.4317 526.43083 526.1322 531.8358 4.98% 0.18% 0.18% 0.12% 1.20%
3 528.3979 555.4163 528.4667 528.62956 528.2806 532.4024 5.11% 0.01% 0.04% -0.02% 0.76%
4 573.0704 600.8845 570.6554 570.98355 570.9045 572.6099 4.85% -0.42% -0.36% -0.38% -0.08%
5 614.985 644.4068 610.3391 610.87612 611.3568 611.033 4.78% -0.76% -0.67% -0.59% -0.64%
6 593.1431 621.9021 586.4728 587.21539 588.1052 586.1928 4.85% -1.12% -1.00% -0.85% -1.17%
7 637.3985 666.6511 628.3274 629.03143 630.5863 626.9917 4.59% -1.42% -1.31% -1.07% -1.63%
8 644.8803 673.8684 633.6212 634.38001 636.4728 631.4755 4.50% -1.75% -1.63% -1.30% -2.08%
9 670.1504 700.8958 657.2386 658.10257 661.4039 654.4939 4.59% -1.93% -1.80% -1.31% -2.34%
10 831.3683 870.6717 815.8726 814.77074 821.8929 809.0664 4.73% -1.86% -2.00% -1.14% -2.68%
Fuel
Total 1269.67 1200.557 1254.418 1254.4182 1253.86 1254.789 -5.44% -1.20% -1.20% -1.25% -1.17%
1 46.08012 43.45468 45.3759 45.376208 45.37668 45.34744 -5.70% -1.53% -1.53% -1.53% -1.59%
2 54.40968 51.19329 53.62589 53.625897 53.62951 53.55798 -5.91% -1.44% -1.44% -1.43% -1.57%
3 75.11979 70.83104 74.04787 74.045867 74.05015 73.99802 -5.71% -1.43% -1.43% -1.42% -1.49%
4 101.3089 95.85156 99.75728 99.75734 99.75733 99.7573 -5.39% -1.53% -1.53% -1.53% -1.53%
5 127.7964 120.9991 125.8058 125.80764 125.8093 125.8082 -5.32% -1.56% -1.56% -1.55% -1.56%
6 141.779 134.1567 139.7521 139.74746 139.7417 139.7538 -5.38% -1.43% -1.43% -1.44% -1.43%
7 155.4252 147.0947 153.2519 153.24666 153.2347 153.2615 -5.36% -1.40% -1.40% -1.41% -1.39%
8 160.3144 151.6277 158.4764 158.45919 158.4111 158.5243 -5.42% -1.15% -1.16% -1.19% -1.12%
9 174.4281 164.9322 172.8515 172.81995 172.6978 172.9506 -5.44% -0.90% -0.92% -0.99% -0.85%
10 233.0081 220.416 231.4738 231.53199 231.1514 231.8297 -5.40% -0.66% -0.63% -0.80% -0.51%
Clothing
Total 6400.713 6404.135 6251.186 6254.2316 6278.024 6240.643 0.05% -2.34% -2.29% -1.92% -2.50%
1 131.4908 134.8901 131.7615 131.72919 131.6797 134.4217 2.59% 0.21% 0.18% 0.14% 2.23%
2 213.7063 218.3836 213.4573 213.45676 213.2901 216.4761 2.19% -0.12% -0.12% -0.19% 1.30%
3 304.2415 309.5205 302.6178 302.73843 302.4799 305.5353 1.74% -0.53% -0.49% -0.58% 0.43%
4 387.6505 392.0705 383.1475 383.42293 383.3565 384.7885 1.14% -1.16% -1.09% -1.11% -0.74%
5 547.7642 552.0786 538.9143 539.46673 539.9613 539.6282 0.79% -1.62% -1.51% -1.42% -1.49%
6 613.551 615.2523 600.1969 601.0587 602.0915 599.872 0.28% -2.18% -2.04% -1.87% -2.23%
7 708.4074 708.1158 690.7112 691.57078 693.4695 689.0803 -0.04% -2.50% -2.38% -2.11% -2.73%
8 843.9874 840.9663 819.9391 820.98201 823.8585 816.9903 -0.36% -2.85% -2.73% -2.38% -3.20%
9 1053.469 1048.095 1021.571 1022.9255 1028.101 1017.269 -0.51% -3.03% -2.90% -2.41% -3.44%
10 1596.445 1584.763 1548.87 1546.8807 1559.737 1536.582 -0.73% -2.98% -3.10% -2.30% -3.75%
Transport
Total 28393.8 27922.89 27625.47 27639.722 27736.89 27580.53 -1.66% -2.71% -2.66% -2.31% -2.86%
1 443.0082 447.9337 439.5937 439.48108 439.3085 448.8691 1.11% -0.77% -0.80% -0.84% 1.32%
2 709.2316 713.0272 702.8109 702.80915 702.2361 713.1931 0.54% -0.91% -0.91% -0.99% 0.56%
3 1325.653 1325.604 1310.899 1311.3944 1310.333 1322.876 0.00% -1.11% -1.08% -1.16% -0.21%
4 1962.046 1950.939 1931.062 1932.3218 1932.018 1938.569 -0.57% -1.58% -1.51% -1.53% -1.20%
5 2580.196 2555.519 2528.876 2531.2933 2533.458 2532 -0.96% -1.99% -1.90% -1.81% -1.87%
6 3053.338 3011.271 2977.567 2981.4836 2986.177 2976.09 -1.38% -2.48% -2.35% -2.20% -2.53%
7 3510.436 3451.167 3413.382 3417.2881 3425.915 3405.971 -1.69% -2.76% -2.65% -2.41% -2.98%
8 3924.444 3844.585 3801.625 3806.1595 3818.666 3788.802 -2.03% -3.13% -3.01% -2.70% -3.46%
9 4529.235 4427.368 4377.351 4382.9216 4404.204 4359.656 -2.25% -3.35% -3.23% -2.76% -3.74%
10 6356.214 6195.48 6142.306 6134.5697 6184.573 6094.51 -2.53% -3.37% -3.49% -2.70% -4.12%
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Other
Total 101495 100196.2 99811.83 99848.17 100089.8 99729.69 -1.28% -1.66% -1.62% -1.38% -1.74%
1 3139.71 3150.454 3137.97 3137.5299 3136.855 3174.136 0.34% -0.06% -0.07% - -0.09% 1.10%
2 4106.815 4110.619 4097.998 4097.9919 4095.984 4134.317 0.09% -0.21% -0.21% -0.26% 0.67%
3 5746.12 5735.932 5718.802 5720.2625 5717.134 5754.071 -0.18% -0.48% -0.45% -0.50% 0.14%
4 7316.732 7276.026 7252.083 7255.4682 7254.652 7272.243 -0.56% -0.88% -0.84% -0.85% -0.61%
5 8778.214 8704.986 8672.312 8678.335 8683.726 8680.095 -0.83% -1.21% -1.14% -1.08% -1.12%
6 10832.71 10709.68 10662.39 10672.596 10684.82 10658.55 -1.14% -1.57% -1.48% -1.37% -1.61%
7 11456.37 11299.68 11249.84 11259.297 11280.17 11231.9 -1.37% -1.80% -1.72% -1.54% -1.96%
8 12883.88 12675.15 12616.82 12627.872 12658.33 12585.57 -1.62% -2.07% -1.99% -1.75% -2.32%
9 15836.88 15555.68 15482.58 15497.02 15552.17 15436.67 -1.78% -2.24% -2.15% -1.80% -2.53%
10 21397.52 20978.02 20921.02 20901.796 21025.99 20802.15 -1.96% -2.23% -2.32% -1.74% -2.78%
Sevices
Total 44037.81 43378.61 43140.74 43153.94 43285.45 43072.24 -1.50% -2.04% -2.01% -1.71% -2.19%
1 995.5311 1001.334 993.3061 993.14694 992.9031 1006.388 0.58% -0.22% -0.24% -0.26% 1.09%
2 1332.957 1336.587 1327.637 1327.6353 1326.896 1341.014 0.27% -0.40% -0.40% -0.45% 0.60%
3 1897.859 1896.584 1884.867 1885.4101 1884.246 1897.994 -0.07% -0.68% -0.66% -0.72% 0.01%
4 2775.946 2760.386 2745.135 2746.5557 2746.213 2753.599 -0.56% -1.11% -1.06% -1.07% -0.81%
5 3298.826 3270.426 3250.046 3252.5598 3254.81 3253.294 -0.86% -1.48% -1.40% -1.33% -1.38%
6 4017.885 3969.436 3942.594 3946.7807 3951.797 3941.015 -1.21% -1.87% -1.77% -1.64% -1.91%
7 4992.84 4918.304 4887.797 4892.3129 4902.284 4879.228 -1.49% -2.10% -2.01% -1.81% -2.28%
8 5889.648 5784.813 5749.098 5754.608 5769.801 5733.511 -1.78% -2.39% -2.29% -2.03% -2.65%
9 6544.73 6417.764 6376.324 6382.8545 6407.796 6355.57 -1.94% -2.57% -2.47% -2.09% -2.89%
10 12291.59 12022.98 11983.94 11972.076 12048.7 11910.62 -2.19% -2.50% -2.60% -1.98% -3.10%
Durables
Total 44426.54 43675.14 43682.73 43699.261 43799.54 43662.65 -1.69% -1.67% -1.64% -1.41% -1.72%
1 1854.84 1852.673 1852.724 1852.4618 1852.06 1874.293 -0.12% -0.11% -0.13% -0.15% 1.05%
2 2146.719 2138.839 2140.843 2140.8394 2139.78 2160.004 -0.37% -0.27% -0.27% -0.32% 0.62%
3 2788.435 2770.672 2773.528 2774.2431 2772.711 2790.795 -0.64% -0.53% -0.51% -0.56% 0.08%
4 3238.779 3205.873 3208.208 3209.7191 3209.355 3217.208 -1.02% -0.94% -0.90% -0.91% -0.67%
5 3795.015 3745.784 3746.754 3749.3811 3751.732 3750.149 -1.30% -1.27% -1.20% -1.14% -1.18%
6 4842.311 4764.945 4763.011 4767.6095 4773.118 4761.277 -1.60% -1.64% -1.54% -1.43% -1.67%
7 5093.97 5000.568 4998.553 5002.7936 5012.156 4990.505 -1.83% -1.87% -1.79% -1.61% -2.03%
8 5467.446 5353.349 5350.161 5354.8897 5367.926 5336.783 -2.09% -2.15% -2.06% -1.82% -2.39%
9 6657.749 6508.648 6504.161 6510.2818 6533.656 6484.704 -2.24% -2.31% -2.21% -1.86% -2.60%
10 8541.276 8333.792 8344.783 8337.0418 8387.041 8296.928 -2.43% -2.30% -2.39% -1.81% -2.86%
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Appendix 6b - Model results for a tripling of current consumption taxes
Revenue returning instrument
Baseline C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum
Percentage changes from baseline
C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum
Instrument - -0.11555 0.18072 0.3501935 0.939562 1.026514
w 0.909091 0.87602 0.872567 0.8746141 0.855761 0.86754 -3.64% -4.02% -3.79% -5.87% -4.57%
r 1 0.934882 0.966532 0.9639954 0.958759 0.923766 -6.51% -3.35% -3.60% -4.12% -7.62%
E 1 1 1 0.9999998 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Q 921786.9 910620.7 907285.8 908538.11 910870 907936.5 -1.21% -1.57% -1.44% -1.18% -1.50%
Q P index 1 0.979852 1.00378 0.9785975 0.976847 0.975464 -2.01% 0.38% -2.14% -2.32% -2.45%
Q P t index 1.051586 1.031797 1.05576 1.0305312 1.028724 1.027408 -1.88% 0.40% -2.00% -2.17% -2.30%
C P Index 1.116322 1.118105 1.120661 1.1155279 1.116207 1.115044 0.16% 0.39% -0.07% -0.01% -0.11%
C 293159.3 285193.4 283003.5 282549.16 284248.5 282231.4 -2.72% -3.46% -3.62% -3.04% -3.73%
G 104994.2 104994.2 104994.2 104994.18 104994.2 104994.2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 104426.7 101226.4 100081.3 101787.96 102420.5 101504.1 -3.06% -4.16% -2.53% -1.92% -2.80%
X 128586.2 128586.2 128586.2 128586.23 128586.2 128586.2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
M 143322.9 143322.9 143322.9 143322.89 143322.9 143322.9 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
G cxp (£) 277885.3 275209.7 279115 275065.26 274302.5 278881.3 -0.96% 0.44% -1.01% -1.29% 0.36%
G rev (£) 259782.9 257107.3 261012.6 256962.94 256200.1 260779 -1.03% 0.47% -1.09% -1.38% 0.38%
TLD 310481.9 305513.5 303232.1 304560.35 307645 304441 -1.60% -2.34% -1.91% -0.91% -1.95%
Prices (raw)
a 1 0.980115 0.997078 0.9787063 0.982035 0.976213 -1.99% -0.29% -2.13% -1.80% -2.38%
c 1 0.986808 1.010352 0.9862235 0.979091 0.983466 -1.32% 1.04% -1.38% -2.09% -1.65%
d 1 0.974521 0.989661 0.9725597 0.98195 0.97005 -2.55% -1.03% -2.74% -1.80% -3.00%
e1 1 0.985085 1.009362 0.9843671 0.977737 0.981414 -1.49% 0.94% -1.56% -2.23% -1.86%
e2 1 0.947125 0.984894 0.9432279 0.957332 0.937421 -5.29% -1.51% -5.68% -4.27% -6.26%
e3 1 0.968661 0.993111 0.9664184 0.971401 0.962646 -3.13% -0.69% -3.36% -2.86% -3.74%
e4 1 0.981186 1.00574 0.9801767 0.974575 0.976806 -1.88% 0.57% -1.98% -2.54% -2.32%
e5 1 0.967544 1.001551 0.9654537 0.964594 0.960814 -3.25% 0.16% -3.45% -3.54% -3.92%
f 1 0.987486 1.00811 0.9868963 0.981132 0.984408 -1.25% 0.81% -1.31% -1.89% -1.56%
9 1 0.970962 1.018306 0.9695284 0.957594 0.963884 -2.90% 1.83% -3.05% -4.24% -3.61%
hd 1 0.954554 0.991041 0.951282 0.961049 0.945906 -4.54% -0.90% -4.87% -3.90% -5.41%
0 1 0.987286 1.009419 0.9867122 0.980156 0.984097 -1.27% 0.94% -1.33% -1.98% -1.59%
oc 1 0.974309 0.996468 0.9724775 0.976862 0.969247 -2.57% -0.35% -2.75% -2.31% -3.08%
s 1 0.982816 1.002615 0.9817047 0.981023 0.979062 -1.72% 0.26% -1.83% -1.90% -2.09%
sb 1 0.985595 1.010276 0.9849212 0.978029 0.982009 -1.44% 1.03% -1.51% -2.20% -1.80%
t 1 0.988041 1.00488 0.987403 0.983861 0.985255 -1.20% 0.49% -1.26% -1.61% -1.47%
z 1 0.985141 1.010076 0.9844407 0.977525 0.981467 -1.49% 1.01% -1.56% -2.25% -1.85%
zm 1 0.990433 1.004043 0.9899174 0.987078 0.988193 -0.96% 0.40% -1.01% -1.29% -1.18%
QD - Output by sector C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum
a 8038.752 8633.525 7922.751 7912.4635 7949.251 7923.359 7.40% -1.44% -1.57% -1.11% -1.44%
c 10013.31 10011.52 9723.613 9708.3346 9765.278 9692.528 -0.02% -2.89% -3.05% -2.48% -3.20%
d 77388.42 76116.7 75823.61 76279.453 76515.96 76194.72 -1.64% -2.02% -1.43% -1.13% -1.54%
e1 3828.899 3799.029 3822.123 3822.1901 3821.964 3822.275 -0.78% -0.18% -0.18% -0.18% -0.17%
e2 11812.04 11812.05 11812.05 11812.053 11812.05 11812.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
e3 11088.18 10801.52 11023.16 11023.797 11021.63 11024.61 -2.59% -0.59% -0.58% -0.60% -0.57%
e4 22105.07 21579.38 21985.81 21986.982 21983 21988.47 -2.38% -0.54% -0.53% -0.55% -0.53%
e5 6980.809 6573.416 6888.388 6889.2971 6886.211 6890.454 -5.84% -1.32% -1.31% -1.36% -1.29%
f 56290.51 54433.55 54519.55 54458.985 54687.4 54465.55 -3.30% -3.15% -3.25% -2.85% -3.24%
g 79013.71 78756.05 78701.59 78686.731 78742.73 78675.17 -0.33% -0.40% -0.41% -0.34% -0.43%
hd 39382.93 38386.08 38447.29 38405.111 38563.81 38389.12 -2.53% -2.38% -2.48% -2.08% -2.52%
0 45684.05 45376.81 45311.8 45294.376 45361.14 45280.57 -0.67% -0.81% -0.85% -0.71% -0.88%
oc 103756.8 101929.8 101342.1 102225.8 102580.9 102075.2 -1.76% -2.33% -1.48% -1.13% -1.62%
s 173169 171809.5 171427.8 171350.9 171662.6 171247.4 -0.79% -1.01% -1.05% -0.87% -1.11%
sb 48677.7 48456.15 48378.28 48485.784 48530.14 48466.36 -0.46% -0.62% -0.39% -0.30% -0.43%
t 48416.18 47421.29 46897.29 46847.44 47084.76 46775.11 -2.05% -3.14% -3.24% -2.75% -3.39%
z 125209.3 122674.3 122079.4 122172.03 122715 122040.6 -2.02% -2.50% -2.43% -1.99% -2.53%
zm 50931.23 50925.36 50924.12 50923.781 50925.06 50923.52 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.02%
HLD - Household labour supply
1 207 206.7394 206.5155 206.48425 205.2552 206.5517 -0.13% -0.23% -0.25% -0.84% -0.22%
2 640 641.6174 639.6352 639.64428 638.5505 641.2487 0.25% -0.06% -0.06% -0.23% 0.20%
3 3470 3485.259 3469.294 3470.078 3472.217 3482.819 0.44% -0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 0.37%
4 10348 10367.5 10316.65 10321.03 10359.69 10357.62 0.19% -0.30% -0.26% 0.11% 0.09%
5 18551 18505.96 18413.1 18429.56 18536.79 18478.06 -0.24% -0.74% -0.65% -0.08% -0.39%
6 28978 28713.71 28567.37 28617.132 28819.92 28644.02 -0.91% -1.42% -1.25% -0.55% -1.15%
7 37653 37164.67 36945.42 37047.923 37348.58 37053.09 -1.30% -1.88% -1.61% -0.81% -1.59%
8 48300 47423.34 47087.29 47292.96 47712.22 47242.27 -1.82% -2.51% -2.08% -1.22% -2.19%
9 61274 59971.92 59488.61 59818.402 60460 59714.06 -2.13% -2.91% -2.38% -1.33% -2.55%
10 101061 99032.82 97958.82 98717.133 100091.8 98621.27 -2.01% -3.07% -2.32% -0.96% -2.41%
193
HP -Consumption price index
1 1.160835 1.164208 1.165808 1.1645932 1.164783 1.164431 0.29% 0.43% 0.32% 0.34% 0.31%
2 1.158564 1.162659 1.163689 1.1624754 1.162665 1.162313 0.35% 0.44% 0.34% . 0.35% 0.32%
3 1.148448 1.153929 1.153715 1.1525123 1.1527 1.152352 0.48% 0.46% 0.35% 0.37% 0.34%
4 1.143039 1.148166 1.148172 1.1461333 1.146451 1.145861 0.45% 0.45% 0.27% 0.30% 0.25%
5 1.138112 1.143003 1.143174 1.1405835 1.140988 1.140238 0.43% 0.44% 0.22% 0.25% 0.19%
6 1.125859 1.130079 1.130575 1.1272026 1.127729 1.126752 0.37% 0.42% 0.12% 0.17% 0.08%
7 1.117076 1.119374 1.121288 1.1164438 1.117199 1.115798 0.21% 0.38% -0.06% 0.01% -0.11%
8 1.107481 1.108215 1.11124 1.1051809 1.106126 1.104373 0.07% 0.34% -0.21% -0.12% -0.28%
9 1.10145 1.101374 1.104955 1.098253 1.099298 1.097359 -0.01% 0.32% -0.29% -0.20% -0.37%
10 1.083802 1.080077 1.086327 1.0768205 1.078302 1.075554 -0.34% 0.23% -0.64% -0.51% -0.76%
HNI - ■ Household net income
1 12646.23 12598.16 12617.51 12616.254 12612.22 12903.08 -0.38% -0.23% -0.24% -0.27% 2.03%
2 15980.43 15837.6 15894.54 15890.901 15880.98 16169.76 -0.89% -0.54% -0.56% -0.62% 1.18%
3 21397.41 21086.82 21173.62 21171.529 21160.17 21426.3 -1.45% -1.05% -1.06% -1.11% 0.13%
4 26924.95 26332.46 26427.36 26434.77 26447.29 26575.88 -2.20% -1.85% -1.82% -1.77% -1.30%
5 33964.3 33028.84 33118.87 33143.576 33210.76 33190.85 -2.75% -2.49% -2.42% -2.22% -2.28%
6 41983.06 40584.61 40637.84 40698.788 40826.73 40644.66 -3.33% -3.20% -3.06% -2.75% -3.19%
7 49606.75 47759.99 47787.91 47892.899 48109.03 47737.28 -3.72% -3.67% -3.45% -3.02% -3.77%
8 59022.54 56578.11 56545.13 56729.911 57046.78 56459.47 -4.14% -4.20% -3.88% -3.35% -4.34%
9 71663.95 68517.55 68430.27 68705.549 69244.75 68316.85 -4.39% -4.51% -4.13% -3.38% -4.67%
10 121536.8 116211 116088 116645.82 118039.9 115870.2 -4.38% -4.48% -4.02% -2.88% -4.66%
Food
Total 61166.66 59309.69 59395.7 59335.132 59563.55 59341.7 -3.04% -2.90% -2.99% -2.62% -2.98%
1 2747.536 2735.307 2729.667 2728.3528 2727.832 2777.466 -0.45% -0.65% -0.70% -0.72% 1.09%
2 3364.242 3334.001 3333.56 3331.6342 3330.207 3377.342 -0.90% -0.91% -0.97% -1.01% 0.39%
3 4288.012 4229.362 4231.338 4229.3566 4227.859 4268.509 -1.37% -1.32% -1.37% -1.40% -0.45%
4 4251.976 4158.91 4168.719 4166.7615 4168.63 4182.449 -2.19% -1.96% -2.00% -1.96% -1.64%
5 5704.18 5561.172 5566.137 5564.0482 5573.26 5569.254 -2.51% -2.42% -2.46% -2.30% -2.37%
6 6566.139 6371.492 6372.852 6371.5566 6387.67 6364.163 -2.96% -2.94% -2.96% -2.72% -3.08%
7 7078.485 6842.618 6846.862 6843.0341 6867.991 6824.727 -3.33% -3.27% -3.33% -2.97% -3.58%
8 7731.061 7443.653 7448.975 7443.8349 7477.626 7414.946 -3.72% -3.65% -3.72% -3.28% -4.09%
9 8597.003 8256.776 8265.966 8260.1067 8311.06 8222.672 -3.96% -3.85% -3.92% -3.33% -4.35%
10 10838.03 10376.4 10431.62 10396.446 10491.41 10340.17 -4.26% -3.75% -4.07% -3.20% -4.59%
Ale
Total 6075.122 6669.895 5959.12 5948.8328 5985.62 5959.728 9.79% -1.91% -2.08% -1.47% -1.90%
1 456.222 504.8923 459.0619 458.74817 458.6238 470.5204 10.67% 0.62% 0.55% 0.53% 3.13%
2 525.5059 579.7849 527.394 526.95025 526.6215 537.514 10.33% 0.36% 0.27% 0.21% 2.29%
3 528.3979 584.3266 528.6259 528.24441 527.9562 535.8017 10.58% 0.04% -0.03% -0.08% 1.40%
4 573.0704 630.3753 568.4551 568.00494 568.4346 571.6167 10.00% -0.81% -0.88% -0.81% -0.25%
5 614.985 675.3799 606.027 605.64417 607.3336 606.5986 9.82% -1.46% -1.52% -1.24% -1.36%
6 593.1431 651.9277 580.2384 580.02935 582.6319 578.8369 9.91% -2.18% -2.21% -1.77% -2.41%
7 637.3985 696.9444 619.8245 619.20089 623.2725 616.2219 9.34% -2.76% -2.85% -2.22% -3.32%
8 644.8803 703.6023 623.0406 622.24006 627.5118 617.7498 9.11% -3.39% -3.51% -2.69% -4.21%
9 670.1504 732.2411 645.0894 644.19709 651.9773 638.5101 9.27% -3.74% -3.87% -2.71% -4.72%
10 831.3683 910.4201 801.3631 795.57351 811.2571 786.3579 9.51% -3.61% -4.31% -2.42% -5.41%
Fuel
Total 1269.67 1133.323 1238.738 1239.0422 1238.009 1239.429 -10.74% -2.44% -2.41% -2.49% -2.38%
1 46.08012 40.86298 44.69461 44.6957 44.69613 44.64331 -11.32% -3.01% -3.00% -3.00% -3.12%
2 54.40968 48.02598 52.8641 52.868977 52.87257 52.74434 -11.73% -2.84% -2.83% -2.83% -3.06%
3 75.11979 66.62217 73.00147 73.005503 73.00853 72.92026 -11.31% -2.82% -2.81% -2.81% -2.93%
4 101.3089 90.51784 98.23938 98.238346 98.23934 98.24552 -10.65% -3.03% -3.03% -3.03% -3.02%
5 127.7964 114.3707 123.8482 123.8458 123.8562 123.8518 -10.51% -3.09% -3.09% -3.08% -3.09%
6 141.779 126.7403 137.7235 137.72392 137.7179 137.7262 -10.61% -2.86% -2.86% -2.86% -2.86%
7 155.4252 139.0011 151.0551 151.05677 151.0445 151.0633 -10.57% -2.81% -2.81% -2.82% -2.81%
8 160.3144 143.2048 156.5469 156.56018 156.4703 156.6316 -10.67% -2.35% -2.34% -2.40% -2.30%
9 174.4281 155.7374 171.111 171.13712 170.9035 171.2989 -10.72% -1.90% -1.89% -2.02% -1.79%
10 233.0081 208.2395 229.6536 229.90993 229.2004 230.3043 -10.63% -1.44% -1.33% -1.63% -1.16%
Clothing
Total 6400.713 6398.923 6111.013 6095.7347 6152.678 6079.928 -0.03% -4.53% -4.76% -3.88% -5.01%
1 131.4908 138.4224 132.0375 131.89958 131.8449 137.0899 5.27% 0.42% 0.31% 0.27% 4.26%
2 213.7063 223.1984 213.249 213.00214 212.8193 218.8915 4.44% -0.21% -0.33% -0.42% 2.43%
3 304.2415 314.8486 301.1153 300.83393 300.6214 306.4137 3.49% -1.03% -1.12% -1.19% 0.71%
4 387.6505 396.3147 378.9289 378.55317 378.9118 381.5689 2.24% -2.25% -2.35% -2.25% -1.57%
5 547.7642 555.9748 530.6048 530.21349 531.9406 531.1892 1.50% -3.13% -3.20% -2.89% -3.03%
6 613.551 616.2142 587.6614 587.42053 590.4187 586.0471 0.43% -4.22% -4.26% -3.77% -4.48%
7 708.4074 706.7847 674.1085 673.35288 678.2872 669.7439 -0.23% -4.84% -4.95% -4.25% -5.46%
8 843.9874 836.4939 797.375 796.28339 803.4726 790.1615 -0.89% -5.52% -5.65% -4.80% -6.38%
9 1053.469 1040.787 991.6292 990.24151 1002.342 981.3974 -1.20% -5.87% -6.00% -4.85% -6.84%
10 1596.445 1569.884 1504.303 1493.9341 1522.02 1477.425 -1.66% -5.77% -6.42% -4.66% -7.46%
Transport
Total 28393.8 27419.92 26903.43 26842.383 27075.54 26771.91 -3.43% -5.25% -5.46% -4.64% -5.71%
1 443.0082 453.0834 436.298 435.81988 435.6304 453.8226 2.27% -1.51% -1.62% -1.67% 2.44%
2 709.2316 716.9014 696.6759 695.83096 695.2051 715.991 1.08% -1.77% -1.89% -1.98% 0.95%
3 1325.653 1325.191 1296.892 1295.7416 1294.872 1318.556 -0.03% -2.17% -2.26% -2.32% -0.54%
4 1962.046 1938.571 1901.767 1900.0534 1901.689 1913.806 -1.20% -3.07% -3.16% -3.08% -2.46%
5 2580.196 2528.644 2480.462 2478.7546 2486.29 2483.012 -2.00% -3.87% -3.93% -3.64% -3.77%
6 3053.338 2966.026 2906.237 2905.1454 2918.736 2898.919 -2.86% -4.82% -4.85% -4.41% -5.06%
7 3510.436 3387.748 3322.147 3318.7214 3341.087 3302.359 -3.49% -5.36% -5.46% -4.82% -5.93%
8 3924.444 3759.515 3686.283 3681.5474 3712.728 3654.988 -4.20% -6.07% -6.19% -5.39% -6.87%
9 4529.235 4319.1 4234.763 4229.0706 4278.698 4192.789 -4.64% -6.50% -6.63% -5.53% -7.43%











































































































































































































































Appendix 6c - Model results for a doubling of current production taxes
Revenue returning instrument
C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum
-0.6285 0.210908 0.3707884 0.918714 1.071928
Percentage changes from baseline
C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum
w 0.909091 0.871009 0.879626 0.8619382 0.856624 0.89684 -4.19% -3.24% -5.19% -5.77% -1.35%
r 1 0.919505 0.974835 0.9267214 0.96429 0.939172 -8.05% -2.52% -7.33% -3.57% -6.08%
E 1 0.996961 0.996961 0.9969607 0.996961 0.996961 -0.30% -0.30% -0.30% -0.30% -0.30%
Q 921786.9 908178.5 910130.4 903001.87 914840.3 924887.2 -1.48% -1.26% -2.04% -0.75% 0.34%
Q P index 1 0.981474 1.021218 0.9767438 0.983453 0.992757 -1.85% 2.12% -2.33% -1.65% -0.72%
Q P t index 1.051586 1.039598 1.079258 1.0349943 1.041327 1.050303 -1.14% 2.63% -1.58% -0.98% -0.12%
C P Index 1.116322 1.114736 1.120635 1.1117775 1.114504 1.115306 -0.14% 0.39% -0.41% -0.16% -0.09%
C 293159.3 282994.1 285481.4 278148.31 287042.4 295153.6 -3.47% -2.62% -5.12% -2.09% 0.68%
G 104994.2 104994.2 104994.2 104994.18 104994.2 104994.2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
I 104426.7 100929 100393.6 100598.14 103542.4 105478.2 -3.35% -3.86% -3.67% -0.85% 1.01%
X 128586.2 128632 128632 128631.96 128632 128632 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
M 143322.9 143314.2 143314.2 143314.19 143314.2 143314.2 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
G exp(£) 277885.3 275301.6 281659.2 274626.01 274973.3 288702.2 -0.93% 1.36% -1.17% -1.05% 3.89%
G rev (£) 259782.9 257199.3 263556.9 256523.69 256871 270599.9 -0.99% 1.45% -1.25% -1.12% 4.16%
TLD 310481.9 305316.3 304254.8 303430.73 310249.6 310249.6 -1.66% -2.01% -2.27% -0.07% -0.07%
Prices (raw)
a 1 0.979058 1.007717 0.9747917 0.986715 0.987867 -2.09% 0.77% -2.52% -1.33% -1.21%
c 1 0.988231 1.026436 0.9846619 0.982879 0.998429 -1.18% 2.64% -1.53% -1.71% -0.16%
d 1 0.968883 0.994462 0.9639254 0.984114 0.977418 -3.11% -0.55% -3.61% -1.59% -2.26%
e1 1 0.993916 1.034248 0.9900858 0.989606 1.004874 -0.61% 3.42% -0.99% -1.04% 0.49%
e2 1 0.935769 1.000217 0.9250216 0.961412 0.956072 -6.42% 0.02% -7.50% -3.86% -4.39%
e3 1 0.977308 1.023335 0.9706897 0.989115 0.991365 -2.27% 2.33% -2.93% -1.09% -0.86%
e4 1 1.106741 1.155915 1.1022109 1.104622 1.120821 10.67% 15.59% 10.22% 10.46% 12.08%
e5 1 0.971992 1.031821 0.9645462 0.977342 0.989249 -2.80% 3.18% -3.55% -2.27% -1.08%
f 1 0.990567 1.024696 0.9873762 0.986672 0.999782 -0.94% 2.47% -1.26% -1.33% -0.02%
g 1 0.968103 1.044668 0.9604434 0.960471 0.988795 -3.19% 4.47% -3.96% -3.95% -1.12%
hd 1 0.945292 1.005879 0.9357299 0.964802 0.964038 -5.47% 0.59% -6.43% -3.52% -3.60%
0 1 0.987846 1.023959 0.9844778 0.983057 0.997515 -1.22% 2.40% -1.55% -1.69% -0.25%
oc 1 0.970161 1.007083 0.9645691 0.980053 0.9815 -2.98% 0.71% -3.54% -1.99% -1.85%
s 1 0.980613 1.013173 0.9764744 0.983273 0.990065 -1.94% 1.32% -2.35% -1.67% -0.99%
sb 1 0.984676 1.024642 0.9808223 0.97982 0.995396 -1.53% 2.46% -1.92% -2.02% -0.46%
t 1 0.990673 1.019353 0.987891 0.989238 0.9986 -0.93% 1.94% -1.21% -1.08% -0.14%
z 1 0.985954 1.026716 0.9820705 0.981204 0.996924 -1.40% 2.67% -1.79% -1.88% -0.31%
zm 1 0.992572 1.015508 0.9902996 0.991399 0.998916 -0.74% 1.55% -0.97% -0.86% -0.11%
QD - Output by sector C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum
a 8038.752 8413.774 7922.487 7747.9131 7955.292 8207.301 4.67% -1.45% -3.62% -1.04% 2.10%
c 10013.31 9888.433 9786.541 9549.5158 9838.938 10084.74 -1.25% -2.26% -4.63% -1.74% 0.71%
d 77388.42 75976.57 76009.54 75794.701 76937.28 77791.31 -1.82% -1.78% -2.06% -0.58% 0.52%
e1 3828.899 3807.113 3826.66 3827.4198 3826.425 3825.605 -0.57% -0.06% -0.04% -0.06% -0.09%
e2 11812.04 11834.72 11834.72 11834.722 11834.72 11834.72 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19%
e3 11088.18 10883.39 11070.98 11078.272 11068.73 11060.86 -1.85% -0.16% -0.09% -0.18% -0.25%
e4 22105.07 21707.14 22051.13 22064.504 22047 22032.57 -1.80% -0.24% -0.18% -0.26% -0.33%
e5 6980.809 6671.761 6938.35 6948.7111 6935.145 6923.963 -4.43% -0.61% -0.46% -0.65% -0.81%
f 56290.51 54335.64 55029.1 53971.898 55238.73 56567.5 -3.47% -2.24% -4.12% -1.87% 0.49%
g 79013.71 78676.33 78772.64 78531.58 78824.18 79087.83 -0.43% -0.31% -0.61% -0.24% 0.09%
hd 39382.93 38200.23 38667.61 37967.103 38813.48 39635.3 -3.00% -1.82% -3.60% -1.45% 0.64%
0 45684.05 45287.1 45401.68 45114.73 45463.51 45777.69 -0.87% -0.62% -1.25% -0.48% 0.20%
oc 103756.8 101746.1 101540.5 101536.65 103206.3 104346 -1.94% -2.14% -2.14% -0.53% 0.57%
s 173169 171439.4 171855.4 170606.32 172151.9 173373.6 -1.00% -0.76% -1.48% -0.59% 0.12%
sb 48677.7 48433.94 48405.42 48401.857 48609.59 48748.89 -0.50% -0.56% -0.57% -0.14% 0.15%
t 48416.18 47143.29 47288.9 46299.091 47526.55 48565.23 -2.63% -2.33% -4.37% -1.84% 0.31%
z 125209.3 121983.6 122712.5 120744.83 123536.3 125961 -2.58% -1.99% -3.57% -1.34% 0.60%
zm 50931.23 50930.13 50932.33 50926.832 50933.5 50939.51 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.02%
HLD - Household labour supply
1 207 206.4172 206.4956 206.04024 204.7852 207.2653 -0.28% -0.24% -0.46% -1.07% 0.13%
2 640 641.1494 639.2917 639.58778 637.7932 642.9107 0.18% -0.11% -0.06% -0.34% 0.45%
3 3470 3484.903 3467.328 3474.3549 3471.064 3491.131 0.43% -0.08% 0.13% 0.03% 0.61%
4 10348 10369.93 10319.22 10334.074 10376.14 10402.63 0.21% -0.28% -0.13% 0.27% 0.53%
5 18551 18508.43 18436.22 18434.649 18599.71 18615.71 -0.23% -0.62% -0.63% 0.26% 0.35%
6 28978 28705.53 28643.82 28568.998 28976.54 28996.1 -0.94% -1.15% -1.41% -0.01% 0.06%
7 37653 37146.81 37072.79 36945.608 37603.52 37632.31 -1.34% -1.54% -1.88% -0.13% -0.05%
8 48300 47383.86 47295.42 47085.623 48117.2 48196.29 -1.90% -2.08% -2.51% -0.38% -0.21%
9 61274 59910.24 59784.79 59498.479 61062.05 61094.39 -2.23% -2.43% -2.90% -0.35% -0.29%
10 101061 98958.99 98389.46 98243.312 101200.8 100970.9 -2.08% -2.64% -2.79% 0.14% -0.09%
196
HP -Consumption price index
1 1.160835 1.161589 1.163856 1.1617119 1.162445 1.162558 0.06% 0.26% 0.08% 0.14% 0.15%
2 1.158564 1.159884 1.161661 1.1595209 1.160253 1.160365 0.11% 0.27% 0.08% - 0.15% 0.16%
3 1.148448 1.150905 1.151614 1.1494922 1.150218 1.150329 0.21% 0.28% 0.09% 0.15% 0.16%
4 1.143039 1.144941 1.146462 1.1428656 1.144096 1.144284 0.17% 0.30% -0.02% 0.09% 0.11%
5 1.138112 1.139639 1.141715 1.1371436 1.138707 1.138947 0.13% 0.32% -0.09% 0.05% 0.07%
6 1.125859 1.126651 1.12959 1.1236383 1.125673 1.125985 0.07% 0.33% -0.20% -0.02% 0.01%
7 1.117076 1.115876 1.121123 1.1125747 1.115496 1.115945 -0.11% 0.36% -0.40% -0.14% -0.10%
8 1.107481 1.104668 1.111772 1.1010781 1.104732 1.105293 -0.25% 0.39% -0.58% -0.25% -0.20%
9 1.10145 1.097802 1.105862 1.0940336 1.098074 1.098695 -0.33% 0.40% -0.67% -0.31% -0.25%
10 1.083802 1.076374 1.08881 1.0720294 1.077758 1.078639 -0.69% 0.46% -1.09% -0.56% -0.48%
HNI • ■ Household net income
1 12646.23 12587.14 12624.13 12589.709 12616.9 13456.55 -0.47% -0.17% -0.45% -0.23% 6.41%
2 15980.43 15804.83 15914.32 15812.045 15895.72 16832.41 -1.10% -0.41% -1.05% -0.53% 5.33%
3 21397.41 21018.74 21221.61 21008.869 21202.22 22265.98 -1.77% -0.82% -1.82% -0.91% 4.06%
4 26924.95 26214.4 26530.17 26149.554 26553.37 27579.5 -2.64% -1.47% -2.88% -1.38% 2.43%
5 33964.3 32858.12 33291.04 32722.121 33407.97 34459.89 -3.26% -1.98% -3.66% -1.64% 1.46%
6 41983.06 40355.52 40907.33 40113.721 41149.87 42301.33 -3.88% -2.56% -4.45% -1.98% 0.76%
7 49606.75 47472.29 48145.85 47142.779 48562.07 49769.85 -4.30% -2.94% -4.97% -2.11% 0.33%
8 59022.54 56218.66 57019.37 55768.282 57672.56 59028.67 -4.75% -3.39% -5.51% -2.29% 0.01%
9 71663.95 68068.07 69037.72 67485.25 70105.02 71551.04 -5.02% -3.66% -5.83% -2.18% -0.16%
10 121536.8 115420 117067.7 114511.73 119649.8 121226.9 -5.03% -3.68% -5.78% -1.55% -0.25%
Food
Total 61166.66 59209.5 59902.96 58845.76 60112.6 61441.36 -3.20% -2.07% -3.79% -1.72% 0.45%
1 2747.536 2738.216 2737.515 2729.6218 2734.995 2878.962 -0.34% -0.36% -0.65% -0.46% 4.78%
2 3364.242 3334.942 3345.348 3326.0702 3340.735 3494.638 -0.87% -0.56% -1.13% -0.70% 3.88%
3 4288.012 4227.488 4250.067 4214.0581 4245.134 4409.302 -1.41% -0.88% -1.72% -1.00% 2.83%
4 4251.976 4157.394 4194.338 4145.7382 4193.735 4310.419 -2.22% -1.36% -2.50% -1.37% 1.37%
5 5704.18 5552.999 5605.284 5524.6169 5613.908 5745.344 -2.65% -1.73% -3.15% -1.58% 0.72%
6 6566.139 6359.82 6425.453 6318.3049 6443.834 6577.229 -3.14% -2.14% -3.77% -1.86% 0.17%
7 7078.485 6827.576 6909.974 6778.0013 6936.339 7063.563 -3.54% -2.38% -4.25% -2.01% -0.21%
8 7731.061 7424.874 7525.17 7364.6612 7560.98 7691.704 -3.96% -2.66% -4.74% -2.20% -0.51%
9 8597.003 8235.951 8355.3 8168.4624 8412.631 8538.844 -4.20% -2.81% -4.98% -2.14% -0.68%
10 10838.03 10350.24 10554.51 10276.225 10630.31 10731.35 -4.50% -2.62% -5.18% -1.92% -0.98%
Ale
Total 6075.122 6448.963 5957.677 5783.1031 5990.482 6242.491 6.15% -1.93% -4.81% -1.39% 2.75%
1 456.222 495.2037 457.4794 455.60806 456.8815 491.4355 8.54% 0.28% -0.13% 0.14% 7.72%
2 525.5059 567.4528 525.7624 521.35703 524.7071 560.3129 7.98% 0.05% -0.79% -0.15% 6.62%
3 528.3979 569.6727 526.8421 519.97676 525.8996 557.6093 7.81% -0.29% -1.59% -0.47% 5.53%
4 573.0704 612.7472 567.3399 556.29889 567.2022 594.1165 6.92% -1.00% -2.93% -1.02% 3.67%
5 614.985 654.6722 605.3368 590.73291 606.9073 631.0611 6.45% -1.57% -3.94% -1.31% 2.61%
6 593.1431 629.5427 579.938 562.88602 582.8862 604.484 6.14% -2.23% -5.10% -1.73% 1.91%
7 637.3985 672.0773 620.4127 599.21638 624.6877 645.5068 5.44% -2.66% -5.99% -1.99% 1.27%
8 644.8803 676.666 624.2794 599.66226 629.8352 650.3133 4.93% -3.19% -7.01% -2.33% 0.84%
9 670.1504 702.2359 646.4901 618.50464 655.1986 674.5718 4.79% -3.53% -7.71% -2.23% 0.66%
10 831.3683 868.6931 803.7963 758.86012 816.277 833.0797 4.49% -3.32% -8.72% -1.82% 0.21%
Fuel
Total 1269.67 1166.229 1255.452 1258.9193 1254.379 1250.637 -8.15% -1.12% -0.85% -1.20% -1.50%
1 46.08012 42.03093 45.36614 45.373593 45.36859 45.12652 -8.79% -1.55% -1.53% -1.54% -2.07%
2 54.40968 49.44084 53.62237 53.673587 53.63493 53.1121 -9.13% -1.45% -1.35% -1.42% -2.38%
3 75.11979 68.55152 74.0514 74.128403 74.06254 73.59124 -8.74% -1.42% -1.32% -1.41% -2.03%
4 101.3089 93.0167 99.73202 99.709165 99.73189 99.68393 -8.19% -1.56% -1.58% -1.56% -1.60%
5 127.7964 117.4831 125.7555 125.66498 125.7625 125.8053 -8.07% -1.60% -1.67% -1.59% -1.56%
6 141.779 130.2656 139.7556 139.7969 139.7411 139.5712 -8.12% -1.43% -1.40% -1.44% -1.56%
7 155.4252 142.8738 153.2683 153.33137 153.2427 153.0586 -8.08% -1.39% -1.35% -1.40% -1.52%
8 160.3144 147.3646 158.6439 159.06994 158.5274 158.0358 -8.08% -1.04% -0.78% -1.11% -1.42%
9 174.4281 160.4252 173.1963 174.04714 172.8929 172.1546 -8.03% -0.71% -0.22% -0.88% -1.30%
10 233.0081 214.7771 232.0603 234.12427 231.4146 230.4976 -7.82% -0.41% 0.48% -0.68% -1.08%
Clothing
Total 6400.713 6273.876 6171.984 5934.9588 6224.381 6470.184 -1.98% -3.57% -7.28% -2.75% 1.09%
1 131.4908 136.6429 131.6831 130.85973 131.4199 146.777 3.92% 0.15% -0.48% -0.05% 11.63%
2 213.7063 220.0897 213.0724 210.61692 212.4838 232.475 2.99% -0.30% -1.45% -0.57% 8.78%
3 304.2415 310.0011 301.3895 296.31143 300.6917 324.274 1.89% -0.94% -2.61% -1.17% 6.58%
4 387.6505 389.4709 380.329 371.08156 380.2135 402.8553 0.47% -1.89% -4.27% -1.92% 3.92%
5 547.7642 546.0588 533.71 518.71488 535.3245 560.2023 -0.31% -2.57% -5.30% -2.27% 2.27%
6 613.551 604.5544 592.534 572.78276 595.953 621.0356 -1.47% -3.43% -6.64% -2.87% 1.22%
7 708.4074 692.8502 680.9542 655.12055 686.1706 711.6037 -2.20% -3.88% -7.52% -3.14% 0.45%
8 843.9874 819.4873 806.9784 773.18707 814.6107 842.7609 -2.90% -4.39% -8.39% -3.48% -0.15%
9 1053.469 1019.408 1004.554 960.69856 1018.202 1048.568 -3.23% -4.64% -8.81% -3.35% -0.47%
10 1596.445 1535.312 1526.78 1445.5853 1549.311 1579.631 -3.83% -4.36% -9.45% -2.95% -1.05%
Transport
Total 28393.8 27140.48 27289.6 26298.448 27506.57 28532.55 -4.41% -3.89% -7.38% -3.12% 0.49%
1 443.0082 452.0304 439.2547 436.38481 438.3375 491.913 2.04% -0.85% -1.50% -1.05% 11.04%
2 709.2316 713.8357 701.4039 692.96215 699.3802 768.1664 0.65% -1.10% -2.29% -1.39% 8.31%
3 1325.653 1317.568 1305.735 1284.8822 1302.87 1399.613 -0.61% -1.50% -3.08% -1.72% 5.58%
4 1962.046 1924.069 1918.01 1875.6662 1917.481 2020.972 -1.94% -2.24% -4.40% -2.27% 3.00%
5 2580.196 2507.299 2505.911 2440.2388 2512.978 2621.784 -2.83% -2.88% -5.42% -2.61% 1.61%
6 3053.338 2938.616 2942.506 2852.6254 2958.052 3071.988 -3.76% -3.63% -6.57% -3.12% 0.61%
7 3510.436 3353.547 3368.789 3251.2455 3392.501 3508.009 -4.47% -4.04% -7.38% -3.36% -0.07%
8 3924.444 3718.388 3744.986 3597.8811 3778.184 3900.544 -5.25% -4.57% -8.32% -3.73% -0.61%
9 4529.235 4269.588 4307.047 4126.5357 4363.192 4488.047 -5.73% -4.91% -8.89% -3.67% -0.91%




































101495 97956.89 98966.54 96439.491 99506.76 102270.6 -3.49% -2.49% -4.98% -1.96% 0.76%
3139.71 3151.605 3136.819 3125.5879 3133.232 3339.76 0.38% -0.09% -0.45% -0.21% 6.37%
4106.815 4096.514 4093.271 4063.6282 4086.173 4324.744 -0.25% -0.33% -1.05% -0.50% 5.31%
5746.12 5693.302 5703.815 5642.1789 5695.36 5978.639 -0.92% -0.74% -1.81% -0.88% 4.05%
7316.732 7182.8 7217.268 7103.0807 7215.846 7492.776 -1.83% -1.36% -2.92% -1.38% 2.41%
8778.214 8560.944 8615.363 8450.9889 8632.999 8903.281 -2.48% -1.86% -3.73% -1.65% 1.42%
10832.71 10491.88 10571.35 10335.92 10611.92 10907.97 -3.15% -2.41% -4.59% -2.04% 0.69%
11456.37 11034.08 11142.15 10855.817 11199.67 11478.73 -3.69% -2.74% -5.24% -2.24% 0.20%
12883.88 12335.15 12479.06 12118.099 12560.13 12857.71 -4.26% -3.14% -5.94% -2.51% -0.20%
15836.88 15106.84 15300.52 14828.87 15446.41 15769.5 -4.61% -3.39% -6.36% -2.47% -0.43%
21397.52 20303.78 20706.92 19915.321 20925.02 21217.48 -5.11% -3.23% -6.93% -2.21% -0.84%
44037.81 42297.92 42722.11 41455.42 43006.72 44234.9 -3.95% -2.99% -5.86% -2.34% 0.45%
995.5311 1004.38 992.8662 988.80765 991.5695 1066.51 0.89% -0.27% -0.68% -0.40% 7.13%
1332.957 1334.593 1325.867 1314.9611 1323.254 1411.351 0.12% -0.53% -1.35% -0.73% 5.88%
1897.859 1884.671 1879.249 1856.3366 1876.104 1981.757 -0.69% -0.98% -2.19% -1.15% 4.42%
2775.946 2725.101 2730.47 2682.5992 2729.873 2846.28 -1.83% -1.64% -3.36% -1.66% 2.53%
3298.826 3215.258 3226.219 3157.7333 3233.575 3346.505 -2.53% -2.20% -4.28% -1.98% 1.45%
4017.885 3885.505 3905.169 3808.7493 3921.807 4043.409 -3.29% -2.81% -5.21% -2.39% 0.64%
4992.84 4796.45 4836.3 4699.8493 4863.749 4997.108 -3.93% -3.14% -5.87% -2.59% 0.09%
5889.648 5620.222 5680.322 5500.7084 5720.724 5869.226 -4.57% -3.55% -6.60% -2.87% -0.35%
6544.73 6221.079 6293.94 6081.2286 6359.855 6506.038 -4.95% -3.83% -7.08% -2.82% -0.59%
12291.59 11610.66 11851.71 11364.447 11986.21 12166.71 -5.54% -3.58% -7.54% -2.48% -1.02%
44426.54 42597.58 43319.85 42237.322 43545.28 44815.28 -4.12% -2.49% -4.93% -1.98% 0.88%
1854.84 1847.96 1852.022 1845.3241 1849.882 1973.084 -0.37% -0.15% -0.51% -0.27% 6.37%
2146.719 2125.216 2138.331 2122.693 2134.586 2260.478 -1.00% -0.39% -1.12% -0.57% 5.30%
2788.435 2741.857 2766.168 2735.9946 2762.029 2900.743 -1.67% -0.80% -1.88% -0.95% 4.03%
3238.779 3155.177 3192.641 3141.6732 3192.006 3315.645 -2.58% -1.42% -3.00% -1.44% 2.37%
3795.015 3672.457 3721.889 3650.2172 3729.58 3847.461 -3.23% -1.93% -3.82% -1.72% 1.38%
4842.311 4653.52 4721.939 4615.8466 4740.225 4873.673 -3.90% -2.49% -4.68% -2.11% 0.65%
5093.97 4867.653 4950.215 4821.8257 4976.01 5101.176 -4.44% -2.82% -5.34% -2.32% 0.14%
5467.446 5193.18 5291.158 5136.6997 5325.853 5453.229 -5.02% -3.22% -6.05% -2.59% -0.26%
6657.749 6300.706 6426.96 6227.1227 6488.782 6625.72 -5.36% -3.47% -6.47% -2.54% -0.48%
8541.276 8039.858 8258.525 7939.9251 8346.324 8464.073 -5.87% -3.31% -7.04% -2.28% -0.90%
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Appendix 6d - Model results for a tripling of current production taxes






Q P index 1
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C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum
-0.15065 0.336736 0.3489804 0.830358 1.147305
0.818523 0.854507 0.8144999 0.805027 0.884914 -9.96% -6.00% -10.41% -11.45% -2.66%
0.821837 0.953428 0.8469781 0.927995 0.88084 -17.82% -4.66% -15.30% -7.20% -11.92%
0.99394 0.99394 0.9939397 0.99394 0.99394 -0.61% -0.61% -0.61% -0.61% -0.61%
887728.7 900060 883885.24 907885.7 928724 -3.69% -2.36% -4.11% -1.51% 0.75%
0.954734 1.046666 0.9524408 0.966725 0.985176 -4.53% 4.67% -4.76% -3.33% -1.48%
1.01983 1.111262 1.0176513 1.030978 1.048608 -3.02% 5.67% -3.23% -1.96% -0.28%
1.11058 1.125589 1.107158 1.112593 1.114322 -0.51% 0.83% -0.82% -0.33% -0.18%
267153.4 279048.4 262973.87 280918.3 297686.4 -8.87% -4.81% -10.30% -4.18% 1.54%
104994.2 104994.2 104994.18 104994.2 104994.2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
96265.67 96701.99 96601.772 102657.8 106728 -7.82% -7.40% -7.49% -1.69% 2.20%
128677.5 128677.5 128677.48 128677.5 128677.5 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07%
143305.5 143305.5 143305.54 143305.5 143305.5 -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
271585.7 286141.9 271272.6 272079.3 300065.4 -2.27% 2.97% -2.38% -2.09% 7.98%
253483.3 268039.6 253170.28 253977 281963.1 -2.42% 3.18% -2.55% -2.23% 8.54%
297335 298484.4 295880.44 310021.7 310021.7 -4.23% -3.86% -4.70% -0.15% -0.15%
0.950257 1.017745 0.9481652 0.972833 0.975332 -4.97% 1.77% -5.18% -2.72% -2.47%
0.970583 1.057095 0.9689565 0.965848 0.996661 -2.94% 5.71% -3.10% -3.42% -0.33%
0.931059 0.991008 0.9287865 0.968275 0.955818 -6.89% -0.90% -7.12% -3.17% -4.42%
0.979936 1.071281 0.9781261 0.978126 1.007692 -2.01% 7.13% -2.19% -2.19% 0.77%
0.856798 1.006256 0.8518331 0.923312 0.913914 -14.32% 0.63% -14.82% -7.67% -8.61%
0.942663 1.050675 0.9391345 0.977197 0.982148 -5.73% 5.07% -6.09% -2.28% -1.79%
1.201062 1.320241 1.1984153 1.205289 1.237834 20.11% 32.02% 19.84% 20.53% 23.78%
0.931415 1.069585 0.9277005 0.954026 0.978209 -6.86% 6.96% -7.23% -4.60% -2.18%
0.975708 1.052709 0.9741958 0.973254 0.999057 -2.43% 5.27% -2.58% -2.67% -0.09%
0.92341 1.098119 0.919899 0.921336 0.977454 -7.66% 9.81% -8.01% -7.87% -2.25%
0.875903 1.017436 0.8714593 0.929638 0.928994 -12.41% 1.74% -12.85% -7.04% -7.10%
0.970158 1.051758 0.9686047 0.966182 0.994791 -2.98% 5.18% -3.14% -3.38% -0.52%
0.930167 1.017485 0.9274523 0.959642 0.962769 -6.98% 1.75% -7.25% -4.04% -3.72%
0.95253 1.029753 0.9504457 0.966141 0.979469 -4.75% 2.98% -4.96% -3.39% -2.05%
0.962916 1.053805 0.9611504 0.959829 0.990638 -3.71% 5.38% -3.88% -4.02% -0.94%
0.976257 1.041265 0.9748214 0.978341 0.996587 -2.37% 4.13% -2.52% -2.17% -0.34%
0.965323 1.057716 0.9635151 0.962442 0.993455 -3.47% 5.77% -3.65% -3.76% -0.65%
0.980837 1.032988 0.9796741 0.982678 0.997246 -1.92% 3.30% -2.03% -1.73% -0.28%
C taxes P Labour Corporation Income Lump-sum
8372.316 7832.432 7450.0278 7868.509 8392.191 4.15% -2.57% -7.32% -2.12% 4.40%
9477.407 9600.697 9087.3113 9664.354 10174.03 -5.35% -4.12% -9.25% -3.48% 1.61%
74080.23 74770.69 74147.328 76485.33 78269.77 -4.27% -3.38% -4.19% -1.17% 1.14%
3796.211 3824.082 3824.8648 3823.838 3822.27 -0.85% -0.13% -0.11% -0.13% -0.17%
11857.28 11857.28 11857.284 11857.28 11857.28 0.38% 0.38% 0.38% 0.38% 0.38%
10783.03 11050.51 11058.019 11048.16 11033.11 -2.75% -0.34% -0.27% -0.36% -0.50%
21500.85 21991.33 22005.104 21987.03 21959.44 -2.73% -0.51% -0.45% -0.53% -0.66%
6511.228 6891.339 6902.0163 6888.012 6866.625 -6.73% -1.28% -1.13% -1.33% -1.64%
51711.67 53946.22 51594.713 54188.67 56922.56 -8.13% -4.16% -8.34% -3.73% 1.12%
78157.95 78571.74 78042.48 78633.69 79179.36 -1.08% -0.56% -1.23% -0.48% 0.21%
36599.66 38070.03 36532.83 38242.34 39941.27 -7.07% -3.33% -7.24% -2.90% 1.42%
44674.48 45167.15 44537.064 45241.82 45892.07 -2.21% -1.13% -2.51% -0.97% 0.46%
99061.19 99520.97 99225.991 102655.4 105047.1 -4.53% -4.08% -4.37% -1.06% 1.24%
168750.9 170757.9 168030.54 171134.9 173664.4 -2.55% -1.39% -2.97% -1.17% 0.29%
48103.35 48157.71 48115.166 48541.45 48833.82 -1.18% -1.07% -1.16% -0.28% 0.32%
45022.23 46344.19 44199.766 46644.2 48790.04 -7.01% -4.28% -8.71% -3.66% 0.77%
117114.1 120591 116201.56 121855.4 126881.9 -6.47% -3.69% -7.19% -2.68% 1.34%




































































































HP -Consumption price index
1 1.160835 1.162016 1.166999 1.162473 1.163986 1.164229 0.10% 0.53% 0.14% 0.27% 0.29%
2 1.158564 1.160656 1.16488 1.1603609 1.161872 1.162115 0.18% 0.55% 0.16% - 0.29% 0.31%
3 1.148448 1.152343 1.154899 1.1504187 1.151916 1.152157 0.34% 0.56% 0.17% 0.30% 0.32%
4 1.143039 1.145273 1.150122 1.1425299 1.145067 1.145475 0.20% 0.62% -0.04% 0.18% 0.21%
5 1.138112 1.139243 1.145631 1.1359833 1.139207 1.139725 0.10% 0.66% -0.19% 0.10% 0.14%
6 1.125859 1.125058 1.133747 1.1211882 1.125383 1.126058 -0.07% 0.70% -0.41% -0.04% 0.02%
7 1.117076 1.111727 1.125808 1.1077746 1.113793 1.114762 -0.48% 0.78% -0.83% -0.29% -0.21%
8 1.107481 1.098421 1.116874 1.0943219 1.101844 1.103055 -0.82% 0.85% -1.19% -0.51% -0.40%
9 1.10145 1.090456 1.111178 1.0862373 1.094553 1.095892 -1.00% 0.88% -1.38% -0.63% -0.50%
10 1.083802 1.064186 1.095127 1.059768 1.07154 1.073438 -1.81% 1.04% -2.22% -1.13% -0.96%
HNI ■• Household net income
1 12646.23 12514.01 12605.37 12529.043 12587.41 14309.32 -1.05% -0.32% -0.93% -0.47% 13.15%
2 15980.43 15587.04 15858.13 15631.192 15810.37 17735.84 -2.46% -0.77% -2.19% -1.06% 10.98%
3 21397.41 20534.31 21072.07 20597.53 21005.71 23195.65 -4.03% -1.52% -3.74% -1.83% 8.40%
4 26924.95 25282.59 26194.05 25341.723 26178.42 28296.03 -6.10% -2.71% -5.88% -2.77% 5.09%
5 33964.3 31395.9 32717.42 31441.912 32847.26 35022.53 -7.56% -3.67% -7.43% -3.29% 3.12%
6 41983.06 38194.6 39989.22 38207.124 40315.07 42692.84 -9.02% -4.75% -8.99% -3.97% 1.69%
7 49606.75 44638.55 46895.74 44638.538 47517.84 50014.68 -10.02% -5.46% -10.02% -4.21% 0.82%
8 59022.54 52493.42 55297.84 52471.178 56327.5 59128.6 -11.06% -6.31% -11.10% -4.57% 0.18%
9 71663.95 63290.15 66773.66 63255.646 68549.89 71550.79 -11.68% -6.82% -11.73% -4.35% -0.16%
10 121536.8 107322.1 113193.9 107376.04 117743.3 121113.4 -11.70% -6.86% -11.65% -3.12% -0.35%
Food
Total 61166.66 56583.26 58817.81 56466.302 59060.26 61794.15 -7.49% -3.84% -7.68% -3.44% 1.03%
1 2747.536 2721.265 2728.371 2711.0884 2722.565 3014.544 -0.96% -0.70% -1.33% -0.91% 9.72%
2 3364.242 3292.795 3328.496 3286.0163 3317.345 3630.553 -2.12% -1.06% -2.33% -1.39% 7.92%
3 4288.012 4143.469 4216.759 4136.7822 4202.389 4537.541 -3.37% -1.66% -3.53% -2.00% 5.82%
4 4251.976 4033.781 4144.182 4035.7105 4135.512 4374.622 -5.13% -2.54% -5.09% -2.74% 2.88%
5 5704.18 5348.536 5519.948 5339.6679 5523.544 5794.187 -6.23% -3.23% -6.39% -3.17% 1.58%
6 6566.139 6080.243 6304.356 6064.6221 6321.799 6596.551 -7.40% -3.99% -7.64% -3.72% 0.46%
7 7078.485 6488.849 6765.442 6470.9137 6794.672 7057.19 -8.33% -4.42% -8.58% -4.01% -0.30%
8 7731.061 7012.267 7348.585 6990.6538 7391.764 7661.458 -9.30% -4.95% -9.58% -4.39% -0.90%
9 8597.003 7752.095 8147.595 7730.753 8229.039 8490.667 -9.83% -5.23% -10.08% -4.28% -1.24%
10 10838.03 9709.961 10314.08 9700.0937 10421.63 10636.83 -10.41% -4.83% -10.50% -3.84% -1.86%
Ale
Total 6075.122 6406.332 5866.448 5484.044 5902.525 6426.207 5.45% -3.43% -9.73% -2.84% 5.78%
1 456.222 516.4757 458.858 454.73794 457.4726 528.8358 13.21% 0.58% -0.33% 0.27% 15.92%
2 525.5059 587.1559 526.3602 516.61023 523.7946 597.4987 11.73% 0.16% -1.69% -0.33% 13.70%
3 528.3979 585.056 525.9851 510.69668 523.2255 589.0125 10.72% -0.46% -3.35% -0.98% 11.47%
4 573.0704 620.0788 563.0363 538.44679 561.0524 616.9548 8.20% -1.75% -6.04% -2.10% 7.66%
5 614.985 655.6556 597.8213 565.3516 598.477 648.7184 6.61% -2.79% -8.07% -2.68% 5.49%
6 593.1431 623.6335 569.4944 531.70157 572.2895 617.1279 5.14% -3.99% -10.36% -3.52% 4.04%
7 637.3985 658.7416 606.9094 560.21337 611.6369 654.8489 3.35% -4.78% -12.11% -4.04% 2.74%
8 644.8803 655.8822 607.8085 553.84875 614.4763 656.8972 1.71% -5.75% -14.12% -4.71% 1.86%
9 670.1504 676.0271 627.5404 566.38798 639.8434 680.1558 0.88% -6.36% -15.48% -4.52% 1.49%
10 831.3683 827.6253 782.6343 686.04906 800.2565 836.1572 -0.45% -5.86% -17.48% -3.74% 0.58%
Fuel
Total 1269.67 1112.494 1239.71 1243.2839 1238.597 1231.439 -12.38% -2.36% -2.08% -2.45% -3.01%
1 46.08012 39.65925 44.67507 44.687782 44.67967 44.03724 -13.93% -3.05% -3.02% -3.04% -4.43%
2 54.40968 46.64398 52.85285 52.950679 52.88009 51.69605 -14.27% -2.86% -2.68% -2.81% -4.99%
3 75.11979 64.89894 72.99729 73.127362 73.02425 71.98901 -13.61% -2.83% -2.65% -2.79% -4.17%
4 101.3089 88.2475 98.1784 98.031799 98.17124 98.07671 -12.89% -3.09% -3.23% -3.10% -3.19%
5 127.7964 111.4867 123.7311 123.35569 123.7363 123.876 -12.76% -3.18% -3.47% -3.18% -3.07%
6 141.779 123.8426 137.6689 137.46414 137.6696 137.4288 -12.65% -2.90% -3.04% -2.90% -3.07%
7 155.4252 135.9071 151.0018 150.71891 151.001 150.7595 -12.56% -2.85% -3.03% -2.85% -3.00%
8 160.3144 140.7497 156.7061 157.03433 156.6148 155.7911 -12.20% -2.25% -2.05% -2.31% -2.82%
9 174.4281 153.8716 171.5214 172.57537 171.1954 169.8806 -11.79% -1.67% -1.06% -1.85% -2.61%
10 233.0081 207.1872 230.3776 233.33784 229.6246 227.9042 -11.08% -1.13% 0.14% -1.45% -2.19%
Clothing
Total 6400.713 5860.903 5984.192 5470.8067 6047.849 6557.529 -8.43% -6.51% -14.53% -5.51% 2.45%
1 131.4908 138.8177 131.9374 130.12935 131.3289 163.2825 5.57% 0.34% -1.04% -0.12% 24.18%
2 213.7063 220.9216 212.6517 207.23949 211.2254 252.7463 3.38% -0.49% -3.03% -1.16% 18.27%
3 304.2415 306.6461 299.1201 287.88076 297.0874 345.9882 0.79% -1.68% -5.38% -2.35% 13.72%
4 387.6505 377.4192 374.3384 353.90496 372.6852 419.5611 -2.64% -3.43% -8.71% -3.86% 8.23%
5 547.7642 522.8094 522.1074 489.04702 522.7768 574.2591 -4.56% -4.68% -10.72% -4.56% 4.84%
6 613.551 569.0405 575.138 531.77739 578.3533 630.0787 -7.25% -6.26% -13.33% -5.74% 2.69%
7 708.4074 644.8624 658.2862 601.91958 664.0075 716.4224 -8.97% -7.08% -15.03% -6.27% 1.13%
8 843.9874 754.2287 776.3781 702.99131 785.4624 843.3334 -10.64% -8.01% -16.71% -6.93% -0.08%
9 1053.469 933.1587 964.0206 868.98371 983.1476 1045.835 -11.42% -8.49% -17.51% -6.68% -0.72%
10 1596.445 1392.999 1470.214 1296.9332 1501.775 1566.022 -12.74% -7.91% -18.76% -5.93% -1.91%
Transport
Total 28393.8 25046.65 26365.75 24221.982 26626.65 28745.77 -11.79% -7.14% -14.69% -6.22% 1.24%
1 443.0082 452.6831 435.8233 429.55552 433.7138 544.6793 2.18% -1.62% -3.04% -2.10% 22.95%
2 709.2316 705.0087 694.4689 675.95476 689.5892 831.8779 -0.60% -2.08% -4.69% -2.77% 17.29%
3 1325.653 1284.166 1288.498 1242.5139 1280.184 1479.856 -3.13% -2.80% -6.27% -3.43% 11.63%
4 1962.046 1842.44 1880.528 1787.1833 1872.984 2086.353 -6.10% -4.15% -8.91% -4.54% 6.34%
5 2580.196 2370.211 2443.016 2298.5413 2445.939 2670.309 -8.14% -5.32% -10.92% -5.20% 3.49%
6 3053.338 2738.836 2849.015 2651.977 2863.6 3097.803 -10.30% -6.69% -13.14% -6.21% 1.46%
7 3510.436 3092.426 3249.922 2993.7251 3275.875 3513.23 -11.91% -7.42% -14.72% -6.68% 0.08%
8 3924.444 3386.967 3594.66 3275.5973 3634.086 3884.918 -13.70% -8.40% -16.53% -7.40% -1.01%
9 4529.235 3859.248 4120.913 3730.4833 4199.39 4456.377 -14.79% -9.02% -17.64% -7.28% -1.61%
10 6356.214 5314.664 5808.902 5136.4506 5931.292 6180.364 -16.39% -8.61% -19.19% -6.69% -2.77%
Other
Total 101495 92521.51 96859.17 91311.005 97508.63 103228.9 -8.84% -4.57% -10.03% -3.93% 1.71%
1 3139.71 3146.506 3134.905 3110.2465 3126.616 3550.159 0.22% -0.15% -0.94% - -0.42% 13.07%
2 4106.815 4057.421 4082.446 4017.0118 4065.242 4555.682 -1.20% -0.59% -2.19% -1.01% 10.93%
3 5746.12 5586.479 5668.735 5531.8225 5644.065 6227.325 -2.78% -1.35% -3.73% -1.78% 8.37%
4 7316.732 6954.173 7134.193 6880.1922 7113.765 7685.266 -4.96% -2.49% -5.97% -2.77% 5.04%
5 8778.214 8208.607 8478.935 8113.4707 8486.281 9045.166 -6.49% -3.41% -7.57% -3.33% 3.04%
6 10832.71 9957.579 10351.88 9829.237 10390.27 11001.44 -8.08% -4.44% -9.26% -4.08% 1.56%
7 11456.37 10386.51 10879.06 10246.349 10942.58 11519.01 -9.34% -5.04% -10.56% -4.48% 0.55%
8 12883.88 11508.44 12139.78 11344.745 12237.01 12850.81 -10.68% -5.78% -11.95% -5.02% -0.26%
9 15836.88 14017.31 14850.21 13813.211 15056.2 15725.49 -11.49% -6.23% -12.78% -4.93% -0.70%
10 21397.52 18698.49 20139.04 18424.719 20446.59 21068.57 -12.61% -5.88% -13.89% -4.44% -1.54%
Sevices
Total 44037.81 39592.26 41623.73 38860.659 41975.8 44518.33 -10.09% -5.48% -11.76% -4.68% 1.09%
1 995.5311 1004.382 990.5929 981.6989 987.6021 1141.652 0.89% -0.50% -1.39% -0.80% 14.68%
2 1332.957 1322.3 1319.838 1295.8209 1313.519 1494.898 -0.80% -0.98% -2.79% -1.46% 12.15%
3 1897.859 1847.277 1863.441 1812.6931 1854.286 2071.936 -2.67% -1.81% -4.49% -2.30% 9.17%
4 2775.946 2630.751 2692.096 2585.9753 2683.547 2923.62 -5.23% -3.02% -6.84% -3.33% 5.32%
5 3298.826 3070.545 3165.011 3013.3871 3168.065 3401.267 -6.92% -4.06% -8.65% -3.96% 3.11%
6 4017.885 3668.828 3810.225 3597.2115 3825.915 4076.482 -8.69% -5.17% -10.47% -4.78% 1.46%
7 4992.84 4488.87 4704.961 4404.9361 4735.174 5010.062 -10.09% -5.77% -11.77% -5.16% 0.34%
8 5889.648 5209.453 5504.733 5111.2122 5553.021 5858.611 -11.55% -6.54% -13.22% -5.72% -0.53%
9 6544.73 5731.357 6083.367 5618.3632 6176.099 6478.176 -12.43% -7.05% -14.15% -5.63% -1.02%
10 12291.59 10618.49 11489.47 10439.361 11678.57 12061.63 -13.61% -6.53% -15.07% -4.99% -1.87%
Durables
Total 44426.54 40122.88 42395.11 40019.598 42661.4 45286.84 -9.69% -4.57% -9.92% -3.97% 1.94%
1 1854.84 1837.237 1849.813 1835.1169 1844.872 2097.461 -0.95% -0.27% -1.06% -0.54% 13.08%
2 2146.719 2095.963 2131.412 2096.9152 2122.341 2381.058 -2.36% -0.71% -2.32% -1.14% 10.92%
3 2788.435 2678.752 2747.495 2680.516 2735.425 3020.919 -3.93% -1.47% -3.87% -1.90% 8.34%
4 3238.779 3041.213 3153.905 3040.6132 3144.792 3399.825 -6.10% -2.62% -6.12% -2.90% 4.97%
5 3795.015 3505.289 3660.414 3501.1911 3663.615 3907.234 -7.63% -3.55% -7.74% -3.46% 2.96%
6 4842.311 4396.208 4620.642 4385.3192 4637.932 4913.262 -9.21% -4.58% -9.44% -4.22% 1.47%
7 5093.97 4560.333 4829.628 4546.1887 4858.093 5116.47 -10.48% -5.19% -10.75% -4.63% 0.44%
8 5467.446 4821.858 5143.201 4803.3359 5184.782 5447.332 -11.81% -5.93% -12.15% -5.17% -0.37%
9 6657.749 5818.298 6232.983 5794.0341 6320.213 6603.696 -12.61% -6.38% -12.97% -5.07% -0.81%
10 8541.276 7367.723 8025.622 7336.3676 8149.336 8399.582 -13.74% -6.04% -14.11% -4.59% -1.66%
Chapter 7 - Conclusions
The crux of the double dividend hypothesis is that imposing a tax on an
environmental bad and using the revenue gained to reduce other forms of
taxation has two beneficial aspects. Firstly the environmental tax means that
environmental quality is improved and secondly, the reduction in
distortionary taxation increases the efficiency of the economy as a whole.
Although the concept can be traced back to Sandmo (1973), the 1990's saw a
large body of literature emerge. To a large extent this literature was
spawned by the assertion made in Pearce (1991) that the question of the
existence of a double dividend was of crucial importance in addressing the
issue of carbon taxation in the context of global warming. However,
virtually all of this subsequent work ignores distributional issues. It is the
contention here that distributional issues are of vital importance in a social
and political context when considering tax reform in reality and it is this
matter that this thesis attempts to address.
To recap, Chapter 1 presented an in-depth literature review of the existing
double dividend literature. The 'double dividend' was defined, formally, in
section 1.2.1 with particular reference to the strong and weak forms as
defined by Goulder (1995b). The strong form of the double-dividend
hypothesis refers to the effect of revenue-neutral tax reform being such that
the tax-reform process in itself is desirable1 - the economy is 'better off' even
if the, presumably beneficial, environmental effects are ignored. The
existence of the strong form of the double dividend, the idea that revenue-
neutral environmental taxes are desirable in themselves, is the 'holy-grail' of
environmental tax reform as it means that the magnitude of environmental
effects need not be considered as the tax switch, from economic 'goods' to
economic 'bads' is in itself desirable. This is the view taken by the
proponents of ecological tax reform, for example von Weizsaker (1991).
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The weak form of the double dividend is simply that the tax shift causes the
efficiency of the rest of the tax system to be improved. The tax shift in itself
is undesirable but revenue-neutrality is found to be preferable to revenue
retention or returning revenue through lump-sum transfers. An important
point is that lump-sum transfers are considered non-distortionary by
classical theory and the argument in favour of the weak form of the double
dividend is that although such revenue neutral tax reform may lead to an
efficiency loss, there is a gain from the reduction of distortionary taxation
that would not exist were the revenue retained or redistributed in a lump¬
sum fashion. The question of the distortionary properties of lump-sum
transfers is one which is returned to below.
A key point in this section, made by Schob (1995), is that the redistribution of
revenue through the lowering on non-environmental taxes will in itself have
an environmental effect. This effect may either reinforce or diminish the
effect of the environmental tax and will depend on the nature of the
complementarity and substitutability relationships between goods. This is
an issue that is kept to the forefront throughout the reminder of this work.
Section 1.3 looks at the academic issues present in the existing literature,
primarily the distinction between theoretical and empirical analysis. The
issue is that the theoretical literature tends to deal with an arbitrary
unspecified pollutant whilst the empirical literature, almost in its entirety,
deals with carbon taxation. Indeed this distinction is carried forward in this
work. It is interesting to note that the bulk of the theoretical literature finds
that the double dividend hypothesis does not exist in it's strong form and
may not exist in its weak form. The results from the empirical literature are
more mixed and a majority finds that the weak form of the second dividend
holds. This section also briefly outlines the paper, Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994b) that becomes the basis for Chapter 2.
The bulk of the first chapter is taken up by section 1.4 which produces a
framework for categorising the double dividend literature in a policy
context. This is done for reasons of expositional clarity and goes some way
to allowing differences in the literature to be contextualised. Once this policy
framework is in place the section examines the available literature in each of
the policy categories.
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Section 1.5 examines the choice of revenue recycling instrument. The most
common in the literature is income or labour taxes but close inspection
suggests that other taxes may also be appropriate. It is difficult or
impossible to analyse non-income taxes as a revenue recycling instrument in
a theoretical or partial equilibrium framework so the use of these alternative
instruments is held over to the empirical general equilibrium model that
forms chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Finally in this first chapter, the measurement of desirability used to analyse
the double dividend is considered in section 1.6. The use of differing
measurements of desirability, primarily employment and welfare, by
different authors is judged to complicate the digestion of the existing
literature and must be kept in mind, where possible.
This first chapter serves to clarify the methodological approaches that are
used in the remainder of the thesis. It is obvious, from an examination of
Chapter 1, that both a theoretical and an empirical approach must be
undertaken to place the thesis firmly in the context of the existing literature.
It is this move from (relatively) simplistic theoretical models to complex
empirical analysis that forms the methodological arc of this work.
Chapter 2 extends the theoretical model of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b)
to encompass differentiated households. This extended model is able to
reproduce their results but allows an initial exploration of the distributional
issues arising from the double dividend hypothesis.
The basic Bovenberg and de Mooij critique of the double dividend
hypothesis is that a revenue neutral change in an environmental tax will
cause a fall in employment in the presence of distortionary labour market
taxation. The reasoning is as follows: the rise in the environmental tax causes
an erosion of the environmental tax base which means that the reduced rate
of labour taxation is unable to fully compensate for the adverse effects of the
increased environmental tax. This causes a fall in the real (after tax) wage
which in turn causes a fall in employment. However, the situation, using
such a distortionary tax as a revenue recycling instrument, will be preferable
to lump-sum transfers - the weak form of the double dividend holds.
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When households are differentiated by income, then sensible assumptions
about the differences in wage elasticity of supply between households
coupled with similar assumptions about the substitutability of dirty and
clean goods mean that lower income households face a smaller relative
change in employment. The employment effect is progressive as lower
income households lose proportionately less.
Turning to welfare, the situation is unclear as relative changes in welfare
depend on the households environmental valuation. It is not clear that how
the environmental valuation of households changes as one moves up
through the income distribution. It may be surmised that higher income
households are likely to value the environment more , but this ignores any
local or geographically based pollution effects. It is clear that environmental
valuation and hence relative welfare changes will depend on the nature of
the pollutant concerned.
The next stage is to examine a relatively simplistic empirical model that
allows the need for environmental valuation measures to be avoided. This
forms the reasoning behind chapter 3. The model used in this chapter is a
simple partial equilibrium model, dealing with only the consumption sector
of the economy. This model, which is an extension of Schob (1995), to (again)
allow for differentiated households, uses the Almost Ideal Demand (AID)
system of Pashardes (1993). The AID system is calibrated to reflect the
budget shares of 7 consumption goods for 10 households each representing
a decile of the income distribution. One of the seven goods, Fuel, is deemed
as the pollutant or 'dirty' good and the tax rate upon it is increased. A
revenue neutral change is achieved by reducing the tax rate on each of the
other goods, or tax rates overall in terms of VAT.
A measure, the marginal social cost of public funds, is defined that allows
the double dividend issue to be analysed in terms of the direct impact, the
environmental impact and the distributional impact. The initial theoretical
section shows that the environmental dividend may not necessarily be
positive. This would be due to the complementarity and substitutability
relationships between goods, causing a rise in consumption of the 'dirty'
good when the price of clean goods falls (due to the tax rate fall).
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The empirical section shows that the environmental dividend is always
positive, but, in line with the theory, shows that the size of this
environmental improvement is very strongly dependant on the revenue
recycling instrument chosen. The strong form of the second dividend exists
only when the externality tax revenue is used to reduce the tax rate on
Alcohol and Tobacco. However, the weak form of the second dividend
holds in all cases.
Turning to distributional issues, lower income households face a direct
welfare loss under all alternate tax shift options and thus require a positive
environmental valuation in order to be better off. By calculating critical
levels of marginal environmental valuation for all households such that they
gain, in terms of welfare, when the tax shifts are imposed, the final section of
the chapter posits the tentative result that, if environmental valuation,
generally, is high, equity may be improved. In other words, if there is a
strong environmental valuation in the economy, the revenue-neutral tax
change may be progressive in that lower income households gain
proportionately more.
As detailed above, the model in this chapter, is a partial equilibrium one and
does not take into account employment effects. The next stage in the
methodology is the construction of an Applied or Computable General
Equilibrium Model2, that encompasses the entire economy. This model is
highly complex in nature and its exposition and results form the remainder
of this work.
Chapter 4 details the theoretical background to the CGE model. The focus of
the model is, in line with the existing empirical literature, on energy
taxation. The model draws heavily from Ballard et.al. (1985) but contains
features designed to focus on issues specific to the distributional
implications of the double dividend with regard to energy taxation.
The household sector is modelled as 10 separate households each
maximising a 3 stage constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In
the first stage - a leisure-work trade off - households determine their labour
supply. In addition to labour income they receive payment as the owners of
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the capital in the economy and benefit from transfer payments from
government. Once a household's effort is determined, a second stage of the
utility function distributes the return from this effort between consumption
and saving. The level of saving determines the level of investment in the
model. Finally, consumption expenditure is divided, in fixed proportions,
between durables and non-durables and non-durable demand is determined
by an AID system.
The production side of the model uses an intermediate demand matrix to
determine intermediate inputs but it's novel feature is the direct inclusion of
energy, along with labour and capital, as a factor of production. Constant-
elasticity production functions for each of the 18 production sectors allow
energy to be substituted for labour and capital when energy prices change.
Each of the 18 sectors is represented by a single competitive firm operating
under constant returns to scale and making zero profits.
The government sector is modelled as having fixed expenditure in terms of
quantity (but not price), as collecting taxes on income, consumption,
produced goods and from producers on labour employed and paying
transfer payments to households. The inclusion of transfer payments allows
lump-sum redistribution of energy tax revenue to be examined.
The data and calibration procedures used for the model are detailed in
Chapter 6. Input-Output tables (1990) for the UK economy are used to
calibrate the non-household sectors. Data from Economic Trends is used for
the household sector and is matched to the Input-Output data.
The two trade elasticities (export and import) and the uncompensated wage
elasticity of labour supply and the savings elasticity are not determined by
the calibration process and are determined from external empirical
estimates. Sensitivity analysis is performed to determine the effect of
changes in these parameters on the model results. The model is not
sensitive to the trade elasticities and whilst there is more sensitivity to the
two household elasticities, the central cases chosen, of each, give sensible
results.
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The results of the model are explained in Chapter 7. Energy taxes on
consumption and production are examined separately and in each case there
are 5 possible revenue returning instruments - Consumption taxes
(excluding the energy consumption good - Fuel), taxes on producer labour
demand (equivalent to employer's National Insurance contributions),
corporation tax (levied on profits i.e. the return to capital), household
income taxation and, lastly, an increase in transfer payments (equivalent to a
lump-sum transfer).
The results for the energy consumption tax are in line with those of the
literature. The weak form of the double dividend hypothesis is found to
hold in that all the tax- based revenue recycling instruments were preferable
to lump-sum transfers in terms of the effect on output.
With an energy tax on producer prices the results were in conflict with the
literature. It was found that the double dividend did not exist in any form
and that lump-sum transfer was preferable as the revenue recycling
instrument. The reason for this is that the significant revenue raised from the
energy tax, when redistributed to households in a lump-sum fashion causes
a substantial increase in consumption and thus output. This result is driven
by the inclusion of transfer payments as a form of household income.
This result may be somewhat mitigated by the lack of involuntary
unemployment in the model. As detailed in section 4.9.3, the existing
theoretical papers that include involuntary unemployment tend to be more
favourable to the existence of a double dividend. Involuntary
unemployment was not included due to the complexity of such a model in a
general equilibrium framework. It would be interesting to see if these
theoretical results were backed up in an empirical context but this is beyond
the scope here.
The key focus here has been distributional issues, and the household results
of the model suggest that fears that revenue-neutral environmental tax
reform will have a regressive effect are unfounded. All changes to the
income distribution in the model's results are progressive in nature,
regardless of the revenue-recycling instrument used. The fact that the
income of lower income households is comprised of a larger relative share of
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transfer payments compared with higher income households, means that
lower income households are less exposed to changes in wages and the
interest rate.
The three models that form this thesis raise an interesting methodological
dilemma. It is clear that the more complicated and the more empirical the
model, the more it can capture of reality but the less it's results can be
understood intuitively (and the harder it is to work with). In addition the
more complicated the model the greater the sensitivity of its results to the
assumptions made.
As an example, consider the DICE model of Nordhaus (1993) that specifies
the link between emissions and climate, and then, climate and the economy.
Environmental scientists cannot specify these relationships well in the short
term. Indeed weather forecasters fail to accurately predict the situation a
week ahead, so how can one expect to model not just climate but the effect of
emissions and concentrations of pollutants over a period of decades.
In the context of this work, a potential weakness of the general equilibrium
model presented may be the specification of energy as a direct, substitutable
input into production. But this is certainly preferable to the simple
alternative of a fixed intermediate use coefficient. The other alternative of
somehow measuring technical change in production with regard to
incentives offered by a rise in the cost of energy is akin to fortune telling and
no more likely to produce an accurate forecast.
Thus, there is a trade off to be faced between analytical complexity on one
hand and intuition and practicality on the other. It is the contention of the
author that such a balance has been struck in this work.
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Notes:
Section 1.6 deals with the notion of 'desirability' - a complicated issue in itself.
2The two terms appear to be interchangeable.
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